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The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

I

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new Age espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after

Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

STATINTL

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NEW C.I.A. DEPUTY? Maj. Gen. Vernon A. Walters is reportedly being considered for the post of deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

General May Get No. 2 Post in C.I.A.

STATINTL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—President Nixon is reported to be considering the appointment of an Army major general, Vernon A. Walters, to be the next deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

General Walters, who is now defense attaché at the Embassy in Paris, would succeed Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. of the Marine Corps, according to United States and foreign officials here. General Cushman has been named by President Nixon to be next commandant of the Marine Corps and is scheduled to take command Friday.

Spokesmen for the White House, State Department and the C.I.A. declined comment on the report concerning General Walters. Nonetheless, reliable informants said that the general, who has had extensive experience as an interpreter with

both President Eisenhower and with President Nixon, was in line to be second-ranking official at the agency.

President Nixon's reorganization of the United States Government agencies involved in foreign intelligence, announced Nov. 5, provided an "enhanced leadership role" for Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence. At the time, intelligence sources said that Mr. Helms would concentrate evaluating foreign intelligence for the President and on budget and management problems of the intelligence "community" as a whole.

Day-to-Day Control

The Deputy Director, they said, would take over more of the day-to-day operations of the C.I.A., including control of clandestine collection of intelligence through secret agents and such electronic techniques as spy satellites and code-cracking.

Informants here noted that General Walters had served as Mr. Nixon's interpreter during the recent meeting with President Pompidou of France in the Azores. General Walters also served as interpreter for President Nixon early this month during the visit of President Emilio G. Médici of Brazil.

General Walters, whose nickname is Dick, is widely known for his extraordinary linguistic gifts. He is fluent in French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch and Russian. He also speaks some Arabic and Greek. Languages are his hobby.

He was born in New York March 3, 1917, and grew up in Europe, where his father, an

American businessman, lived. He attended French schools, and was graduated from Stonyhurst College in England. He enlisted in the Army on May 2, 1941.

During World War II he was commissioned and assigned as a liaison officer with the Brazilian forces fighting in the United States Fifth Army in Italy under Gen. Mark W. Clark. His language abilities brought him to General Clark's attention and ultimately to the attention of Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Fifth Army chief of staff.

As defense attaché in Paris and previously in Rio de Janeiro, General Walters is a senior officer of the Defense Department's Intelligence Agency in both rank and experience. He also has a 20-year knowledge of North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, which created the C.I.A., the positions of director and deputy director cannot be held simultaneously by military officers on active duty.

Richard Helms, who was named Director of Central Intelligence in 1966, is the first career civilian intelligence officer to have risen to the nation's top intelligence position. The tradition, however, is to name a military deputy when the director is a civilian — and vice versa.

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Calif. Demos Eye Reform

By Harry Johanesen

The California Democratic Party's executive committee convened today at the Airport Hilton to elect a Northern California chairman and adopt new procedures for the selection of state delegates to the Democratic National Convention.

Candidates for the chairmanship are attorney John Merlo of Chico, the party's state treasurer and acting northern chairman, and State Sen. George Zernovich of Fresno. Both are well liked by party leaders and rank and file Democrats.

Merlo has been serving as acting northern chairman since Jack Brooks, San Leandro land developer, resigned last September.

New Procedures

The new delegate selection procedures scheduled for adoption will require Democratic candidates wanting to enter the state's June primary to hold caucuses in each of California's 43 Congressional districts on Feb. 12.

The caucuses will nominate delegates for appointment to the convention delegation and each presidential candidate would be required to select 88 percent of his delegation from the names submitted by the caucuses.

The remaining 12 percent would not be appointed until after the June primary. This would make room for the appointment of key party members who might have been members of a defeated slate or were not selected to run on any candidate's slate.

Reform Commission

The new procedures also include new rules established by the McGovern Commission on Party Reform. These require that candidates must include a "fair repre-

sentation" of working persons, minority group members, diverse age groups including teenagers, and women.

Democratic State Chairman Charles T. Manatt of Los Angeles conceded that the new procedure for selecting convention delegates is a revolutionary one.

Manatt said he was surprised to learn that Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty is lining up delegates by mail for the Democratic delegation he expects to enter in the June primary.

Caucuses

The chairman said Yorty supporters still would be required to hold the district caucuses at which delegates nominees would be chosen at the grass roots.

At a meeting of the party's Commission on Platform and Policy, held late yesterday at the Airport Hilton, the executive committee heard reports on "issues conferences" held in numerous communities.

Ten commission committees submitted national platform recommendations developed at the conferences. The recommendations touched all the bases of domestic and foreign affairs and added some new resolutions for the convention to consider as platform planks, such as:

- "Resolved that the CIA should be involved only in the gathering of intelligence and that all other CIA activities such as those involving subversion and overthrow of governments should be abandoned."

- "Resolved that a Right of Privacy Amendment be added to the Constitution to protect the privacy of individuals."

PHOENIX, ARIZ.

REPUBLIC

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Englishman, after 8½ years in U.S., misses amenities of life

By RICHARD SCOTT
Manchester Guardian Service

(Scott, who has just moved from Washington to Paris, reflects on 8½ years as the Guardian's correspondent in the U.S. capital.)

Looking back over the past 8½ years in which I have lived in the United States, I find that my strongest impressions are largely critical. This is perhaps somewhat surprising since I leave the country with a good deal of affection and admiration for its people. They are certainly very different from ourselves. More different than one assumes on arrival. The fact that we have a roughly common language and have been taught to regard each other as cousins induces false assumptions of similarities.

After a few years' residence in the United States, one realizes, if one had not done so before, that there is — for want of a better phrase — a "European Way of Life," compounded from things both spiritual and material, which is important to one. This is absent in North America, and exists as much in England as in France or in Italy. An Englishman might conceivably be homesick in France, but he could not languish for the same reason as he may in America — for nostalgia for that indefinable quality that is Europe.

The question most frequently put by Europeans to their compatriots living in the United States confirms the real existence of violence in that country. How great, really, is the danger of being beaten up on the street, or of being robbed? The statistics, of

course, show that there is indeed a far higher incidence of crime and violence in the United States than in any European country. But just how much is one conscious of this in one's daily life?

Violence on streets

One can speak only for oneself. A French friend says that he never knew real fear before coming to live in New York, even during the years fighting in the Maquis. That was not my own experience in Washington. Yet Washington is the only city in which I have lived where my own friends and acquaintances were among those who had been beaten, raped, yes, even murdered. It would be wrong, however, to say that I was daily, or more than occasionally, conscious of the need for caution and even more rarely of actual fear.

It was not something that preoccupied one. Subconsciously, no doubt, the anxiety was there. One learned to take precautions — normally of a negative character — almost without realizing it. There were streets, even areas, where one did not loiter after dark; some where one would not dream of passing through on foot — scarcely even in daytime — nor readily in a car at night. So one didn't.

It was only when one was out of the country that one realized in sudden flashes the extent to which one's personal freedom was curtailed by the extent of violence in the United States. I recall walking back to my hotel with a former colleague after the dinner in London this year,

well after midnight. It suddenly came to me that this was something I would never have done in Washington.

Complex government

In the area of politics, perhaps my outstanding impression is of the infinite complexity of the American system. This complexity seems to arise partly from the vast size and variety of the country and its population; partly because of the checks and balances established by the founding fathers in the written constitution, and the paramouncy which these give to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, each within its own sphere.

The federal character of the Constitution, the fairly wide powers remaining to the individual states, the division of government into three equal branches, tends to complicate and to weaken the central administration in Washington. This is particularly so when the President's party does not control Congress, as has been the case since Nixon came to the White House. The American president's need for caution, compromise, and consensus is normally far greater than that of the British prime minister. His potential power is far greater than that of the British prime minister. His potential power is far greater, but his actual power to act assertively often may be less.

Government in the United States is complicated not only because of the complete separation of the executive and the legislative branches with neither responsible to the other, but because of the extraordinarily intricate proce-

dures followed by the latter, and the massive, cumbersome size of the former. Jealousies between the Congress and the White House, exist also between the various government departments. This results in widespread overlapping and duplication of functions.

In the field of intelligence and security, for example, the area of responsibility remains substantially undefined as between the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department, Pentagon, and White House. They each maintain their own sources and lines of communications. The proliferation of civil servants is so great that most of them seem to spend most of their time in committee telling each other what they have been doing or plan to do.

In London, if you wanted to know what the British government's policy is on any given subject, you can be fairly sure of getting it from the department concerned — if they will talk at all. In Washington, almost everyone is ready to talk — but you are apt to receive several different and often conflicting answers to your questions, but from within the same department.

Legal system creaks

The passage of a bill through Congress is devious and slow, and subject to innumerable pitfalls. A committee chairman like Rep. Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., has more real power than have most members of the Cabinet. And in the Senate there is almost limitless scope for delaying tactics by strongwilled minorities.

DEC 1971

STATINTL

U.S. Supplies Bulletproof Vests To Some Asian and Latin Chiefs

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4 — tective forces, technical advice and special equipment. Nguyen Van Thieu, the President of South Vietnam, has a bulletproof vest, supplied by the United States, to wear during public appearances.

So does Nguyen, Cao Ky, his principal political rival.

Other Asian leaders whose wardrobes include lightweight American-made protection against assassins' bullets are President Park Chung Hee of South Korea, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines and King Phumiphon Aduldet of Thailand.

The bulletproof vests provided to some Asian leaders, as well as to certain unspecified heads of state in Latin America, were made by Federal laboratories in Saltsburg, Pa., at the request of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, knowledgeable sources have disclosed.

Vest Weighs 3 Pounds

Weighing only about three pounds each, they are said to be able to withstand point-blank blasts from any known hand gun.

Defense Department sources were reluctant to say how Air Force-purchased bulletproof vests came to be furnished to certain foreign leaders.

Diplomatic sources, however, said that in recent years a number of governments have become concerned about the quality of protection afforded their leaders. President Park, for example, was the target of a determined attempt on his life in early 1968 by North Korean agents.

Working through the local American ambassadors, these countries asked whether any United States agency could help provide training for their pro-

tection forces, technical advice and special equipment. According to Government sources here, the United States Secret Service, which protects the President and his family, does not get involved in foreign programs. The Central Intelligence Agency said it did not have the necessary expertise.

Job for Air Force Office

So the job was turned over to the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations, which spends most of its time tracking down spies within Air Force ranks, but also has provided protection for top defense and military officials and some Congressmen during overseas trips.

Extensive training in the United States has been provided by the agency to bodyguards from several nations, Pentagon sources acknowledged.

The bulletproof vests available on the market up to several years ago were considered too heavy for people of relatively small build, the sources said. So the Air Force worked with Federal laboratories in designing a three-pound vest made of overlapping, Teflon-coated plastic plates.

Air Force tests showed the vests could withstand direct shots from .357-caliber magnum and .45-caliber automatic pistols. Bought in quantity, for national leaders and all their bodyguards, the vests cost about \$60 each, a Pentagon source said.

Mr. Ky got his vest when he was Premier of South Vietnam, informed sources said, while Mr. Thieu got his when he became President.



BULLETPROOF VESTS of this type have been provided to certain Asian and other governmental leaders by Federal laboratories at the request of an Air Force section.

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Intelligence Priorities

... Congress must monitor CIA operations

President Nixon's irritation at the quality of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence apparatus is understandable. However, his efforts to streamline operations, while welcome, are not without hazard to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.

The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinating responsibility and some budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 persons and spend about \$6 billion annually.

To the extent that the President has made the intelligence operation more efficient and responsive—as indeed it should be — he has increased the security of the United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulating national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities.

A special congressional watchdog com-

mittee is supposed to review CIA operations and funding. Unfortunately, it seldom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs. This congressional abdication of its responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA.

An efficient intelligence operation is vital to the interests of the American people. But the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as the formation of coups d'etat, direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination.

President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is pre-eminently concerned with gathering and evaluating intelligence data. But, only a vigilant and responsible Congress can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert intelligence activities.

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A Many Splintered Thing

The American intelligence community since long before World War II has been, and remains to a large degree, a many splintered thing. Every agency needing fresh, accurate and secret information on which to formulate its plans and actions has developed its own set of spies. This lack of coordination and cohesiveness has become apparent with some disasters, most notably the Pearl Harbor attack of Dec. 7, 1941, and a lot of embarrassments such as the Bay of Pigs debacle and more recently the abortive commando raid on the deserted prisoner of war camp on Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi, on Nov. 21, 1970.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was established with the aim of coordinating all this nation's intelligence efforts. Besides the CIA, the U.S. intelligence network today includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and nuclear intelligence operations of the Atomic Energy Commission. The counter-intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation must also be included.

President Nixon, following what has almost become a presidential tradition after public disclosure of an intelligence failure, has shaken up the top levels of the American spy network. In an apparent hope of overcoming the shortcomings of the present system, Mr. Nixon has given Richard Helms, the CIA director, "an enhanced leadership role in planning, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence operations." Theoretically this is the authority that director of intelligence has had for years. But according to one official because of bureaucratic rivalry among competing intelligence agencies this has not always worked out.

Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and William J. Fulbright, D-Ark., have seen

Mr. Helms' new job more of a "demotion upstairs" than any enhanced leadership role. Their suspicions are understandable, considering the Sontay raid failure and the inability of the intelligence community to forecast the reaction of North Vietnam to the invasion of South Laos last February and March.

Bolstering the senator's suspicions must be the lack of concrete knowledge about the apparent leadership crisis in mainland China. This development comes at a time of delicate negotiations preceding Mr. Nixon's planned trip to Peking. It would be foolish for Mr. Nixon to make the journey without accurate knowledge of the power structure in Peking.

However, the concern of Sens. Symington and Fulbright that Mr. Helms has been "kicked upstairs" sounds more like the political reactions of two men who have consistently disagreed with the President, than the genuine concern of persons fearful the nation might be losing the needed talents of a highly competent intelligence administrator.

Instead the senators should be applauding the President for his efforts to bring greater coordination and cohesiveness to an intelligence effort that has become famous for Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs and Sontay.

STATINTL

CIA Revamping

STATINTL

How the Administration Is Trying to Improve Intelligence

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

By HENRY J. TAYLOR

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money.

Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total of \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

Next to the Pentagon with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and—largely unknown—they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief re-

ports directly to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II, it is understandably jealous of its prerogatives, and traditionally it plays its findings very close to its vest.

Additional intelligence agencies—all growing, all sprawling, all costly—spread out into the world from the office of the secretary of defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches—most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

The function of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus affect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence com-

self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.



CIA Director Richard Helms heads up the 15,000-man intelligence operation that is now being streamlined.

27 NOV. 1971

Congress and the CIA

President Nixon has issued an executive order which invests Richard Helms, director of the CIA, with authority to oversee all the intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) and to cut "bureaucratic fat" and professional overlapping wherever possible. There may be merit in this new order, but there is incontestable merit in Sen. Stuart Symington's reaction to it. The Senator notes that the CIA was brought into existence in 1947 by an act of Congress. Its powers and duties are defined by legislation adopted by the Congress. The director and deputy director are subject to confirmation by the Senate. Last year the Congress appropriated between \$5 billion and \$6 billion for the intelligence establishment; no one knows the exact amount, since part of the CIA's budget is artfully concealed. Yet the Senate was not consulted about the proposed reorganization. Senator Symington serves on the CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. To his knowledge, the subcommittee was not consulted about, nor did it approve, the reorganization ordered by the President. As a matter of fact the subcommittee has not met once during the current year. This is an amazing state of affairs. Surely the Congress has a right to be consulted about the reorganization of an agency which owes its existence to an Act of Congress and is sustained by annual appropriations voted by the Congress.

The fact is that the CIA enjoys an autonomy almost as complete as that enjoyed by the FBI. Whatever the original intention of the Congress, the CIA functions today as an adjunct of the White House. The intelligence it gathers is available to the President; it is not available to the Congress. Under the proposed reorganization, it will be even more directly responsible to the President, and by its oversight control over the other agencies will be supplying him with a unified appraisal. An agency that gathers information for the President may be tempted to provide him with the estimates it thinks he wants (as the Pentagon Papers have shown, intelligence reports that do not coincide with White House opinion are apt to be ignored), and as Joseph Kraft pointed out in a recent column, there is much to be said for diverging, even conflicting, reports in the highly subjective area of intelligence evaluation.

The CIA is closed off from scrutiny by the press, public and the Congress; like the FBI, it functions in splendid bureaucratic isolation. Mr. Helms is such a gray eminence that a private elevator takes him to and from his office in the CIA structure in Langley, Va. Like Mr. Hoover, he is usually not "available," except at budget time. Recently, however, he has been trying to give the agency a new, or at least a brighter image, since he is well aware of a growing restiveness in the Congress and of the need to slash budgets. A *Nation* editorial of May 3 called attention to the way in which Mr. Helms was "breaking cover" to talk about the brilliant achievements of the

agency and to assure us that it is staffed by dedicated friends of the democratic ideal. Now he is up to the same antics again. This week he is the "cover boy" on *Newsweek*, with the predictable feature telling of gallant CIA capers of a kind that could have been made known only by the agency that is so super-secret it feels compelled to conceal its activities from the Congress.

Congress should not take any more of this guff from the agency or its director. It has authority to insist that its authority be respected and it has a clear responsibility to act in that spirit. In an editorial last August 2, we remarked on a measure, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, which would require the CIA to make its intelligence reports available to the chairman of the germane committees of the Congress (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and also require the agency to prepare reports at the request of the Congress. There is precedent for such legislation in the instructions given the AEC. After all, the CIA often gives to foreign governments information and reports which it will not make available to the Senate or the House. This is selective secrecy carried to a grotesque extreme.

Hearings will be held on Senator Cooper's bill (S. 2224) during the first week of February. It is a wise and sensible proposal. We hope it is adopted. We hope too that the CIA subcommittee will come alive and begin to exercise a real degree of oversight over the agency. Better still, the Senate should adopt the resolution offered by Senator Symington (S. 192, November 13) to create a select committee which would oversee the CIA. But there is really only one way to deal with the problem of the CIA and that is to make it directly responsible to the Congress. If it is engaged in activities of such a character that they cannot be reported to the Congress, then it should be told to abandon those activities. There is no place for a secret agency of the CIA type within the framework of a constitutional democracy, which is how Justice Stanley Reed once characterized our form of government. As long as the CIA can plead secrecy, Congress will be unable to exercise effective oversight. The time has come to make both the FBI and the CIA subject to close and continuing Congressional supervision and control.

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WHY THE SHAKE-UP IN INTELLIGENCE

An urgent need for faster and more accurate information underlies latest moves by the President. Upshot: more say for civilians, less for military.

Once again, the vast U. S. intelligence establishment is being reshaped by the White House. As a result:

- Presidential reins on the 5-billion-dollar-a-year "intelligence community" are to be tightened even more. Primary goal is to avoid repetition of recent disappointments in the quality of American intelligence.

- Fresh effort will be made to reduce costly duplication, overlapping and competition among the military intelligence agencies. The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle.

- The civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, is being given broader authority over the entire U. S. intelligence network—civilian and military.

Key man in the reorganization is Mr. Helms, a veteran of nearly 30 years in his field, who took over in June, 1966, the dual job of heading the CIA plus his role as the President's principal adviser on all intelligence.

Now, under a presidential order of November 5, Mr. Helms has the biggest say on how to allocate men, money and machines in the gathering of foreign intelligence for the U. S.

At the same time, the President assigned Henry Kissinger, the top White House adviser and Director of the National Security Council staff, new powers which give Mr. Kissinger a larger voice in determining the direction U. S. intelligence will take and in assessing the final results.

Behind it all. According to Government insiders, a major reason for the President's action was growing "consumer" dissatisfaction with the intelligence product, particularly with interpretation of the secret data collected.

Too often, these sources say, the President has been inundated with information he does not need, or fails to receive in sufficient quality or quantity the data he considers vital for decisions.

The most recent example, one White House aide disclosed, was unhappiness over the length of time it took to get reliable intelligence on current developments in Red China. The Communist Government had been undergoing a lead-

ership crisis just at the time of delicate Washington-Peking negotiations on the President's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, but weeks went by before the U. S. was able to sift through a welter of conflicting reports.

Officials say that another big reason behind revamping of the intelligence command was the daring—but unsuccessful—attempt by the Army and Air Force on Nov. 21, 1970, to rescue U. S. prisoners of war from the North Vietnamese prison camp at Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. American commandos landed at the camp by helicopter in a well-planned and executed raid. But intelligence had lagged, and the camp was empty. The prisoners had been moved.

One official in a position to know explains that after the White House made the initial decision to rescue the POW's, the CIA supplied a model of the camp and details of Sontay's daily operations as they were known at that time. The actual rescue assignment was given to the Army and Air Force, which had to select, train and rehearse the commando team. By the time the operation was launched, intelligence was out of date.

According to this official: "If Helms had been responsible for the operation—as he would be now under the reorganization—he could have kept current, probably would have learned that the prisoners were moved, and probably would have scrubbed the operation."

Government sources say the President also was irritated by failure of his intelligence agencies to forecast accurately North Vietnamese reaction to the South Vietnamese invasion of Southern Laos last February and March.

Congress has had harsh words for the military. The House Appropriations Committee on November 11 declared that "the upward trend in total intelligence expenditures must be arrested" and recommended a 181-million-dollar cut in the Defense Department's military-intelligence appropriations.

The Committee took aim at duplication of effort. "The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations," it said.



The President hopes to overcome these shortcomings by giving Mr. Helms what Mr. Nixon termed "an enhanced leadership role" in planning, co-ordinating and evaluating all intelligence operations.

The Central Intelligence Director has had for years, on paper, the responsibility of co-ordinating military and civilian intelligence. But this has not always worked in practice. The reason, according to one U. S. official: bureaucratic rivalry among competing intelligence agencies.

Mr. Helms also becomes chairman of a newly formed committee which will advise on formulation of a consolidated foreign-intelligence budget for the entire Government. This committee will decide which intelligence service has the people and assets to do a particular job efficiently and cheaply.

Reshaping the network. The President took these actions to strengthen the American intelligence system:

- Reorganized the U. S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities. The Board, headed by Mr. Helms, includes representatives of the CIA, FBI, Treasury, Atomic Energy Commission and Defense and State Department intelligence agencies.

- Established a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, with Mr. Kissinger as chairman. It will include, besides Mr. Helms, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of

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Präsident Nixon erweitert Macht des CIA-Geheimdienstes

New York. ADN/BZ

USA-Präsident Nixon hat seinem Sonderbeauftragten Henry Kissinger die Reorganisation des Geheimdienstes CIA übertragen. Die CIA ist für zahlreiche politische Intrigen und Putschs insbesondere in jungen Nationalstaaten verantwortlich. Sie erhielt absoluten Vorrang vor allen anderen USA-Geheimdiensten. Es wird erwartet, daß das bereits sieben Milliarden Dollar betragende Spionagebudget weiter erhöht wird. Außerdem soll dem Kongreß jede Kontrollmöglichkeit über den Geheimdienst entzogen werden.

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HENRY J. TAYLOR

Our Spy Elephant Is Sick

STATINTL

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and -- largely unknown -- they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary

of State John N. Irwin 2nd, it is understandably very close to its vest.

ADDITIONAL intelligence agencies -- all growing, all sprawling, all costly -- spread out in to the world from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA), and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches -- most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's duplications, contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council, and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE CONSPIRACIES, STATINTL SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE, STATINTL

In the opinion of American observers, no other aspect of U.S. foreign policy with the exception of the Vietnam war has evoked such vigorous condemnation and protest as the subversive actions of the U.S. intelligence service, its covert and not infrequently overt interference in the internal affairs of other states, its complicity in all kinds of reactionary conspiracies and putsches. The generally known failures and scandalous exposures of its intelligence service have certainly impaired the prestige of the United States.

A MONSTER TOWERING OVER CONGRESS

Immediately after the end of World War II, seeking a greater say in policy-making, the most powerful spokesmen of monopoly capital secured reorganization of the entire government machinery of the United States. In July 1947 the National Security Act was promulgated, envisaging cardinal reconstruction of the military departments, the establishment of a single Department of Defense, a Joint Chiefs of Staff committee, and a Department of the Air Force. At the same time there was constituted the National Security Council, the highest, after the President, body called upon to play an important role in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

During the reorganization of the military and political leadership of the country the greatest attention was paid to intelligence. Drawing upon the experience of Hitler's Germany, the U.S. imperialists set about establishing their own system of total espionage — on a colossal scale as "benefits" the United States of America. Q. Petter, a U.S. intelligence theoretician, wrote that to exercise leadership of the world in all continents, of all types of states and social systems, of all races and religions in any social, economic and political conditions, the United States needed an exceptionally wide ranging intelligence service.

The Central Intelligence Agency, subordinated directly to the President, became the first postwar independent intelligence organization. It was charged with collecting intelligence data and at the same time engineering subversion in other states tasks:

(1) To obtain intelligence information in both secret and legal ways, (2) to generalize the information collected by other organizations and agencies, evaluate it and submit to politicians in a form suitable for utilization, (3) to prepare, in secret, interference in the affairs of other nations in case orders came regarding the need for such interference. Thus, the National Security Act enabled the CIA to exert its influence on matters of state importance, something on which the advocates of a "positions-of-strength policy" pressing for the militarization of the economy and social life of the United States insisted with particular vigour. According to Allen Dulles, this act gave American intelligence a more influential position in government than that held by intelligence in any other country of the world.

INCREASING POWER OF CIA

As American authors claim, the power of the CIA and of its chief has been growing in a geometrical progression. In 1948 the NSC issued a secret order authorizing the CIA to conduct espionage, subversion and other operations on foreign territories. Such

operations, it was stressed, were to be carried out in such a way that the U.S. government could, if necessary, disassociate itself from them. Thus, in the first year of its existence, the CIA was assigned functions which no other intelligence service has ever had.

In 1949 Congress adopted, as an addition to the National Security Act, a special law, on the Central Intelligence Agency. By this act the United States' government and parliament, for the first time in mankind's history, openly elevated espionage to the rank of state policy and thereby officially approved methods of action involving interference in the internal affairs of other countries and violation of their sovereignty.

The law of 1949 already openly placed intelligence above all American legislature: it deprived the congressional committees of the right to intervene in matters pertaining to the organization and activities of the CIA and gave its head unlimited freedom of action, vesting him with almost dictatorial powers. The CIA could ignore federal laws and ordinances whose observance could involve divulgence of information about its structure, functions, names, official designations, salaries, the size of the personnel (the Treasury was instructed not to report to Con-

gress the CIA's personnel with the CIA). In the matters of hire and dismissal the CIA director is not bound by any political or legal norms, procedures or recommendations obligatory for government institutions.

The Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to subsidize the programmes of colleges, to institute and keep up different foundations, cultural societies and publishing houses. Moreover, it could spend material means in disregard of the laws or rules established for government institutions and have its accounts certified only by its director. The latter was thus in a position to spend any sum from the vast allocations without any control or explanations. The CIA was allowed to earmark special sums to be spent by its personnel abroad. It could conclude contracts with non-government institutions on the conduct of research projects.

However, publicly promulgated laws do not give a full idea of the extent of the powers with which the CIA is vested. Along with them there exist top-secret directives of the National Security Council. To be sure, Allen Dulles wrote, there is the secret aspect of the matter, and the law authorizes the NSC (i.e., actually the President) to entrust the CIA with some powers in addition to those specified in the law. These powers are not given publicity. What is involved here is "special operations" and clandestine actions designed to install (often through military coups) reactionary pro-U.S. regimes enjoying the financial and political support of the American ruling circles and the biggest monopolies. In reality these actions became as organic part of the CIA's practical activities.

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INTELLIGENCE:

Helms at the Helm

For months the talk in Washington was that the President was about to reorder the nation's vast, \$6 billion military-civilian intelligence complex. Last week, in a two-page low-key announcement, the White House disclosed that Mr. Nixon had given Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, 58, a broad mandate to unsnarl the U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies. Putting Helms at the helm, insiders predicted, might prove to be the most significant power realignment in U.S. intelligence since the CIA was founded in 1947.

Helms's new job falls well short of over-all intelligence "czar." Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger is still virtually the sole conduit of intelligence information to the President. And, significantly, Kissinger will chair the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Mr. Nixon also created, to evaluate White House-bound data. But the President's order frees Helms of many of his routine CIA duties (which will be taken over by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.) so that he can devote his time to the task of coordinating and streamlining the nation's far-flung and disparate intelligence organizations, which include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

STATINTL

LOUISVILLE, KY.

TIMES

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Symington Questions Shake-Up in Intelligence

By PETER LISAGOR
© Chicago Daily News Service

WASHINGTON—If the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and allied units in the government have been inefficient or unresponsive, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., wants to know how and why.

Symington, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also wants an explanation of why appropriate congressional committees were not consulted in advance of administrative changes in the intelligence operations announced by President Nixon last Friday.

A White House spokesman says there were consultations with key congressional leaders before the changes were made. But Symington says that the CIA subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has not met this year.

Symington's challenge centered on the administration's alleged failure to consult Congress. While he admitted the changes might be "constructive," he posed several questions based on the White House press release that described the reorganization as an effort to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of all U.S. intelligence.

It would provide an "enhanced leadership role" for the CIA's director and would give presidential adviser Henry

Kissinger responsibility for making a net assessment of all available intelligence.

Symington asked in a statement on the Senate floor how the role of CIA Director Richard Helms was being "enhanced" by the "creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs."

He also noted that the attorney general and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit on the new committee. Symington asked two questions about it:

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?"

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

STATINTL

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I agree that the foreign aid program needs a very careful review next year, when we reconvene.

I also agree that certain things need to be done. I agree that there should be reform. Meanwhile, I want a program that will help people.

Ninety-three percent of the funds spent in the foreign aid program are spent within the United States. They involve the labors of 5,000 companies and over 60,000 people, many of whom would be out of work by the ending of such a program arbitrarily or by its excessive diminution.

This is a program to help people. That is why the AFL-CIO is interested in it and has long been interested in it.

It is a program to help people, too, in the other countries of the world. It is a program to help children through UNICEF. It is a program to help the developing countries by means of the developing funds, the multilateral funds, and many of the bilateral funds.

It is a program by which we are enabled to keep our promises and our treaties. It is a program by which we have undertaken to see that, as we withdraw from a long and unpopular war, we do not leave those who remain totally abandoned, utterly unprovided for, and, further, embittered at the ingratitude of the United States.

As a Nation, we have made our covenants. We have given our bonds. We have furnished our assurances to the other peoples of the world. If, for no other reason, we will have to continue the program. Then after we do, let us, by all means, review it. After all, any program that has been in existence for 25 years can stand review.

Let us see if we cannot get one which is less expensive, one which is less costly in the misunderstandings it brings about, one which is more fully in the enlightened self-interest of America, and one which does more fully meet the modern problems of the rest of the world, rather than being structured on the basis of the problems of the world as they were 25 years ago.

I think that the Senate in a spirit of conciliation and compromise is about ready to adopt the proposed new foreign aid program. I think the Senate is perfectly capable of writing a good and a new one. I think we can write it on Capitol Hill. I think that we know our job and are prepared to perform in accordance with it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what the Committee on Foreign Relations reported was a less expensive program. What the administration wants is a continuing resolution, which would be a more expensive program. Furthermore, the program has turned into an arms sales and an arms grant program, by means of which we shift, to a large extent, obsolete weapons of various kinds to various countries and, in that way, build up a dependency, a process which I think is open to question. This country has become the largest arms dealer in the world.

I think it is about time to put a stop to this kind of program and to call it

what it is. That is the purpose of the two bills which will be before the Senate today and tomorrow. I am only sorry that the proposals were not broken down into three parts—economic, humanitarian, and military. This was attempted. Unfortunately, the votes were not present to operate on that basis.

I hope, and I am very sure, the Senate will take a close and a hard look at the proposals now before it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with the words of the distinguished majority leader.

In listening to the news media last night and this morning, many high officials in this administration were lecturing the Senate as to its recent actions on foreign aid. I, for one, do not intend to be sandbagged by any heavy onslaught against the decisions of the Senate.

I also believe it is about time we recognize that the American taxpayer cannot afford to spend tens of billions of dollars to destroy many of these countries—only recently we started on another one, Cambodia—and then spend tens of billions of dollars bringing them back to some form of reasonable economic stability.

I would like to also associate myself with the remarks of the majority leader with respect to the continuing resolution. In my opinion, at this point and under these circumstances, a continuing resolution would be an abandonment on the part of the legislative branch of its prerogatives and responsibilities under the Constitution.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Missouri is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last Friday the White House announced that the President had ordered a reorganization of the intelligence community. I ask unanimous consent that their press release to this end be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as reported by the press, the administration's plan creates an "enhanced leadership role" for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, turns more of the operating responsibility for that Agency over to the Deputy Director, who is a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps, and creates or reconstitutes a variety of boards, committees, and groups who are charged with important responsibilities within the intelligence community.

The reported aim of the reorganization is to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of U.S. intelligence activities and press comments on this move include references to alleged concern over the size

and cost of intelligence operations; also to general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates. Such reports have been officially denied, but it is acknowledged that this reorganization is the result of "an exhaustive study" of the U.S. intelligence activities.

It could be that the reorganization announced last week by the White House is a constructive move. In recent years there has been a growing belief that there was heavy duplication and therefore waste within the overall intelligence community. Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned Members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment.

By the same token, it is equally impossible to determine, at least at this time, whether the organization changes now decreed will accomplish their stated purposes, or to determine what will be their practical effect.

One thing is clear, based on the manner in which the reorganization was handled and announced; namely, the executive branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress. To my knowledge there was no advance consultation whatever with the Congress regarding this reorganization, or even any advance notice of what had been decided.

In 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency was established by act of Congress. Its powers and duties are specified by law. Its Director and Deputy Director are subject to confirmation by the Senate.

Last year the Congress appropriated an amount estimated by the press to be between \$5 and \$6 billion for the activities of this Agency and the other component parts of the intelligence community.

As one Member of the Senate, I will not accept the proposition that the role of Congress in organizing the intelligence community ended 24 years ago with the passage of the National Security Act, or that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests so as to handle this work.

Last Saturday, when I learned from the press about this intelligence reorganization, as ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, I wrote the chairman of that committee, requesting hearings either by the full committee or by the CIA subcommittee, of which I have been a member for some 15 years. In that letter I presented the fact that this subcommittee has not met once this year.

This latest reorganization on the face of it raises questions about past, present, and future performance of our multi-billion dollar annually intelligence community; questions such as:

If it has been inefficient, what and where were its deficiencies?

In what sense does it need to be more "responsive?"

What is implied about the past by the reference in the press release to the objective of insuring "strengthened leadership" in the future?

Joseph Kraft

Recasting Intelligence

THE REORGANIZATION of the intelligence community announced last week looks at first glance like a mere administrative tightening. The producers of the raw intelligence are simply being made more responsive to the needs of the consumers in the White House.

But the Nixon administration is no more free than most others of the itch to enforce conformity. Unless very carefully watched, the new set-up could be one more device for destroying independent centers of analysis and information inside government.

The reorganization has two main components. For one thing, Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given authority to coordinate his own budget with those of the intelligence units within the Defense and State Departments.

Since Helms as CIA director is a member of most of the high-level policy committees in government, he is alert to the intelligence needs of the President and his closest advisers. Presumably he will be able—perhaps with considerable saving of money—to make the work of such intelligence outfits as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency more relevant to White House needs. His part of the reorganization seems relatively straightforward.

THE SECOND PART of the reorganization involves what is called "net assessment." That is a fancy term for the answer to the question: How does the strategic balance stand between Russia and the United States? That question, with deep ramifications in politics and economics as well as foreign policy, is to the various private and public interests that come to a head in government what a piece of red meat is to a pack of starving dogs.

Under the Eisenhower administration the net assessment was handled by a secret subcommittee of the National Security Council headed by a general officer and working out of the Pentagon. In the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the net assessments were essentially made under the direction of Secretary Robert McNamara in the Systems Analysis Division of the Department of Defense.

Under the Nixon administration there has been no central responsibility for net assessment. The result has been a chaotic battle featuring many protagonists. In general, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, with the backing of his director of research John Foster and to the delight of congressional hawks, has tended to rate the Soviet threat very highly. The CIA, to the delight of congressional doves, has been more skeptical about the Communist menace.

Under the new reorganization, responsibility for making the net assessment will be vested in a group working under the head of the National Security Council staff, Dr. Henry Kissinger. The official immediately responsible for the net assessments will be Andrew Marshall, who now leaves the Rand corporation where he has been serving as an analyst to take a place on the NSC staff.

Mr. Marshall is by all accounts an extremely good man—experienced, reliable and discriminating in judgment. Presumably he can do a serious job of pulling together the vast range of complicated data required for making the net assessment.

BUT IT IS a serious question whether that office should be performed in such close range to the White House. For the atmosphere in the White House is heavily political. There is no great disposition toward de-

tached analysis, still less to hear news out of keeping with prejudices and commitments.

A nice case in point is the defense program review committee set up under Dr. Kissinger back in 1969. The purpose of that group was to cast a cold, analytic eye on the defense budget, and some of the best analysts in and out of government signed on to do the staff work.

But the President has backed the big spending program of Defense Secretary Laird. The review committee has been allowed to wither on the vine. Half a dozen of the analysts connected with it have resigned, and the senior official presently concerned, Dr. K. Wayne Smith, is rumored to be leaving soon.

No serious high level critique of the defense budget is now being made anywhere in government. That is one of the reasons the Congress, and those of us in the press, are floundering so when it comes to defense expenditures.

What all this means is that the new intelligence set-up should be watched with great care. It looks like a sensible arrangement. But it could easily become one more instrument for restricting information and criticism to the disadvantage of all of those on the outside of government.

STATINTL

HEHNS TOLD TO CUT GLOBAL EXPENSES

Nixon Order Aims at Better Intelligence Gathering

By BENJAMIN WELLS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 — President Nixon has given Richard Helms, his Director of Central Intelligence, new orders—and new authority—to trim costs and improve the output of the nation's global intelligence system.

In a statement issued yesterday by the White House under circumstances strongly suggesting it was designed to attract as little public notice as possible—Mr. Nixon disclosed details of a far-reaching reorganization.

Intelligence experts here believe that Mr. Helms, armed with his new Presidential backing, may be able in the coming months to cut \$1-billion from the \$5-billion to \$6-billion that the United States spends yearly to ascertain, with spy satellites, electronic eavesdropping, secret agents and other sources, Soviet and Chinese Communist military developments. The reorganization plan, which has been under study at the Office of Management and Budget for at least a year, makes three main changes, informants say:

1. It gives Mr. Helms, who is 53 years old, the first authority ever given an intelligence chief to review—and thus affect—the budgets of all the nation's foreign intelligence agencies as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, which he will continue to head. The other agencies include units within the Defense and State Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. It will free Mr. Helms from much day-to-day responsibility for espionage, counter-espionage and such covert operations as the White House periodically orders through its secret "Forty Committee."

This committee, named for a numbered memorandum, includes Henry A. Kissinger, the White House national security assistant, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2d, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms's duties here will be assumed by his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

3. It creates a new intelligence subcommittee under the National Security Council with the aim of tailoring the daily "product" garnered by the nation's vast overseas intelligence network closer to the needs of the "consumers". President Nixon and his top staff.

Presumably, intelligence sources say, the Forty Committee will be merged into the council's new subcommittee since the membership of each is identical.

Not Always Responsive

"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the intelligence we were collecting wasn't always responsive to their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason was because the intelligence community had no way of knowing day to day what the President and Kissinger needed. This is a new link between producers and consumers. We'll have to wait and see if it works."

Mr. Kissinger will add the chairmanship of the new subcommittee to several others he already holds.

Another development in the president's reorganization is the creation of a "net assessment group" inside Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff. It will be headed by Andrew M. Marshall, a consultant with the Rand Corporation of Los Angeles.

"Net assessment means comparing over-all U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.," said an American intelligence expert. "It's as complicated a calculus as exists. We in the intelligence world often know more about Soviet forces and capabilities than we do about our own—and this new group is intended to pull it all together in one place for the President."

Resources Committee

Under the new plan Mr. Helms will also head an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee on which will be represented the state and Defense Departments, the office of Management and Budget and the C.I.A.

The white house announcement said that the committee will "advise the D.C.I. on the preparation of a consolidated program budget." This, in the view of experts, is Mr. Helms's new authority to supervise and, at least partly, control the work involved in collecting intelligence.

The Pentagon spends \$3-billion yearly on intelligence if all its activities are counted, said one source.

"This is 80 per cent of everything the United States spends for intelligence," he said. The President hasn't given Helms control of the D.O.D.'s intelligence budget, but at least he can now see it and advise on it before it's presented as a fait accompli."

CIA

STATINTL

STATINTL

Nixon moves to better spy systems' coordination; Kissinger, Helms assigned broader powers

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington--President Nixon moved yesterday to improve coordination among the government agencies involved in foreign intelligence activities.

Part of the plan would tie the intelligence effort more closely into the National Security Council apparatus headed by Mr. Nixon's most influential foreign-policy adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

The reorganization also will mean that Richard Helms, the director of central intelligence, will turn over many of his agency's day-to-day operations to his deputy and spend more time as the government's general intelligence overseer.

The CIA chief theoretically has been the head of the whole "intelligence community" since the Kennedy administration,


presiding over the United States Intelligence Board. But the limits of his authority never have been defined very precisely.

The White House, announcing the new structures yesterday, said they were designed "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness" of the intelligence agencies, which together employ an estimated 200,000 persons—three-fourths of them military servicemen—and spend about \$5 billion a year.

Mr. Nixon also ordered the creation of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Dr. Kissinger will head. The committee, the White House said, "will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products."

This seemed to indicate that the council will have greatly expanded authority over the different agencies.

Within the council's structure a new "net assessment group," also will be created. The group will evaluate intelligence data and make studies on the relative balances of military strength in



RICHARD HELMS

the world. The unit will be headed by Andrew Marshall, the Rand Corporation's former director of strategic studies.

The CIA director will be given "an enhanced leadership role," serving as chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board and also heading a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will draw up proposals for a consolidated budget for all the intelligence agencies.

Marine in charge.

Officials said this means that the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman of the Marine Corps, will take over much of the responsibility for the CIA's own operations.

Government agencies represented on the intelligence board include, beside the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Defense Department's National Security Agency, which specializes in code-cracking; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has separate Army, Navy and Air Force components working on military intelligence; the Treasury Department's Office of Economic and Financial Intelligence; and the Atomic Energy Commission.



HENRY KISSINGER

Proposals to revamp the intelligence structure have been floating through the administration for many months. The plan announced yesterday was drafted primarily by the National Security Council staff and the Office of Management and Budget.

2 failures cited

Questions about the present system's effectiveness seemed to center mainly on the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Two notable intelligence failures in Indochina have been cited as causing the failure of an attempt by U.S. troops in November, 1970, to rescue American prisoners of war from the Sontay Prison Camp in North Vietnam and as having hampered the South Vietnamese campaign in Laos last February and March.

In the Sontay attempt, the Army and Air Force raiders landed only to discover that all the P.O.W.'s had been moved out.

In the Laos campaign, the South Vietnamese Army suffered heavy losses and its units were sent reeling back

STATINTL

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White House Shakes Up Vast Intelligence-Gathering Network

CIA's Helms Seen Possible Czar, Pentagon's Agency
Downgraded as Kissinger and Staff Receive New Powers

BY DAVID KRASLOW

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The White House announced Friday a shakeup of the government's massive intelligence bureaucracy that could have major impact in enabling the President to assess more accurately any Soviet threat to the United States.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, emerges from the long-planned reorganization as an even stronger figure with responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities. Some sources said Helms' role could develop into that of an intelligence czar.

Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, and the National Security Council staff also are given significant new powers in the shakeup.

Budget-Clearing Procedure

The Pentagon's huge Defense Intelligence Agency is downgraded and will be required, along with other intelligence arms of the government, to clear its budget through a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee chaired by Helms.

Informed sources said the shakeup reflected the President's unhappiness with the quality of information supplied him on occasion and his belief that the splintered intelligence activities can be coordinated better.

The President also is convinced, it was said, that the government's intelligence bill — reliably estimated at about \$5 billion a year now — is unnecessarily high. Administration officials hope to achieve a saving of at least several hundred million dollars along with greater efficiency.

For years many in Congress and in the executive branch have thought that the government's intelligence effort, because of growth of staff and fragmentation among various agencies, was becoming unmanageable and that the cost was getting out of hand.

The studies that led to Friday's announcement were launched secretly by the National Security

Council more than a year ago.

A major change, which for the first time will give the White House the expert capability to make its own intelligence evaluation of such strategic problems as the Soviet missile threat, is the establishment of the Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council staff.

The group will be headed by a senior staff member. A White House source said that job would go to Andrew W. Marshall, now director of strategic studies at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica.

The different interpretations that the Pentagon and the CIA have given to the construction of about 90 missile silos in the Soviet Union is expected to be one of the first strategic policy problems to be put before the NAG.

The size of the defense budget and the strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians could be affected by whatever decision the President finally makes regarding the purpose of those still-empty silos.

Pentagon analysts have tended to a more alarmist reading of the silo construction, suggesting the Russians may be developing a new weapons system for offensive purposes.

While not ruling out that possibility, the CIA, it is understood, tends to the view that the silos are designed primarily to afford greater protection for missiles already in being and are therefore defensive.

Thus, where differences arise in the intelligence community on strategic questions, the NAG would be expected to reduce such disputes to manageable proportions for the President.

Helms' strengthened position will derive in large measure from his new authority over what the White House described as a "consolidated intelligence program budget."

Never before has there been a single intelligence budget. Under the present system each agency engaged in intelligence work submits its own budget request to the White House.

Under the reorganization the budget requests will go to the committee chaired by Helms and whose membership will include representatives of the State and Defense departments and the Office of Management and Budget.

Also among the "major management improvements" announced by the White House were:

— "An enhanced leadership role" for the director of central intelligence (Helms) in "planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

— Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by the President's national security assistant (Kissinger), whose membership will include the attorney general, the director of central intelligence, the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That committee is to "give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user."

STATINTL

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SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

NEWS

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Intelligence Overhaul

President Nixon's decision to overhaul the government's intelligence operations does not necessarily mean that the Central Intelligence Agency will be downgraded into a lesser intelligence role.


But the plan for reform and coordination of intelligence gathering systems indicates that congressional critics of the CIA have scored some strong points. As these critics contend, the CIA has been too much a law unto itself and has wrapped all its operations in a cloak of super secrecy.

If a better coordinated intelligence system emerges, and if Congress and the American public are better informed about our international spying tactics, then this overhaul of U.S. intelligence operations will have served a valuable purpose.

6 NOV 1971



RICHARD HELMS
... intelligence chief



GEN. ROBERT CUSHMAN
... new CIA duties

Helms to Oversee U.S. Spy Network

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon announced a long-awaited reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community yesterday creating a government-wide coordinating role for CIA Director Richard Helms and bringing military agencies under closer civilian control.

The overhaul was ordered following what the White

House called "an exhaustive study" of the far-flung foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. The various agencies are unofficially reported to employ 200,000 persons and to cost \$5 billion yearly.

The aim of the reorganization, according to the White House announcement, is to improve "efficiency and effectiveness." Although the statement did not say so, high-ranking officials are known to feel that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it produces.

There also have been reports that the President and senior aides were unhappy with the military intelligence planning which went into the abortive Son Tay prison raid and the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. White House officials denied yesterday

that reorganization is in response to dissatisfaction about particular estimates or reports.

One of the principal changes announced yesterday is the creation of a consolidated foreign intelligence program budget for the entire government, to be supervised by a high-ranking committee under Helms. Officials said Helms would be empowered to dip into any intelligence agency, civilian or military, for information to justify elements of its budget.

According to the announcement, Helms is being granted "an enhanced leadership role ... in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

Helms has been instructed to reorganize his own office

he may assume his new government-wide responsibilities, officials said.

He will turn over many of his operating responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert F. Cushman Jr.

Cushman served four years as the national security aide of then-Vice President Nixon from 1957 to 1960, and is considered close to Mr. Nixon.

Helms will become chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board to consider national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Other members of the board will be Cushman, the chiefs of the major intelligence agencies of the Defense and State Departments and representatives of the Treasury Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Atomic Energy Commission.

Two elements of the reorganization appear to give greater control to the National Security Council staff under presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger.

A new NSC intelligence committee, headed by Kissinger and including Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other high officials, has been established to give "direction and guidance" on national intelligence needs and evaluate the usefulness of the information received from the user's point of view.

At the NSC staff level, the reorganization created a new net assessment group to be headed by Anthony Marshall, former director of strategic studies of the Rand Corp. NAC, as it is known, will produce White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers, as well as assessments of intelligence quality.

The assessment of the strategic balance is a critical factor in the battle over future military budgets. U.S. military leaders, intelligence services and some outsiders have expressed anxiety about a large Soviet buildup of strategic

The White House announcement also said that Mr. Nixon has ordered three consolidations in the Pentagon's intelligence organization:

- A national cryptologic command to consolidate all communications intelligence activities under the director of the National Security Agency, the monitoring and codebreaking agency with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md.

- An office of Defense investigations, to consolidate all personnel security investigations in the Defense Department.

- A Defense map agency to combine the now separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services.

Officials said the reorganization is "not a plan to save money," but they expressed optimism that some funds will be saved through the various new controls and consolidations.

STATINTL

Spending at Heart of Spying Shakeup

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The creation of a consolidated intelligence program budget is at the heart of the intelligence shakeup ordered by President Nixon, informed sources say.

Preparation of the intelligence budget should for the first time give the President and other top officials a clear picture of how much is being spent for intelligence, where it is being spent and what it is buying, these officials said.

Richard Helms, who now is head of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be responsible for preparation of the budget as part of what the White House announcement said would be his "enhanced leadership role" in the intelligence field.

Not 'Intelligence Czar'

Informed officials cautioned, however, that the changes ordered by the President would not make Helms an "intelligence czar" in the sense that he will tell the heads of other intelligence agencies within the government how to run their jobs. His control over the pursestrings will, however, give him much more control of the over-all intelligence activities of the government than he has had in the past.

The changes ordered by Nixon also give his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, an enhanced role in the intelligence field by making him chairman of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee—one of a growing number of similar committees he heads.

A new Net Assessment Group will be under Kissinger. Its job is to review and evaluate all the products of intelligence work

and to make comparative studies of American and Soviet capabilities. It will be headed by Andrew Marshall, a member of the National Security Council staff.

The changes, designed to bring greater control over the estimated \$5 billion a year spent and 200,000 people who work on intelligence, have been the subject of a lengthy dispute within the administration.

Packard Unimpressed

In a press conference Thursday, the day before the changes were announced at the White House, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, one of the most outspoken government officials, indicated he was not entirely pleased by the way the struggle had worked out.

"There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experience with a lot of people in the White House the last couple of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. But that's my own personal view."

Because the Defense Department spends most of the money and employs most of the people and machines involved in intelligence, the changes will have a major impact there.

Consolidation Is Key

The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense Department security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations and the consolidation of all mapping and charting activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials

said these two changes won't be much of a problem.

But they said the order to set up a National Cryptologic Command under Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency, would "take some doing" because the Defense Department's code-breaking activities now are so fragmented.

Similarly, they said, the Defense Department faces some difficulties in reorganizing its tactical intelligence—the information used by field commanders rather than top officials in Washington.

National Terms

Although the tendency is to think in terms of national intelligence—the kind of information on which the President bases major decisions, for example—the bulk of the intelligence gathered by the various agencies is of a tactical nature, involving such things as the day-to-day movements of potentially hostile ships.

The White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would turn over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., so he can devote more time to the leadership of the over-all intelligence community.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee that has been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes ordered by the President place an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a "super-human job."

"One wonders if any human is capable of that kind of responsibility," he said.

C.I.A. — A SECRET ARMY FOR SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

STATINTL

They even speculates on life of world figure!

(PIERRE NORD, an internationally known expert on espionage, describes subversive war — the ultimate weapon — in his book "L'intoxication" (Editions Fayard). It is a document, a first-hand memoir. In it, he traces the development of the great contemporary affairs and evokes little-known facets of the 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutionary, ideological cold war that has changed the face of the world since 1945... Here are passages from his chapter on the United States Central Intelligence Agency — C.I.A.).

The C.I.A.'s headquarters is sheltered from the curious in a 125-acre park at Langley, Virginia, twenty minutes by car from the White House. Information has assumed that the President of the United States runs the secret services himself (!) and is as close to the other user of its services, the Pentagon, joint headquarters of the American General Staff and the U.S. Department of Defence.

The C.I.A. director, head of American secret warfare, espionage activity and subversion in foreign countries, is assisted by two other men: the chiefs of the Intelligence Division and Plans Division, and he knows what combination of electronic brains and robots!

SPYING IN LUXURY OF ELECTRONICS

The C.I.A. directors — surrounded by luxury and calm in their Langley office, dressed in shirt-sleeves and slippers if they like their ease — can exploit the labours of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its satellites carrying out patrols for them in the stratosphere at 40,000 miles an hour; the Midas II detecting missiles, the Samos series and other systems taking photographs. Tomorrow, the orbiting space stations will be the only category which can be

The results of these space eyes, translated into film and tape recordings, graphs and summaries, allows the directors to count Soviet missiles stockpiled at Sverdlovsk, or to determine the advanced state of the next Chinese nuclear experiment, or to hear Moscow's orders to its submarines cruising along Florida's coast, or to follow the countdown of Soyuz rocket "Number X" at Baikonour in the farthest reaches of the Soviet Union as easily as they can check the progress of their own Apollo "Number Y" at Cape Kennedy. All instantly.

A SECRET "ARMY"

It is openly reported that the American secret service is an army of hundreds of thousands of men. That is plainly an exaggeration; but it would be less so if the venal foreign agents on the monthly payroll and freelance spies were counted.

WHO CAN say how many are work in Indochina alone? It would be well below the mark if scientific and industrial workers who conceive and build the espionage machinery were counted.

Spying and counterespionage have become vital industries and electronic values are the workhorses of Wall Street, the New York Stock Exchange.

evaluated in terms of numbers: the C.I.A.'s WORKING STAFF.

The C.I.A. declares some 20,000 permanent employees and some writers have put the total at 60,000 — divided more or less equally between the "blacks" who operate under cover and the "whites" who check in at Langley and its branches every day and cannot conceal themselves.

"BLACK" agents get data at its source overseas under cover as tourists, journalists, businessmen or diplomats. These are the real secret agents. The "WHITES" include a technological elite of researchers, scientists, chemists, metallurgists, mathematicians, biologists, electricians, electronics experts, photographers, doctors, foresters, dietiticians and even magicians.

And this is no joke. Going even farther: The Americans and the Soviets moreover have been experimenting in thought transmission, and what has filtered through of the first results could shake the most rational mind.

HOW CLOSE TO DEATH?

But it is certainly the medical service which is the Agency's avant garde. Among its other duties, it predicts

calculates the length of the remaining life-span of foreign personalities who interest the United States. Its doctors say they do not bother with leading American figures: that is false on the face of it because it is the latter who determine everybody's future.

As for the private lives and financial affairs of these personalities, the C.I.A.'s leading legal experts, accountants, and police officers often know more than their colleagues in the subject's homeland.

A very select company of sociologists, economists, historians, geographers, financiers, political experts and emigres interpret an enormous mass of information collected on each antagonistic, neutral or allied state.



Richard Halloran —
the new C.I.A. boss.

Being the most expensively paid in the world, they appear qualified enough to conclude "Here is what this country will be in such and such circumstances".

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M - 108,821
S - 124,741

From the People

The CIA in Peace and War

To the Editor of the Gazette:

Your October 3rd story, "Ex-Agent Warns CIA Must Be Controlled," contains enough inaccuracies and innuendos to lead me to question its authenticity, and to suspect it as simply another unjustified attack by the news media on the Central Intelligence Agency.

If the story is accurate, Victor Marchetti, who has just resigned from the CIA after 16 years, did not learn very much about the Agency, even though he claims to have reached its "highest levels." More likely, the interview has been distorted somewhere along the way either by the reporter or an editor.

The article contains two major misleading, if not completely inaccurate, statements. First, Marchetti claims there is a danger the CIA may be used to set up spy operations against dissident groups in the United States, such as student groups and black movements. To make such a statement is very misleading since legislation prohibits the CIA from engaging in domestic operations. Domestic operations are the bailiwick of the FBI. To change the CIA charter to provide otherwise would require an act of Congress. Congress isn't about to give such approval. In this sense, the headline, "Ex-Agent Warns CIA Must Be Controlled" is very misleading. It is already controlled, namely Congress specifically where it will run its operations.

The second misleading statement is allegedly made by Marchetti, when he is quoted as saying: "One of the things the CIA clandestine people can do is to start up wars . . . They can start up a private war in a country, clandestinely, and make it look like it's just something the local yokels have decided to do themselves." The inference of this statement is that the CIA decides on its own when it will start up a war, in short, the assumption is that the CIA exercises considerable control over U. S. foreign policy, and makes all kinds of decisions on its own without consulting anyone. This is a fairy tale created by newsmen and others who for reasons of their own take great liberties with the facts. By statute, the CIA functions under the National Security Council, the chief body formally constituted for advising the President on na-

(Communications on any subject are welcome. Letters should be under 500 words and typewritten if possible. All letters are subject to editing. Each letter must be signed although signatures will be withheld on request. No published letters will be returned. No unpublished letters will be returned unless self-addressed envelope is enclosed—Editor.)

tional security affairs. The NSC is composed of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Since the NSC only recommends policy to the President, the CIA is in effect directly subordinate to the President. Congress also oversees the CIA, through key congressmen. This latter precaution apparently is necessary for several reasons: (1) if Tully's book, *The CIA*, is accurate, the operations of the Agency are very sensitive, and (2) some congressmen are sorely afflicted with a constipation of thought and a diarrhea of words. To tell some congressmen about CIA operations would be to shout it to the world.

Other points in the article raise questions. If Marchetti is so concerned about intelligence problems, why did he resign? It would appear that a person who had reached "the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency," would be better able to bring about reforms by staying in rather than by tucking tail and running. Frankly, barring the excellent possibility of news processing distortion of the interview, it sounds more like Marchetti got fired, and is now letting off steam to get revenge.

One of the things the story fails to tell readers is that thousands of capable CIA employees, who come from our best colleges and universities, are working nights and weekends to protect the security of the people of the U. S. and have given no thought to resigning. Even Bobby Kennedy had great praise for the CIA.

Walter P. Carr
Russellville.

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11 OCT 1971

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

STATINTL

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

STATINTL

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

STATINTL

Spies: Foot Soldiers in an Endless War

STATINTL

OUTSIDE London's Marlborough Street magistrates' court one morning last week, a throng of newsmen waited impatiently. The object of their interest, an ostensibly minor Soviet trade official named Oleg Lyalin, 34, failed to show up to answer the charges against him—"driving while unfit through drink." He was resting instead in a comfortable country house near London where, for the past several weeks, he had been giving British intelligence a complete rundown on local Soviet espionage operations. His revelations prompted the British government two weeks ago to carry out the most drastic action ever undertaken in the West against Soviet spies: the expulsion of 105 diplomats and other officials—nearly 20% of the 550 Russian officials based in Britain.

The case generated waves from Moscow to Manhattan. As soon as Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev returned to the Soviet capital from his three-day visit to Yugoslavia, he took the extraordinary step of convening an emergency meeting of the 15-man Politburo right on the premises of Vnukovo Airport. The high-level conference, which forced a 24-hour delay of a state dinner in honor of India's visiting Premier Indira Gandhi, might have dealt with the still-mysterious goings-on in China. But it might also have dealt with the difficult problem of how the Kremlin should react to the unprecedented British expulsions—a problem that Moscow, by week's end, had not yet solved.

Potato-Faced Fellows

In Manhattan, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home spent 80 minutes with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "We have taken our action," said Sir Alec, "and that's all there is to it." Nonetheless, he emphasized that the British step was "designed to remove an obstacle to good relations." Harrumphed Gromyko: "That's a fine way to improve relations." He added that Moscow would be forced to retaliate. But the British apparently knew of some spies among the remaining 445 Russians in Britain. "Yes," said a Foreign Office man, "we have retained second-strike capability."

The British case dramatized the expanse and expense of espionage activity round the world. It was also a reminder that the old spy business, which has received little attention in the past three or four years, is as intense—and dirty—as ever, despite the rise of a new type of operative. Since World War II, espionage has undergone a metamorphosis. For a time, its stars were the famed "legals" or "double covers"—agents—the Colonel Abels, the Golden Lonsdales, the Kim-Phillips. Says British Sovietologist Robert Conquest:

embassy operations rather as a skilled armored thrust compares with human-wave tactics in war." Moreover, the growing phalanxes of routine operatives are supported by spy-in-the-sky satellites that can send back photographs showing the precise diameter of a newly dug missile silo. But even as the modern army still needs the foot soldier, so does espionage still need the agent on the ground. "A photograph may show you what a new plane looks like," says a key intelligence expert, "but it won't tell you what's inside those engines and how they operate. For that you still need someone to tell you."

Eric Ambler, author of spy mysteries, has little use for the new species of



BBC FILM SHOWING SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" AT SECRET PICKUP POINT

There was still a roar in the old lion.

spy, particularly the representatives of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), the Soviet Committee for State Security, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "KGB men?" he sneers. "They're the potato-faced fellows you see on trains in Eastern Europe wearing suits that aren't quite right and smelling too much of eau de cologne. The CIA people all smell like after-shave lotion. They always look as if they are on their way to some boring sales conference for an unexciting product—and in a way, they are."

In one respect, Ambler is unfair and behind the times. The contemporary KGB man is generally far more polished, more sophisticated, more accomplished in foreign languages and manners than his counterpart of a few years ago. But Ambler is right in

liberately misleading, planted by departments of "disinformation."

It is work that occupies tens of thousands of mathematicians and cryptographers, clerks and military analysts, often with the most trivial-seeming tasks. Yet it is work that no major nation feels it can afford to halt. Says a former British ambassador: "We all spy, of course, more or less. But the Russians are rather busier at it than most. They're more basic too; not so subtle as our chaps. I like to think that we have a certain finesse in our methods—that we don't go at the thing bull-headed. But maybe our tasks are different from theirs, just because this country is so wide open."

While open Britain, there remains the question, in Eric Ambler's words: "What on earth has the KGB got to spy on in

LITTLE ROCK, ARK.

GAZETTE OCT 10 1971

M - 108,821

S - 124,741

Spying: The Most Constant Factor in U.S.-Russian Relationship

(C) Newhouse News Service

For 50 years, America and Russia have been at one another's throats or, occasionally, in one another's arms. But one factor in the relationship has remained constant—spying.

The espionage game never falters, and it is a contest that has yet to produce a clear winner. The United States spends more money and has more scientific equipment. But no one puts more agents in the field than the mammoth Russian espionage establishment.

Though 105 Soviet officials were recently ejected from Britain because of spying activities, the chief target of the Russian apparatus remains the United States. There are 214 Russian citizens professionally employed at Washington, mostly at the Soviet Embassy, and 419 at New York where they work at the United Nations and for commercial organizations such as Amtorg, Intourist and Aeroflot.

United States officials consider that about 50 per cent of these Russians are engaged to greater or lesser extent in espionage. Adding in the non-working dependents of these individuals, the total of Soviet citizens legally in the United States comes off about 1,250. It is taken for granted that some of the wives among these dependents are also involved in espionage.

Sports Delegations Include Agents

There are also short-term travelers, members of commercial, cultural and even sports delegations. These, too, are considered to have their share of spies.

"We do as a matter of common sense make certain assumptions that Soviet officials who come to the United States will attempt to take advantage of their assigned responsibilities to undertake extracurricular activities," says State Department spokesman Robert McCleskey. "That being so, we will exercise care and attempt to keep ourselves as well informed as we possibly can about any of these activities."

Spying pays considerably more dividends for a Soviet citizen than for his counterpart in the West. On salary alone, the espionage agent starts his career with an advantage: He is paid twice the wages of an engineer or a teacher and his pay is customarily doubled—and his standard of living notably improved—when he is assigned overseas.

"In the old days," says an American expert in the field, "Soviet agents were rather forbidding characters, chosen for ideological purity as much as for anything else. But that's been changing."

"Now they're getting a young recruit who's anxious to live abroad and enjoy the amenities of the service life. They're probably less dedicated to the Soviet ideology, more sophisticated, more aware of what's going on in the world. In a sense, this makes them more challenging adversaries."

These adversaries are also considerably more upwardly mobile than Western spies. The Soviet espionage establishment is a direct route to power in Russian life. It has huge influence—and sometimes dominance—not only in the political life of the country but in the army and even in important phases of industry.

And the intelligence apparatus has first priority. Any source, any person can be approached for aid, and it is a rare Soviet citizen who can refuse.

In contrast, the FBI and the CIA are frequently rebuffed—and sometimes insulted in the process—when they ask United States citizens for information about their trips abroad or about what they consider "anti-American" activities at home.

"When the Soviet intelligence man at an embassy asks another department for a favor, everybody scrambles to comply," says an American intelligence officer rather wistfully.

"When we ask the Commerce Department or someone to do something for us, as often as not they say they don't have the time."

Usually, the chief Soviet spy in a country is the No. 1 espionage man in his embassy, though his "cover" job may be merely as a clerk or a chauffeur. And sometimes the spy moves out front. The present head of Soviet espionage, Yuri Andropov, was put in as Russian ambassador to Hungary about the time of the revolt there in the mid-50s. His background was, it is felt, a big help in squashing the uprising.

Andropov, 52, is a suave, seemingly casual man who speaks fluent English and is very much at home at a diplomatic party. Nowadays as boss of the KGB—for Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Besopasnosti or State Security Committee—he supervises the Soviet equivalents of the FBI, the CIA, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Customs.

KGB's headquarters are in offices above Moscow's infamous Lubyanka prison. It is estimated that some 300,000 Russians are employed by the agency, though 150,000 of these are border guards whose only assignment is to keep people from entering—or leaving—the country.

Russians Are Geared To Human Network

The remaining 150,000 are in the traditional intelligence system, either as operatives or as collectors, refiners or interpreters of the vast amounts of information that are collected. Though the Russians have some of the latest electronic gadgetry—on satellites and, principally, on fishing trawlers—they are geared far more than most industrialized states to old-line, human spy networks.

They have their "legal" or "light cover" operatives in the world's capitals, and, of course, they have their "deep cover" agents, such as Rudolf Abel and Gordon Lonsdale, both "busted" after long and successful careers underground. These men assume the identities of real people who have died or moved away, and sometimes wait for years setting up their cover before actually going to work as spies.

The darker side of Soviet intelligence—executing agents, undermining governments—is handled by a section of KGB known as "Mokri Dela." The term translates as "wet affairs" but the connotation of wet in this use of the phrase is "bloody."

There is also a "disinformation" branch. Its task is to spread false facts and rumors where they will help to promote particular aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

The greatest trauma for the Soviet espionage establishment is the pain caused by defections. For it is defectors who usually expose agents.

KGB is organized to respond within hours after the news of a defection. The word goes out to all endangered agents, the Soviet government releases countercharges of spying against Russia and—if the international system warrants such a move—there are retaliatory expulsions or arrests of alleged foreign agents in the Soviet Union.

But for every Soviet spy who is publicly exposed, there are literally hundreds who are known but allowed to continue their activities—accompanied, of course, by those who are tailing them. This system places a

Continued

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NEWS

M - 2,129,909
S - 2,948,786

OCT 3 1971

VIEW

London's Spy Furor— Fun's Fun, Ivan, But Enough Is Enough

By ALTON SLAGLE

THE FACT that the Soviet Union numbered among its personnel stationed in Britain certain individuals whose activities could be considered clandestine was hardly a surprise. What nation on earth, after all, does not engage in the ancient art of espionage? Everybody knows, and accepts, the fact. Russia's problem is that she got a little carried away; she overdid it. And she was caught with her spies down.

It does seem, even in espionage circles, that 105 spies in a total personnel of 550 is a lot, especially in peacetime. That's about 20% of all the Russians in Britain—diplomatic, business, tourist and all the rest. Moscow had removed the spy business from an individual category and placed it into mass production.

It's not even that Britain was upset over the fact that Soviet agents were in its midst. It just had to draw the line somewhere.

It had long been assumed that the Soviet spy machine stretched across the various Russian activities in London—from the Moscow Narodny Bank in the financial district to the big old Soviet Embassy building at 13 Kensington Gardens to the Russian trade delegation headquarters on Ilighgate Hill, and in between to the combined Regent St. offices of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, and Intourist, its official travel agency. Then there were UNO Plant Hire, which leases capital goods, and the Soviet Wood Agency, which exports timber.

Believing that a steadily mounting number of Soviet intelligence agents was entering Britain under cover of diplomatic immunity, the British government a while back put a ceiling of 150 on the Russian embassy staff. The trade delegation then increased its personnel sharply.

Until the new expulsion order, which covered 90 Russians in London and 15 visa holders then out of the country and not allowed to return, there was this breakdown on Soviet citizens in Britain:

Embassy: 146, including 83 diplomats, 51 administrators and technicians and 12 service employees such as chauffeurs; trade delegation: 120 (even though British exports to the Soviet Union are less than \$200 million annually); commercial enterprises: 120; "contract inspectors": 70. Working wives and some dozen newsmen brought the total to about 550.

The British embassy staff in Moscow numbers only 78, of whom 40 are diplomats. There are 12 British journalists there and six British businessmen, including representatives of British Overseas Airways Corp., the state airline. There are no permanent British trade delegations, tourist agencies or banks there.

Had Moscow retaliated in kind to the British move, virtually the entire British diplomatic mission there would have been eliminated. But there was no such retaliation, nor is any expected. There was, of course, an official display of indignation and displeasure, but this follows the international script.

The spy business is so well established that Moscow couldn't even complain with a straight face; her indignation was just part of the act. The space-age business of electronic spying has become so commonplace that it is taken for granted. Devices litter the ocean floors to report the passage of shipping and submarines; spy-in-the-sky satellites continually photograph land installations; Soviet trawlers keep an electric eye and ear on the U.S. Apollo space program.

The spy's role in international affairs is thoroughly recognized and accepted. For instance, last April Richard Helms, the director of the U.S. spy works, the Central Intelligence Agency, told a group of newspaper editors of the "major and vital" role U.S. intelligence would have to play in an agreement in the U.S.-Soviet talks on limitation of strategic weapons. Washington could accept an accord, he said, "only if it has adequate intelligence to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

So far as is known, Moscow made no protest to this slur on its gentlemanly conduct.

Even the new British case involved a certain amount of sportsmanship. Moscow's growing spy activities in Britain

(a total number of Soviet employees there is more than in any other Western country—including the United States if the United Nations is not considered) were reportedly known by the Labor government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which preceded the present Conservative government of Edward Heath. The British had suggested several times in a quiet way that Moscow might use a little more discretion in its espionage activities, and Heath apparently acted only after the Russians seemed to indicate that spying was among their international privileges. Only then did there result the largest diplomatic expulsion in peacetime history.

Last fall, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alex Douglas-Home suggested to visiting Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko that Moscow might be overdoing the spying business a bit.

He was told to write a letter, and did—two of them, in fact, both unanswered and the second dripping with this quiet British sarcasm: "You are no doubt aware that the total number of Soviet officials . . . has now risen to more than 500, and you are presumably able to ascertain what proportion of these are intelligence officers."

continued

WASHINGTON POST
30 SEP 1971

William Jackson, CIA Deputy Director

By Michael Hodge

Washington Post Staff Writer

William M. Jackson, 70, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, died of heart failure Tuesday at his home in Tucson, Ariz.

The first member of his family in five generations who wasn't a farmer, Mr. Jackson was born on Belmead Plantation, the farm in Nashville, Tenn., that had the first racing colors in America.

A 1924 graduate of Princeton and a 1928 graduate of Harvard Law School, Mr. Jackson began his government service in 1942 when he entered the Army as a captain. At the time he was a partner in the law firm of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn.

After entering the Army he was assigned to the army Air Corps Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pa. He then went to London on an antisubmarine intelligence mission and shortly after became chief of strategic intelligence for Gen. Jacob L. Deyers.



United Press International

William M. Jackson is shown being sworn in as a special assistant to President Eisenhower in 1956, succeeding Nelson Rockefeller. President Eisenhower looks on.

In 1946 he was named to lead the committee that produced the recommendations that

lead to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. In 1950 he was ap-

pointed deputy director of the agency.

A year later he resigned his post "because of the pressures of private business" but stayed on part time as special assistant to the director.

Two years later he was called on to chair a seven-man presidential committee to review psychological strategy in the cold war.

Mr. Jackson's next government appointment was that of special assistant to President Eisenhower to assist in the execution of foreign policy. Some months later, he was named special assistant to the President for national security affairs.

After leaving government service for the last time, Mr. Jackson resumed his interest in investments by joining the firm of Glenc, Forgan and Co.

Five years ago he retired to Tucson.

He is survived by four sons, William H. and Richard L., of Washington, and Bruce P. and Howell E., of Princeton, N.J.

William H. Jackson Dead at 70; Former C.I.A. Deputy Director

Also a Senior Partner and
Managing Director of Law
and Investment Firms


Special to The New York Times

TUCSON, Ariz., Sept. 28—William H. Jackson, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, died today after a long illness. He was 70 years old.

Mr. Jackson married twice, in 1929 Elizabeth Lyman and in 1951 Mary Lee Pitcairn. Both marriages ended in divorce.

He is survived by two sons of the first marriage, William H. and Richard Lee, and two sons of the second marriage, Bruce P. and Howell E., and four grandchildren.

A funeral service will be held in Nashville, on Friday or Saturday.



The New York Times

William H. Jackson

Study Begun in Early 50's

The problem of setting up a psychological-warfare organization in a democracy was the task put before William Harding Jackson.

In the early nineteen-fifties, he headed a committee appointed by President Eisenhower to study how to mount psychological warfare to give it "a dynamic thrust in the cold war."

In his report, Mr. Jackson stated that "psychological strategy" does not exist as an independent medium. He recommended that the President abolish the Psychological Strategy Board, which in 1953 had been floundering for two years.

The Jackson committee asked, instead, that the President set up an "operations coordinating board" within the National Security Council.

The mission of this new unit would have been to plan detailed actions for carrying on not mere propaganda or psychological warfare but definitive national-security policies.

In effect, the Jackson report stated that the nation should refrain from propaganda stunts, contrived ideas unrelated to stated policy, in the ideological warfare against the Soviet Union. The report was accepted and the operations board was formed.

Behind this major effort was a long career in intelligence work that made Mr. Jackson the ideal man to be the committee's chairman. His World War II service was chiefly in various phases of intelligence, with a brief period in the Office of Strategic Services.

Joined Army as Captain

He entered the Army as a captain in February, 1942, and was assigned to the Army Air Force Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pa. This was followed by antisubmarine service and assignment to intelligence units.

In January, 1944, Mr. Jackson went to London to join the intelligence section of American Military Headquarters, serving as chief of intelligence to Gen. Jacob L. Devers and, later, as deputy chief of intelligence for Gen. Omar Bradley. He was discharged from the Army in August, 1945, as a colonel.

Upon his return, he rejoined his law firm, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, where he had become a senior partner, but left two years later, because, as he put it:

"My prewar work wasn't satisfying any more. A great many civilian soldiers felt the same way I did."

He became a partner in the investment firm of John Hay Whitney and also its managing

director. Before long, however, he was back in intelligence work.

In 1949, he was named to the National Security Council to serve on a committee with Allen W. Dulles and Mathias J. Correa to investigate the intelligence service of the United States.

Appointed Deputy Director

The following August he was named deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with Lieut. Gen. Walter B. Smith.

In January, 1953, President Eisenhower named Mr. Jackson as a special assistant, succeeding Nelson A. Rockefeller. His job was "to assist in the coordination and timing of the execution of foreign policies involving more than one department or agency."

Some months later, he was named special assistant to the President for national security affairs. He recommended to the President that Richard M. Nixon, then the Vice President, be made chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, a unit whose job it was to see that Presidential decisions, recommended by the Security Council, were closely and quickly followed.

While Mr. Eisenhower was sympathetic to the idea, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, was opposed, and the proposal was rejected.

Mr. Jackson was born in Nashville on March 25, 1901, the son of William Harding Jackson and the former Anne Davis Richardson. The family had been farmers for five generations. A grandfather, a West Point graduate, was a Civil War veteran.

The youth was graduated from St. Mark's School, Southborough, Mass., in 1920. He received a B.A. from Princeton in 1924 and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1928.

Admitted to Bar in 1932

He joined the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in 1928 and moved to Carter, Ledyard & Milburn in 1930. He was admitted to the bar in New York in 1932 and two years later became a partner of Carter, Ledyard.

Mr. Jackson was a trustee of the Millbrook School for Boys and of St. Mark's. He also was a director of the Spencer Chemical Company, the Great Northern Paper Company and the Bankers Trust Company.

STATINTL

THE DIPLOMACY OF A 'SECRET'
SERVICE

by Richard H. Smith. A study of the political and diplomatic operations of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. \$7.95. May.

NO BRIDGES BLOWN

by William B. Dreux. Autobiography of a former American infantry officer in the OSS behind German lines in World War II. \$8.95. January.

After 1967 expose CIA sought new ties with campus, labor

By Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff

The written report of a confidential discussion about Central Intelligence Agency operations held in 1968, a year after the public controversy over agency involvement with the National Student Assn., shows the CIA was anxious to establish new contacts with other student groups, foundations, universities, labor organizations and corporations for its overseas work.

The discussion was held in January 1968 among ranking government officials and former officials, including several former CIA officers, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Though no direct quotes are attributed in the report, the opinion was stated by the discussion leader, Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly a deputy director of the CIA, that: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though these relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected."

The discussion also referred to the continued utility of labor groups and American corporations to CIA operations. No such groups or corporations are named.

The written report, like others sponsored by the council, is considered by the participants as "confidential" and "completely off the record."

The document is being circulated by the Africa Research Group, a small, radically oriented organization headquartered in Cambridge, because "it offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations."

Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "University Review," a New York-based monthly.

The document reflects individual assessments of the CIA by those present. The report includes a number of general statements:

—The two elements of CIA activity, "intelligence collection" and "covert action" (or "intervention") are not separated within the agency but are considered to "overlap and interact."

—The focus of classical espionage in Europe and other developed parts of the world had shifted "toward targets in the underdeveloped world."

—Due to the clear jurisdictional boundary between the CIA and FBI, the intelligence agency was "adverse to surveillance of US citizens overseas (even when specifically requested) and adverse to operating against targets in the United States, except foreigners here as transients."

—The acquisition of a secret speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1956 was a classic example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence. The State Department released the text which, according to one participant, prompted "the beginning of the split in the Communist movement." Since this speech had been specifically targeted before acquired, the results meant to this participant that "if you get a precise target and go after it, you can change history."

—"Penetration," by establishing personal relationships with individuals rather than simply hiring them, was regarded as especially useful in the underdeveloped world. The statement is made that "covert intervention (in the underdeveloped world) is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with a fairly short-term objective."

—The reconnaissance of

during the '50s provided "limited but dramatic results. Flights were late of the cancelled scheduled summer between President Eisenhower and after Francis G. was shot down in Asia."

"After five days flights were from the Russian these operation highly secret in States, and with son," reads the these overflight 'leaked' to the press, the US have been forced action."

The meeting, was not to consider CIA missions so characterize concepts and proceed discussion was part of a council statement "Intelligence as Policy."

The chairman meeting was Dillon, an investment banker who had served in Washington as undersecretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration.

Twenty persons were listed as attending including prominent former officials and educators like Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University and David B. Truman, president of Mt. Holyoke College.

The list included Allen W. Dulles, former director of the CIA, and Robert Amory Jr., who had been deputy director, as well as Bissell, who had been deputy director until shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which the CIA was involved.

The discussion took place just a year after revelations by Ramparts Magazine concerning CIA-funded training of agents for South Vietnam at

The document includes the statement that "it is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective."

In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in May 1967, Thomas Braden, who had helped set up the subsidies with Dulles, defended the concept as a way to combat the seven major front organizations of the Communist world in which the Russians through the use of their international fronts had stolen the great words such as peace, justice and freedom."

The report shows that the publicity had not been as damaging to CIA activities

Laird Eyes Civilian for Intelligence

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is expected to approve soon a Pentagon plan which would install, for the first time, a civilian as the top-ranking intelligence official in the Defense Department, according to informed government sources.

The move is part of a more extensive, government-wide reorganization plan, much of which is still unsettled, aimed at making the gathering of all types of military and foreign intelligence more efficient and far less expensive.

Estimates of the current government-wide cost each year for global intelligence gathering, sorting and analyzing run to about \$5 billion and involve some 200,000 people.


The bulk of the money—an estimated \$3 billion annually—and the people—about 150,000—are associated with the Defense Department.

The Pentagon part of the planned reorganization involves establishment of a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence whose job would be to oversee the entire military network, including the separate activities of all three services plus those of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is headed by a military man, and the code-cracking National Security Agency.

There are several candidates for the new post. But the man most Pentagon insiders expect to get the job is Dr. Albert C. Hall, currently a vice-president of Martin-Marietta Corp., the company that builds the booster rockets for most of the U.S. spy satellites.

Hall has a reputation as a top-notch engineer and space expert, having been one of the leading space planners in the Pentagon between 1963-65. He is no stranger to the intelligence field, currently heading the Defense Intelligence Agency's science advisory committee.

The new assistant secretary will become the ranking intelligence official in the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Laird's chief intelligence advisor. As Defense officials describe the plan, however, the



1960 AP Picture

ALBERT C. HALL

... may join Pentagon

director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, will also retain direct access to Laird.

The Pentagon has never had a civilian in the top intelligence job before, on a full-time basis. (Last year, after the department was rocked by disclosures of military spying on civilians, Laird named his close friend and then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert F. Froehke, to also serve as a special assistant for intelligence).

Behind the new move, as Pentagon officials explain it, is a need to cut down the enormous size of the military intelligence community and to weed out unnecessary projects and facilities.

The feeling that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it was producing was the principal impetus, according to civilian officials, for a White House-ordered study of all intelligence operations earlier this year.

In addition, some sources say that President Nixon, while impressed in large measure with the work of the civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, was unhappy with military intelligence planning going into the abortive Sontay prison raid and the South Vi-

Also, the President reportedly was annoyed with the lag in U.S. knowledge of a Soviet cease-fire violation involving construction of SAM missile sites near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Demands for more efficiency have also come recently from Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee. Ellender is threatening to cut \$500 million out of the total intelligence budget which might involve eliminating some 50,000 jobs.

Some government officials estimate that actual cuts could run to about 20,000 people and a savings of a few hundred million dollars.

While the Pentagon, as the chief target of the efficiency experts, is about to get some help, proposals for reorganizing the rest of the intelligence community appear to be still involved in bureaucratic infighting.

Plans to create a new super-agency with CIA director Richard Helms as the chief have been dropped, though many officials believe that Helms will eventually emerge with strengthened and broader powers over all intelligence operations and resources.

Plans to put a new intelligence coordinator in the White House are also said to be unsettled, though such a prospect is viewed as likely.

Helms appears to be a central figure in the question of how far the government will go to shake-up the entire intelligence community. While Helms is viewed in all quarters as the top professional in the field, some intelligence experts fear that giving him a job with a bigger administrative work load will dilute his contribution to the overall quality of U.S. intelligence, weaken the tightly knit CIA, and focus even more power in the White House.

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S - 70,067

'The Intelligence Game'

CIA Draws Praise And Blame From Writers

By LEW SCARR
Copley News Service

Perhaps no area of our government having a direct bearing on our attitude in the cold war has been more controversial, yet less understood than our intelligence network.

It is partly that we don't know what the Central Intelligence Agency does, but if it does what we think it does, it goes against our sense of fair play and that is bad.

The popular notion is that the CIA is a law unto itself. It is believed that it freely interferes in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-Communist governments.

Some writers have capitalized on these beliefs, shadowed them with a cloak and fastened them with a dagger and written books to support them. Fortunately, most were crudely written and rudely received.

Still, many congressmen and some journalists continue to ask, why have an intelligence community at all? Mostly the questioners are those to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists.

Those living in the intelligence community consider the question absurd. But it deserves an answer.

Any president of a large corporation, and, indeed, any chief of state, must have "intelligence" if he is to fulfill his responsibilities.

He may get it from newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or from reports from consultants. Wherever, he must have intelligence. If he does not, he will not survive long.

Before World War II, the armed services had relied heavily upon civilian specialists in wars and, when the fighting was over, they sent the specialists home and forgot all about the need for intelligence.

Gen. George C. Marshall once described the Army's foreign intelligence as "little more than what a military attache could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee cups."

Five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Harry Howe Ransom reports in "The intelligence establishment," President Roosevelt summoned Col. (late Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan to draft a plan for a new intelligence service designed for the requirements of a global war and patterned in the main after the British.

Donovan was a successful lawyer who had won the Medal of Honor in World War I.

"He was an imaginative, aggressive man," Ransom writes, "who had traveled abroad extensively. So far as intelligence work went, he was an amateur, but in the American tradition of public service he seemed qualified to assemble what was to become the forerunner of CIA."

During World War II the closest approach to a central intelligence system was the widely publicized Office of Strategic Services — the almost legendary OSS.

It is difficult to assess the worth of OSS because its official history still remains classified. Still, it must be given credit, despite traditional detractors, for invaluable contributions to allied victory, especially in Burma and in defeating the axis in North Africa and in aiding the French resistance

But it wasn't until 1947 that Congress created the CIA. It was fashioned after OSS and it was born during the year that cold war was declared.

Actually, Congress in setting up CIA delegated it a single function, intelligence, and nothing more. That it does much more is without question, but just what and where it does it is hard to say.

There is a theory among intelligence agents, the good ones, that there should "almost always" be no failures. It is better, so the theory goes, to leave a problem unsolved than to risk failure or discovery.

Still, there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U2 incident.

Taking into account CIA's policy toward supercaution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there must have been, oh, ten or more successes.

The failures have been pinned on the CIA while the successes almost never are. Not definitely.

Some have suspected the CIA of having brought on the downfall of Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in Indonesia, of having installed the military junta in Greece and of having thrown Sihanouk out of Cambodia.

But these rodents, if they are, do nothing more than support the notions of observers who see the CIA as a molder of temporary geography and a shaper of tentative history.

It is the same attitude which Miles Copeland III, who once worked for the State Department and the CIA, writes of in his "The Game of Nations."

"In the intelligence game, competitors seek to gain the greatest possible advantage short of going to war."

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

Intelligence Items

The coded intelligence reports that flood into Washington from all over the world often contain raw, unverified information. The Central Intelligence Agency has devised a simple system for rating the reliability of its reports. The veracity of the source is given an alphabetical rating; an appraisal of the content is rated by number. Thus, an A-1 report would be considered 100 per cent accurate. But if a wholly reliable source passed on a hot barroom rumor, it might be rated A-12. Or if a less trustworthy source submitted what he claimed was a really reliable item, the rating might be C-3. Hereafter, we will use this rating system to help our readers evaluate the accuracy of intelligence items.

Emperor's Surprise (A-2)—No one was more surprised than Emperor Hirohito to learn that his European trip would be interrupted by a stopover in Alaska. Prime Minister Sato neglected to consult the Emperor before setting up the trip. By staging a dramatic meeting between Emperor Hirohito and President Nixon, Sato hopes to take some of the steam out of the hot Japanese reaction to Mr. Nixon's Peking ploy and economic moves against Japan. The Emperor, left out of the backroom planning, was astonished to learn that he would interrupt his European trip to confer with Mr. Nixon in Alaska.

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The CIA: Does It Do What We Think It Does?

By LEW SCARR

Staff Writer, The San Diego Union

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But it wasn't until 1947 that Congress created the CIA. It was fashioned after OSS and it was born during the year that cold war was declared.

Actually, Congress in setting up CIA delegated it a single function, intelligence, and, nothing more. That it does much more is without question, but just what and where it does it is hard to say.

There is a theory among intelligence agents, the good ones; that there should "almost always" be no failures. It is better, so the theory goes, to leave a

problem unsolved than to risk failure or discovery.

Still, there have been failures: The Bay of Pigs, the U2 incident.

Taking into account CIA's policy toward supercaution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there must have been, oh, ten or more successes.

The failures have been pinned on the CIA while the successes almost never are. Not definitely.

Some have suspected the CIA of having brought on the downfall of Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in Indonesia, of having installed the military junta in Greece and of having thrown Sihanouk out of Cambodia.

But these credits, if they are, do nothing more than support the notions of observers who see the CIA as a mold-er of temporary geography and a shaper of tentative history.

It is the same attitude which Miles Copeland III, who once worked for the State Department and the CIA, writes to in his "The Game of Nations:"

"In the intelligence game, competitors seek to gain the greatest possible advantage short of going to war."

Yet, the primary function of the CIA continues to be to coordinate the whole intelligence system, consisting of some 10 or 12 separate services, to ensure as Allen Dulles said:

"That it gives our government's top policy makers exactly the information they need, no more and no less, in order to make the right decisions."

Simple information, raw data, may be good or bad, accurate or inaccurate, relevant or irrelevant, timely or dated.

But "intelligence" is information that has been evaluated, correlated, boiled down to a workable size and placed in reports which can be quickly and easily read.

The chief job of CIA is to supervise this process. No one who understands anything about the demands of management can question the need for a

Few do, or at least should, question that that agency must be the CIA.

Dossier on the

C.I.A.

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. — ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be — and has been — perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency has its secrets. In 1964 the CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

of Newspaper Editors, that the CIA should be supervised by the Intelligence Agency. The time is long overdue for the CIA to take on a supervisory role in the Central Intelligence War. Under this CIA administration of inquiry by the CIA and specifically requiring disclosure of titles, salaries, and expenses of the CIA; (ii) expectations on the Director's part without adverse effect on the Government and the Government for staff abroad and their families. 1949 Central Intelligence Director a license

With so much is seen by many as a sine coup. in Guatemala Mossadegh in the Cuban failure). The President Kennedy 28, 1961, was heralded — because the agency's "m...

representative of the unending gambit and bigger than life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public — and was caught.


WHO RUNS THE GOVERNMENT?

it's not the people you elect to office but their erstwhile business cronies and political hangers-on who turn the bureaucratic wheels

STATINTL

article By ROBERT SEMPLE AMERICANS ARE TAUGHT in their high school civics courses that the people rule this nation through an elective process—every two, four or six years—that sufficiently changes the composition of the Federal Government to guarantee that the will of the people will prevail. As usual, however, high school civics and the conventional wisdom are deficient—not totally, but enough to make anyone who knows how Washington actually functions feel very uneasy, indeed.

For the fact of the matter is that we are ruled only partly by our elected officials. We are more pervasively ruled by what is, for all practical purposes, a hidden Government—hidden in the CIA, the Federal Reserve Board and the lowliest echelons of the



NO. 19 1971
September

A CIA Paper

"Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements

rivalries to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelevian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will pub-

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.

TIMES-PICAYUNE

AUG 30 1977

M - 196,345

S - 308,949

Work of CIA Should Remain Secret

Twenty-four years ago the national legislature created the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency and now there is quite a show of feeling the result was too good from the standpoint of secrecy.

That Congress doesn't know what goes on within the CIA does more than pique curiosity, such as when it finds out about the United States' participation in a Laotian war. It makes many legislators downright put out.

Not that there hasn't been congressional prying before now, but the interest is accentuated. Of almost 200 bills introduced in Congress on the subject, as many as two survived long enough to come to a vote. None has passed.

The CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, it seems, is as hush-hush about the CIA as the CIA itself, which stirs still more consternation on the Hill.

Congress knew when it created the CIA in 1947 that it was setting up no goldfish-bowl agency, so despite criticism about the CIA and its clandestine work it is difficult not to agree with Sen. John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and on its oversight committee, when he says:

"If we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA; we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that."

It is easy to hop on the CIA, for the agency cannot answer its critics. That is the nature of its operations.

The charter of the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, was the culmination of a national resolve that one Pearl Harbor was enough. President Truman said in that year in referring to the Pearl Harbor period, "the military did not know everything the State department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans."

So the idea behind the CIA was to coordinate the intelligence elements of the government. Not a law unto itself, it is answerable to those it serves in government.

For the agency to make Congress privy to its secrets would be to have no secret at all, hence no usable foreign intelligence.

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CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING STATINTL

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees--Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. I, p. 306, 249)

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men--on two committees--hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

STATINTL

Kama River Caper: Scene Three

U.S. foundry experts are latest to join cast in the spine-tingling trade opus—the big USSR truck deal.

By R. A. Wilson and K. A. Kaufman

Some day some super-sleuth—aided by, say, the Pink Panther and James Bond (007)—will leak the “Kama River Papers.”

They’ll be very interesting because, of course, they involve the huge Russian Kama River truck plant which can be a real trade breakthrough for Mack Truck and other U.S. companies.

So far it is unfolding slowly as far as U.S. contenders in the project are concerned. And it unfolds in a confused manner.

In part this appears due to lack of an established pattern for business deals with the USSR on such a large scale. But it’s also true because the Soviet won’t say how its bets are hedged. That they are hedged seems sure.

A part of the story unfolded last week as the Commerce Dept. released export licenses for foundry engineering work and equipment valued at \$162 million.

In terms of the overall project, the Nixon Administration appears committed to approval of export of machine tools for the Kama River plant.

But it’s equally clear the Administration is proceeding carefully and cautiously due to both domestic and international political considerations.

It seems the government tactic may be to grant export licenses for various equipment used in the new truck manufacturing com-

plex over a period of time and without fanfare. It doesn’t appear ready to announce acceptance of the total project with a single announcement.

The object: Keeping the Kama River project from erupting into a full-scale debate within this country on desirability of U.S. participation in a Russian plant that would have the capability of producing military-oriented products, such as tanks.

President Nixon is already under sharp attack from the conservative wing of the Republican Party for his decision to visit Red

China before May ’72 and to support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

Despite this opposition, Mr. Nixon apparently has decided to permit U.S. participation in the Kama River project.

The mentioned granting of the two export licenses for shipment of \$162 million in foundry equipment and a third license covering transfer of technology for use of this equipment to the Soviet Union is the tipoff.

Officials insist the action does not constitute approval of the

Even the CIA Is Getting in the Act

Having recently traveled abroad, one foundry equipment builder relates that upon return the CIA indicated this particular foundry builder had a favored position on the upcoming deal.

Just a routine debriefing session with the neighborhood CIA staffer. Just a what...? Is this happening?

Strictly Procedure

Yes, and apparently it’s definitely routine. This builder said that “without fail, the CIA contacts me when I get back from abroad, it doesn’t matter where.”

Friend or foe, it’s procedure. Another equipment builder indicates this is the case also. “I doubt that anyone who travels abroad regularly isn’t contacted,” said this source.

But maybe it’s no big deal. “They don’t press you. If you don’t want to talk, don’t talk,” was the advice given. “But you might get some decent advice on the other hand.”

Know Any Good Bars?

Both executives indicate the CIA is interested in anything you wish to say. Nocturnal activities, good bars, even business if you want to be serious. But they don’t pump.

Still, both executives also indicate that somewhere in the background they felt the CIA did have at least some slight influence on what business deal went where.

Each, however, felt additionally that no contract, or export license had been gained or lost because of cooperation or the lack of it.

CAMDEN, N.J.
COURIER-POST

AUG 16 1971

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Not Too Much to Ask

When the Central Intelligence Agency was established, in the late 1940s the explanation was that we needed a specially trained and equipped organization to gather information on political, economic, and military situations all over the world. We needed an organization that could give the President reports on these situations every day. The CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if not a secret agency — so that it could go about its data-gathering assignment with a minimum of trouble.

The CIA has, indeed, gathered information and prepared the confidential evaluations for the presidents. Some of these evaluations, like those that forecast the problems in Vietnam, turned out to be good and prescient judgments, even if they were ignored. The CIA would look a lot better today if it had stayed with information gathering — instead of getting into the business of designing and executing adventures like the Bay of Pigs.

It has been rumored for a long time and now is finally confirmed that the CIA has been running the "secret war" in Laos. This is the operation in which an irregular army of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen, Thai volunteers, and men from the Royal Laotian forces has been waging nine years of relatively unavailing war for the Plain of Jars and the hamlets of the eastern half of the country. Our attempt to keep the operation secret has made our motives look too much like the motives of the Communists.

To the extent that the United States must carry on military programs in South Asia — and elsewhere — it would seem more reasonable and satisfactory to have them carried on openly and by the Department of Defense. We may not accomplish what we set out to do in every case. But at least we'll know what the United States is doing. That isn't too much to ask of the government.

Intelligence Units Face Revamping

The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations -- particularly those of the military -- with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have under study since early this year. Now however in addition to some internal Nixon administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least \$500 million out of the roughly \$5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of a corps of military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work that now numbers an estimated 200,000 people.

Ellender's chief target, sources close to the senator say, is not the highly specialized, civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, but the separate intelligence operations run by each of the military services and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Officials have estimated that about \$3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills is spent by the military. The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender's concern is known to involve overlap between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower ranking men, and the setting up of a global communications network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was a widespread feeling in the Executive Branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful intelligence produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed.

The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, CIA and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another involved movement of the CIA's highly esteemed director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

Ex-Hazleton CIA Officer Author Of Spy Novel 'The Rope Dancer'

By BETTY HARTLOR

A Hazleton native who served for 14 years as an officer in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has turned his life in the espionage profession into a suspenseful novel. In "The Rope Dancer," Victor Marchetti tells what it's really like to be an agent for a super-secret organization.

The book by the 41-year-old Marchetti, now a resident of Oakton, Va., officially will be published by Grosset and Dunlap, Inc. of New York Thursday.

The novelist, who formerly lived at 132 N. Wyoming St., is the son of Victor Marchetti, also residing in Oakton, and of the late Martha Marchetti. He is married to the former Bernice Baran, Beaver Meadows.


Was E.S. Carrier

Marchetti, once a carrier for the Standard-Speaker, joined the CIA in 1955 and attained the rank equivalent of a full colonel. He spent the bulk of his career working on the Soviet problem largely as an analyst of military developments, moving up the organizational ladder through assignments in research, operations, current intelligence and national estimates.

He finally entered CIA management where he was executive assistant to the Deputy Director and special assistant to the Executive Director and assistant to the Chief of Planning, Programming and Budgeting.

Sees CIA Out-of-Step

After a few years of working and watching at the executive level, Marchetti came to the conclusion that U.S. intelligence is too affluent, too bureaucratic, amazingly inefficient and ineffective, unbelievably lacking in control and direction and generally out of step with the times and needs of the nation. Because of his eventual disillusionment with its policies and his critical attitude toward its bureaucracy, he resigned from the CIA in 1959 and turned to writing fiction.



Victor Marchetti

"The Rope Dancer" is his initial effort. Another title for the factual thriller by the ex-CIA officer could be "Top Secret: The Nice Guy Next Door is a Soviet Agent."

To his neighbors in suburban Washington, Paul Franklin, the main character in the novel, is a good fellow—devoted to his two rambunctious sons, loyal husband to his attractive wife Nancy. To espionage operatives on two continents, he is one of history's top spies, trading vital U.S. secrets for unprecedented sums and switching his allegiance as fast as jets can take him to East Berlin and Moscow.

Tracks Double Life

In "The Rope Dancer," Marchetti tracks Paul's double life and shows how a top intelligence officer can smuggle U.S. secrets under the very noses of the highest-ranking American intelligence officials.

From the moment that Paul defects to the Communists, his life

becomes a dance with danger, leading to clandestine meetings with the intriguing Vera; his Soviet case officer, Yuri; and even with the head of the infamous Soviet KGB.

While honors and other rewards are secretly heaped upon him in the Kremlin, Paul is threatened by betrayal from within the Communist forces and by the vicious pincer movement of U.S. counter-espionage, masterminded by the wife Wellington. As the pressures build against him, Paul finds himself walled in by a suspicious accidental death, the nervous breakdown of a key agency secretary, and by cut-throat murder.

Although Marchetti did not seek to write an expose of the CIA, he has told a realistic and revealing story of how the agency works, using the novel as his medium. "The Rope Dancer," however, is not an ordinary espionage story. In many respects, it is the most realistic spy novel to be produced since John Le Carre's "The Spy Who Came in from the Cold."

No James Bond Act

The hero is no dashing and fantastic James Bond doing silly and impossible things, nor is he the usual overly sophisticated gentleman master spy of so many British murder mysteries masquerading as espionage novels. Paul Franklin is typical of the kind of men who really do work in the intelligence business, and this is what sets the novel apart from the others.

Most spy stories are written by men and women who wouldn't recognize a real spy if they tripped over one. "The Rope Dancer" was authored by a former professional, who also happens to be a native of this area.

Marchetti admits the characters and situations, although fictional, are drawn from life in the espionage profession. It reflects, he says, "what one sees and hears when working in the executive suite of a super-secret agency."

"The crushing burden of clandestinity, the political maneuverings and hypocrisy, the bureaucratic drudgery—these are portrayed as honestly and realistically as is possible in a work of fiction. After years in the trade and after having read hundreds of imitation spy stories, I wanted to tell it like it really is."

spies are frustratingly ordinary at times and dazzlingly extraordinary on occasion. They may appear to be simple-type people in their everyday life, he says, but they may actually be rebels who strongly distrust their own rebelliousness or wanties capable of extreme ruthlessness and even cruelty.

In an early review, John Harbun of the Saturday Review Syndicate wrote that "The Rope Dancer" is so realistic and so well plotted that one can only hope it is not true.

Although the spy thriller is Marchetti's first writing effort, he has completed the first draft of another novel. This he has set aside to work on a non-fiction book—a critical analysis of the U.S. intelligence system. Negotiations also are under way in New York and elsewhere regarding foreign, paperback and movie rights for "The Rope Dancer."

HAS Grad

The author, who expects to visit Hazleton early this fall, attended Holy Trinity Parochial School, North Laurel Street, and was graduated from Hazleton High School, where he played football and was active in dramatics.

His father, uncle and grandfather operated Marchetti's Plumbing and Heating, North Wyoming Street.

After attending the Hazleton Campus of the Pennsylvania State University for two years, Marchetti went to live in New York's Greenwich Village for a year and took classes at NYU. He then moved on to Paris, where he enrolled at the Sorbonne.

The former local man joined the U.S. Army in Germany in 1951 and was assigned to intelligence duties on the East German border. Two years later he was discharged there. Marchetti went back to Paris, then to New York and finally returned here to marry Bernice Baran, who is the daughter of Mrs. Anna Baran, Beaver Meadows, and of the late Wassil Baran.

After eight years of wandering and wondering, Marchetti relates, he enrolled again at Penn State and attained a college diploma. His work with the Central Intelligence Agency followed.

Mr. and Mrs. Marchetti are the parents of three sons, the eldest of who plays football at Oakton High School. They live outside the village of Oakton, near Vienna, where the nation's

CIA 5.01.3 The Rope Dancer

TOLEDO, OHIO

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The CIA's Secret Army

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimative function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.

—CIA Director Richard Helms

WITH that definition of the basic role of the Central Intelligence Agency, few would quarrel. For the sake of national survival, our Government, as well as most of those around the world, must rely on efficient, secretive intelligence-gathering networks for the collection and interpretation of the raw data upon which vital decisions are made.

The CIA is first and foremost an intelligence agency. It is presumably a successful one since Congress has continued it since 1947, and its programs and budgets are reviewed periodically by congressional representatives. The major criticism that has been raised against this agency is that events of the past have shown it far too willing to engage in clandestine operations that would appear to extend well beyond the realm of espionage and intelligence accumulation.

The story now emerging from a Senate subcommittee staff report, for instance, in which the CIA acknowledges that it is maintaining a 30,000-man armed force that is fighting all over Laos only raises anew questions over where the agency's intelligence functions stop and it becomes an extension of the Defense Department. A 30,000-man force that includes Thai mercenaries recruited and paid by the CIA is no mere platoon; it is, in reality, a small army that is receiving support and presumably direction from the CIA while carrying out military operations 10,000 miles from our shores.

There are adverse ramifications when such disclosures finally come to light. First, they further erode confidence in the Government which had long denied knowledge of any secret war in Laos in which we were a major par-

ticipant. Secondly, they cast a shadowy reflection upon the CIA itself by creating the impression that its primary role is not intelligence but insurrection. Lastly, it is this kind of furtive activity that always carries a high risk that what begins as a secret, guerilla-type war will explode into a larger conflict of far greater implication.

When the CIA was set up, the overall purpose was to form an office that would not replace existing elements of the Government's intelligence community but coordinate the work of all of them. One can only wonder if Congress really had in mind creating an agency that under the guise of intelligence-gathering would one day be maintaining an army of 30,000 in distant Laos, in addition to whatever else it is up to.

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be respected in any incomes policy. However, the evolution (or the failure to evolve) of the guideposts placed too much stress on economic rationality as opposed to workability and acceptance. For example, it was no doubt a mistake to have continued to insist on guideposts which were consistent only with complete stability of the price level at a time when prices had already begun to rise more than nominally.

3. The guideposts—or, more broadly, the intervention through public and private persuasion—had a noticeable and useful impact on wages and prices, even during the period 1966-68 when demand-management policy was inappropriate and highly inflationary. There was (in this writer's judgment) no damage to the allocation of resources, nor appreciable inequity—both of which were frequently charged.

4. Locating the administration of the guideposts and related interventions primarily in the Council of Economic Advisers was not ideal. To be sure, since the policy was voluntary, it benefited from a close association with the prestige of the Presidency and from the President's personal intervention at a few crucial points. Neither the Secretary of Labor nor of Commerce would have been a suitable administrator, given his office, and, in any case, the incumbents during most of the period were not supporters of the policy. A merger of the two Departments, or of the Cabinet reorganization proposed by President Nixon, would provide a more suitable office in the future.

5. Given the seriousness of the problem and the inherent limitations of a purely voluntary policy, the author favours the establishment, by legislation, of a Price-Wage Review Board, with limited powers (a) to require prior notice of wage and price changes, (b) to suspend such changes for a limited period, (c) to investigate them (including power to compel testimony), and (d) to report to the public with recommendations. The Board should be authorized to study and recommend—and possibly even be given limited powers of control—with respect to certain features of price-setting or of wage contracts (e.g., the conditions under which escalator clauses could be used), or to certain trade or employment practices that tended to raise costs or reduce competition. It would not, however, have power ultimately to limit or control any price or wage.

6. The President (but not the Wage-Price Review Board) should have at all times standby authority for the compulsory control of wages and prices, wholly or in any part, with the requirement that any use of this authority be reviewed by the Congress under a procedure which would permit a Congressional veto of the President's action.

7. To the maximum extent possible, the existence of a price-incomes policy (although not, obviously, the details of the policy) should cease to be considered a partisan issue, but rather come to be regarded as a regular and permanent aspect of the U.S. stabilization system.

8. A well-developed incomes policy should be in place and working before the U.S. economy next returns to the zone of full employment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, the Chair recognizes the distinguished junior Senator from

Florida (Mr. CHILES), for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. CHILES when he introduced S. 2458 are printed in the Record under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the Chair recognizes the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS AND PROPOSED HEARINGS ON S. 2224, A BILL TO AMEND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators BAYH, BROOKE, CASE, EAGLETON, HARRIS, HART, HATFIELD, HUGHES, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, MATIAS, MCGOVERN, PACKWOOD, PELL, RICHCOFF, RÖTH, SCHWEIKER, STEVENSON, WILLIAMS be listed as cosponsors of S. 2224, a bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has approved my request to hold hearings after the recess on the bill. It is my expectation that among those who will testify are a number of former and present officials experienced in the field of intelligence and the analysis of facts obtained by the intelligence agencies.

In introducing the bill on July 7, I said that the facts and analyses of intelligence collected by the CIA and made available by law to the executive branch under the National Security Act of 1947 should by law be made available to the Congress.

A chief purpose of the hearings is to establish that the best intelligence must be made available to the appropriate committees of the Congress and through them to the Congress as the Congress make determinations respecting legislative authority and funding of policies and programs of the executive branch, in the field of foreign policy and security. It will also be the purpose of the hearings to consider proposals for establishing guidelines in matters of classification and declassification and in establishing for the Congress effective security procedures so that the material to the Congress would be responsibly used.

When the Senate returns from its recess in September, it is my intention to state in more detail the kinds of information that should be available to the Congress and to outline suggestions as to the way the appropriate committees would maintain security for the documents made available to the Congress.

It is my firm belief that this bill provides an effective and straightforward way—and I might say, legal way—based upon the sound precedent of the law which created the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and specified the duties of the Executive branch to keep that Committee fully and currently informed, for the Congress to better carry out its responsibilities. It is a way to insure that the decisions made by the government of this country—both the executive and the legislative—on foreign policy and national security will be the result of the consideration of the best information obtainable.

I ask unanimous consent that my statement of July 7, 1971, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 7, 1971]

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the formulation of sound foreign policy and national security policy requires that the best and most accurate intelligence obtainable be provided to the legislative as well as the executive branch of our Government. The approval by the Congress of foreign policy and national security policy, which are bound together, whose support involves vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war, yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations, should only be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches.

There has been much debate during the past several years concerning the respective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, unfortunately, confrontation between the two branches of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, executive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relationship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would assure a common understanding of the purposes and merits of policies. It is of the greatest importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest importance to the maintenance of our system of government, with its separate branches held so tenuously together by trust and reason.

It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security policy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and human, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people.

I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the legislative

¹ The author made recommendations along these lines as early as 1958. See his paper in *The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth* (Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panelists appearing before the Joint Economic Committee), 31 March 1958 (U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 634-6 and *passim*.

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trated in a handful of locations, to the complete neglect of the rest of the nation. Neither of these are responsible alternatives, and I respectfully urge you to reject them both by increasing the allocations provided by this legislation.

I would like to make two final comments which are peripheral to the actual drug treatment programs, but which are so important that they cannot be ignored. The first is that research in drug control is vital, more so now than ever. With a crushing problem confronting us on a daily basis, it is easy to overlook or forget the need and long-range benefits of research programs. And yet perhaps no effort is more urgently needed than full-scale medical investigations of the physiological and psychological impact of drug abuse. I strongly urge that this important research not be delayed another day, least of all for want of adequate budget allocations.

Finally, I alluded earlier in my testimony to what I consider to be a disastrous plan to phase-out the NIMH Psychiatry Training Program completely over the next three years. This cut will mean a significant decrease in the number of psychiatric residency slots currently available. Fewer residencies will mean fewer psychiatrists. Fewer psychiatrists will mean an even more critical shortage of trained personnel to staff drug treatment centers. Here, perhaps as nowhere else in this budget, it is possible to see how closely related are all of these programs. Taken alone, the cutbacks in the Psychiatry Training Program seem ill-advised; when viewed against the need for competent drug treatment personnel, it appears to be nothing short of nonsensical.

To combat the drug abuse problem that haunts our playgrounds, our parks, our suburbs, our high schools, our cities, we must give our full support—financial as well as moral—to a full-scale, comprehensive Federal program.

THE WARMAKING POWERS OF CONGRESS

Mr. ROYAL. Mr. President, as the United States continues to extricate itself from the land war in which we became involved in Southeast Asia during the decade of the 1960's, many of us in Congress, as well as many private individuals have begun to give increasing attention to the vital question of the role of Congress in the decisionmaking process which led to that involvement.

This question, it seems to me, breaks into two equally important parts: one deals with the warmaking powers of Congress and the other with the problem of providing adequate information to Congress in order that it may intelligently deal with the substantial questions of war and peace on which we are expected to act.

It is because of my deep concern that the legislative branch of the Government regain its constitutional status of coequality with the executive branch in the matter of decisionmaking that I am pleased to join the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and the distinguished Senators from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) in sponsoring legislation pertaining to these areas.

The Cooper bill (S. 2224) is a direct outgrowth of the discussion and self-reflection which the publication of the so-called "Pentagon papers" stimulated earlier this summer. The revelations of

these previously classified documents and the historic decision of the Supreme Court permitting their publication have engendered debate on topics of vital concern and lasting importance to the Congress.

The essential issue here, of course, is the problem of providing information to Congress. Complete and accurate information from all available sources, should be accessible to the Congress. As matters now stand, Congress is sometimes denied access to current intelligence information compiled by the CIA and the intelligence community.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) has presented a timely and constructive bill that will make such intelligence information available to the Congress just as it is already available to the Executive. His proposal, which I was pleased to cosponsor amends the National Security Act of 1947 by adding a section requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide individual Members of Congress, upon request, through the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate, intelligence information and CIA's analysis thereof. The security of and access to the information provided to the Congress would be the responsibility of the committees, who would institute the necessary measures to provide clearances, secure areas, documents control, and so forth.

The National Security Act of 1947 does not specifically bar intelligence information from Congress, but neither does it provide for the dissemination of such information. This proposal makes intelligence information available to the proper committees as a matter of law. If the Congress is to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy, it must have available intelligence facts and their analysis. Although the Central Intelligence Agency has often provided such information to certain committees and Members of Congress in the past, this has been done only at the pleasure of the Executive, and the veil of secrecy has been extended to cover too much that is necessary to make legislative decisions of great substantive importance to the American people. Proper disclosure to appropriate committees is a vital safeguard against Government adoption of positions and policies of unknown and potentially dangerous implications. Congress cannot be expected to function effectively if it is not acquainted with information about a particular subject in essentially the same detail that is in fact in the possession of the Executive.

Adoption of this proposal, S. 2224, will make available to Congress information absolutely essential if we are to fulfill our obligation to the people of this country. It will strengthen the balance of responsibility between the Executive and the legislature by promoting trust and reasoned judgment on matters relating to the national interest.

The second proposal—the Stennis-Mansfield resolution, Senate Joint Reso-

lution 95—is a pertinent and reasonable response to the other facet of the problem which I referred to earlier, namely the congressional responsibility in the warmaking process.

Senate Joint Resolution 95 does not in any way attempt to fix responsibility for the present tragedy in Southeast Asia on either the Democrats or the Republicans.

Instead, Senate Joint Resolution 95 attacks the heart of the whole 1971 problem. The fact that Congress has not declared war since the Second World War ended in 1945, despite the many conflicts and near conflicts we have engaged in, raises the question of who has the power to begin the wars we fight. Senate Joint Resolution 95 is not an attempt to rewrite the Constitution. The Constitution lodges in the Congress the power to declare war, and throughout our history the Congress has been recognized as the only branch which could declare wars.

This power to declare war is not outmoded simply because we have grown from an America composed of Thirteen Colonies and separated from the rest of the world by an impenetrable sea barrier to an international leader, or which is outdated by modern warfare. As Senator STENNIS stated when introducing this resolution.

I remember I was standing at the desk which is behind me now when the news came into this Chamber that troops had been ordered to land in Korea. I knew that this was the first time in our history a deliberate decision had been made to land troops, an army, in a war against another nation without a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States.

Senate Joint Resolution 95 is an attempt to delineate more clearly the war powers of the executive and the legislative branches. At the same time, it would insure that the decision to go to war, a decision too massive and too important to be decided by one man, would again become the collective judgment of the President and the elected representatives of the American people. The resolution guards the powers of the President and the security of the Nation by outlining very carefully those emergency situations in which the President may commit American troops to combat abroad. At the same time, the resolution safeguards the right of the Congress to declare war by placing a time limit on this commitment of troops. The time limit, 30 days, is long enough to avert a disaster, but short enough so that if a full-scale war is to be begun, the Congress too will be required to authorize it.

Finally, in placing this resolution before the Congress, Senator STENNIS has made a significant contribution to what ought to be a long, serious discussion, and a protracted study, by the Senate, the Congress, and in fact, the whole Nation, in what the future role of the Congress and the President ought to be in the declaration of war. It is a study which the Congress has long shoved aside, and which has not been resolved satisfactorily in the entire history of our Nation. The possibilities for total annihilation today, and the volatile and dangerous situation of the world today

HE'S BETTING HIS FUTURE

STATINTL

Is The CIA Unconstitutional? Bill Richardson Says It's Out Of Bounds

By TOM WERTZ

Tribune-Review Staff Writer

When the federal government tells you it spends 100 million dollars each year on agricultural research, it may, in fact, be spending only 50 million.

When it says it receives and expends 80 million dollars to study the impact of foreign imports on the American market, it may be spending only 45 million on that project.

When it says that the total educational budget for the year 1970 was 30 billion dollars, the actual money expended for educational purposes may have been two billion short of that amount.

Where's the other money going? Some of it, or all of it, is going to support the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which carries out classified, clandestine projects all over the world in the name of national security.

But just how much money is expended, from which regular government agency the money is taken, and the nature and scope of secret work it supports, no one outside of the very tight inner circle of government really knows.

Intricate System

The CIA is the only United States government agency which is immune by Congressional statute from making a public accounting of how it gets or spends public tax money. The secrecy of its receipts and expenditures is maintained through a very intricate system of federal budgeting wherein the budgets of hundreds of unrelated federal agencies — ranging from agriculture to medical research — are purposely inflated to hide, perhaps, billions of dollars diverted to the CIA by manipulations within the government's Budget Bureau.

While dozens of books and articles — some factual, some combinations of fact and fiction — have been written in recent years about the functions of the CIA and its role in a free society, only one individual questioning the CIA's unaccountability and its purpose in America has seen fit to challenge its existence legally, through the courts, in what may become one of the most controversial Constitutional law issues in modern America.

The man is William B. Richardson, a 52-year-old Greensburg resident, student of Constitutional law, husband, father of three, a southerner by birth, former government employee and former insurance manager who presently makes a living by investigating cases for the Westmoreland County Public Defender's Office.

Massive Fraud

Richardson believes firmly that the unaccounted for, secret maintenance of a clandestine agency, such as the CIA, violates the United States Constitution in a number of respects and reduces the government to a deliberate perpetration of a massive fraud against the American people.

In 1967, Richardson, then a claims manager for an insurance company, put his personal success on the block, so to speak, and filed suit against the government in an attempt to force the U.S. Treasury Department to stop publication of what he regarded as a fraudulent accounting of public spending because the government admittedly did not list all the money it spent and, moreover, purposely distorted accounts of all listed expenditures to hide from the public what it allocates to the CIA.

Specifically, Richardson claims it violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution which states clearly that, "... No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

'The Merits'

Since 1967, he has been to the United States District Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court, and is now in the process of going through the court system for a second time after being turned down each step of the way on procedural matters relating to court jurisdiction and like issues. At no time have the courts, as yet, reached a decision on what lawyers call "the merits" of the case, i.e., whether the CIA funding method violates the Constitution.

Richardson is presently before the Third Circuit Court

of Appeals which is expected to decide any day now whether the case is of such consequence Constitutionally to warrant a full hearing on the merits by a three-judge panel. If the case gets to the point of discussing merits, he said, the court will have no choice but to declare the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 unconstitutional. It is through that Congressional act that the government manipulates the budget to allow for secret spending.

What motivates Richardson? And what is his overriding concern on CIA spending?

With only traces of his southern accent showing here and there, Richardson made it clear that he is both repulsed and frightened by what the CIA is purportedly doing with public money.

Inherently Wrong

"I feel it's inherently wrong and the reasons are obvious", he said. "It's one thing to hide funds used in international efforts to accumulate power... but it's quite another thing to use hidden funds to try to direct the thinking of your own people."

And that, he said, is what the CIA appears to be doing.

Richardson said his concern reached the point of alarm and a determination to initiate a challenge when it was disclosed a few years ago by the New York Times and Ramparts magazine that the CIA was underwriting hundreds of "conduits" throughout the United States, among them the National Student Association, in an effort to control public thinking.

"I never in my life had any idea they were operating in the zone of interior" (meaning within the United States and its possessions), he said.

He said he believes that, if unchecked, an organization like the CIA, with unlimited funds, undefined goals, acting as a para-military agency in

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A Conflict Of National Interest

Although we usually view the political and social scene from a different viewpoint, we find ourselves in accord with Columnist Marianne Means in the belief that 110 people are a lot of individuals to keep a secret.

We believe a lot of others would agree--especially if it were explained that the 110 were all members of congress.

The reference is to the Columnist's piece on the proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency be required to give routine briefings of its activities to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees of the House and Senate.

The proposal has been made by the Hon. Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, fourth ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whose chairman is the Hon. J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas.

At the present time the CIA is required to give such reports only to five subcommittees of the two houses, these including only the senior members of the four standing committees.

Quite naturally the heads of CIA (to say nothing of the boys down in the field) are quaking in their boots at the thought of 110 members of congress being made privy to their activities and this is not strange for if there was one fact on which there was any general agreement in the recent Pentagon Papers hassle it was that Washington, D.C., was about the loosest place in the world when considered from the secrecy-security viewpoint.

One can easily imagine the confusion that would exist as 110 members of congress rushed from the multi-exits of the State Department to the taxi stations in an effort to be the first to hold a press conference after receiving something hot like the CIA employment of the Indochina mountain people to locate Chinese launch sites.

We would venture the guess that CIA might as well close up shop if required

110 members of congress, considering also the fact that most of them would have a husband and - or wife.

CIA not only has the difficult problem of furnishing information and intelligence to the President, but it frequently appears that it faces the task of justifying its existence and activities to a large portion of the 435 members of congress. It is rather difficult to accomplish such a mission when such activities are supposed to be known only within the organization.

To its other difficulties, Central Intelligence has the problem of recruiting personnel--commonly known as agents--and this is about as difficult as recruiting for the famous 82nd Airborne, even when the advertisement promises a five-day week, no k.p., and short orders in the mess halls at all hours, including a dish of foam.

Perhaps we have seen too much of Mission Impossible and the electric wizardry of Barney and Jim, but the avid followers of this series should remember that the "Secretary will deny any knowledge" if any of the team gets caught with a hand in the cookie jar.

This is the sort of decision which members of congress are required to make--and incidentally for which they are paid \$47,500 per annum, plus fringe benefits. We have become big boys now and face the necessity of making disagreeable decisions, of which this kind of business is one.

The member of congress is responsible for the actions of the government. Equally as important, he or she is responsible for the disbursement of public funds. To this is added the responsibility for national defense, including methods.

The natural conflict ought to be apparent to all, just as is the conflict within the mind of the President. Consequently we find it necessary to ask ourselves if the system can operate, but,

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Why Not?

Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired for his good common sense, has offered a good common sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the "germane" committees of the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of "analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the intelligence gathered by that agency.

The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Congress is entitled to the same information that the executive receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surprisingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dissemination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Congress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the power of the purse, but few members of either House are courageous enough to stop a war by withholding funds--it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time.

Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would have limited Congressional circulation. It would be made available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff members working on national security matters, subject to the normal security requirements.

Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under the present arrangement. The President, for his purposes, leaks a CIA report to, say, *The New York Times* on, say, the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government. Does the President call in the reporters and tell them candidly that here is a CIA report of general interest which I am divulging to all of you? He does nothing of the kind--he would rather play the leaking game. That is one reason why the executive prefers to hoard the information and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so.

The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The Congress and the public are denied information on which vital decisions are based. The denial applies not only to military information but substantially to all data except what the executive chooses to share, which is always what will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them. The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from the public and the press.

Senator Cooper has taken an important first step to limit the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations. His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy and save us from involvement in another Indochina mess.

STATINTL

Declining Self-Confidence

PETER WILES

International Affairs, April 1971. Reprinted by permission.

The drop in morale in the United States is of deep concern to those who look to American assistance for their security. The author of the essay here writes of this with great sensitivity but points to the problem of declining self-confidence that the Soviet Union faces as well. The United States, however, he considers the more vulnerable of the two -- 'judged by last year's headlines'. While optimistic about the strength of the American system he wonders whether the strains it is undergoing may not cause an abandonment of all of its present foreign policy. Professor Wiles holds the Chair of Russian Social and Economic Studies at the University of London.*

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You may remember that when Flora Poste, in *Cold Comfort Farm*, was summoning up strength to deal with her Aunt Ada Doom, she read again and again in the *Higher Common Sense* of the Abbé Fausse-Maigre, 'the chapter on "Preparing the Mind for the Twin Invasion by Prudence and Daring in Dealing with Substances not Included in the Outline"'.¹ I only wish that, in dealing with our subject, I too could have read the *Higher Common Sense* of the Abbé Fausse-Maigre. For I feel very much like a Mannerist painter, the traditional frame of whose canvas cannot contain his whole picture. True, all the old elements of reality are still there, and as vigorous as ever. His art is still fundamentally figurative in the old way, but here a form is absurdly elongated, there a familiar face has an unnatural pallor and, above all, the extremities of limbs spill out of the canvas altogether. Many small things, in other words, are quite new, and their importance cannot be estimated.

Some of these 'substances not included in the outline' make it much more doubtful whether an imperial Power can any longer mobilize its own people and resources for imperial purposes. Nationalism, certainly, remains very strong indeed, stronger for instance than Communism. We cannot doubt that nations will still fight for their independence and territorial integrity, even for the liberation of 'irredentas' on their borders. But what about putting our troops in Berlin, Saigon, Prague or Singapore, where nationalism

is only indirectly involved? For how long in this permissive and cynical age will any people have the moral self-confidence to do such things?

Self-confidence is the key. An imperialist government has to feel a great historic righteousness about what it does, and the citizens of its core nationality must share much of this feeling. There must of course be adequate numbers of people, and an adequately productive economy; but the will to mobilize, and the willingness to be mobilized, are far more important, and since men are moral beings that will rests upon self-righteousness.

Now it is obvious that this self-righteousness and this will have fallen in Britain to levels so low that we have become almost quite unusable for imperial purposes. What I ask you to consider is how far the US and Soviet peoples have gone along the same road. For the old-fashioned cold war between the two old-fashioned super-powers is still the most important international tension; indeed most of the other tensions concern us British not directly but only in so far as they concern these two.

Having married an American citizen, and being a professor, I am often in the United States, and all my work contacts -- though perhaps only half of my social contacts -- are with students and professors. From this unrepresentative viewpoint, which is also far too much the viewpoint of the journalists we read, the situation is very frightening indeed. A large and growing number of young and educated people have found an answer to William James' desperate question,

* A revised version of a lecture given at Chatham House.

¹ Stella Gibbons, *Cold Comfort Farm*, Chapter 20.

continued

20 JUL 1977



Tom Broderick

Two-Faced Morality

STATINTL

CHIEF JUSTICE Warren Burger is an uncomplicated man who greets late-night visitors guns in hand. It is the duty of every citizen, he wrote in his dissent on the Pentagon Papers, "taxi drivers, justices and the New York Times to report stolen property to responsible officers." It is good, old-fashioned morality, and there is nothing wrong with it except that it is simple-minded as the following stories reveal:

Story number one is as follows: In the fall of 1944,

Gen. William J. Donovan, American hero of World War I and later chief of the World War II espionage organization known as OSS, wrote a memorandum to President Roosevelt. In this memorandum, Donovan suggested establishment of a postwar "centralized intelligence agency."

The letter was stamped "Top Secret" and sent to the White House, eleven copies being retained in Donovan's files. While Mr. Roosevelt was considering Donovan's idea, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover obtained one of the copies and gave it to a Washington reporter for the Chicago Tribune named Walter Trohan.

Trohan denounced Donovan's plan in print as "an all powerful intelligence service ... to pry into the lives of citizens." He explained that it would have "secret funds for spy work along the lines of ... luxury living described in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim."

CONGRESS chimed in. One congressman took the floor to say that the Donovan plan was another "indication that the New Deal, like Simon Legree, wants to own us, body and soul."

In the uproar, Donovan's ambition to keep OSS (with himself as its chief) a part of the U.S. government was ended.

So much for story one. Story two is more recent. A few weeks ago, the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks proposed to return U.S. prisoners of war on condition that President Nixon announce a date for withdrawal of Americans. The proposal put the president on the spot. He had been saying that return of our prisoners was a condition to get out but he had also said we wouldn't leave Vietnam unless the South Vietnamese government had a reasonable chance to survive.

Should he go before the American people and say he was refusing the offer of our prisoners because the government of Hanoi and Ky—after all these years still didn't have a reasonable chance to survive?

What the President did, instead, was to cause a memorandum to be leaked from the Central Intelligence Agency to the New York Times. The memorandum was an analysis of the North Vietnamese proposal. It called the proposal a trap, a snare and a delusion. It helped take the President off the spot.

NOW WHAT are the lessons from these two stories? If it is the duty of every citizen to report stolen property, as the Chief Justice says, does this duty extend to J. Edgar Hoover? Or is he entitled to a higher duty—in this instance to prevent the formation of a government agency which he thought might rival his own? If Hoover is entitled to a higher duty—isn't Dan Ellsberg entitled to argue that he stole the Pentagon papers out of a higher duty, and isn't the New York Times entitled to argue that it received them out of a higher duty?

If it is the duty of newspapers not to print confidential government papers, what are the newspapers to do with confidential papers the President wants printed?

Does the Chief Justice believe that when Sen. Henry M. Jackson announced the other day that the Russians had some new holes in the ground, he was revealing information gained from personal observation? Isn't it more likely that somebody at the Pentagon gave Senator Jackson the content of a secret document?

It's hard to know where to start with this old-fashioned morality is a terrible simplifier. Like a gun in the night.

STATINTL

WORCESTER, MASS.
TELEGRAM

M - 62,339
S - 108,367

JUL 19 1977

STATINTL

Probing the CIA

✓ Congress, which is in an anti-Vietnam, anti-Administration mood, is directing its attention to the Central Intelligence Agency. A number of bills being debated would flush some of the CIA spooks out into the daylight and give Congress more of a say in the agency's operations.

It is a sensitive subject, to say the least. The CIA says it must be close-lipped to be effective. But some of its critics think its curtain of secrecy gives it the power to act as an invisible government, accountable to no one.

✓ The various proposals offered attack the problem from different angles. Rep. Herman Badillo wants an amendment which would confine the CIA to gathering and analyzing intelligence. Sen. George McGovern wants all CIA appropriations and expenditures to appear in the budget as a single line item. (CIA expenses are now concealed). Sen. Clifford Case has introduced legislation to prohibit the CIA from financing a second country's operation in a third country (as the CIA is doing now with the Thais in Laos). Senator Sen. John Cooper, who is a former ambassador and friendly to the CIA, nevertheless wants its "conclusions, facts and analyses" distributed in full to the relevant committees in Congress as well as to the executive branch. This would require an amendment to the National Security Act.

✓ It is plain that some of these proposals are aimed at the executive

branch, which Congress has become very suspicious of. Many congressmen have the feeling that they have been hoodwinked by various presidents (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution affair, for example), and they are convinced that the powers and secrecy of the CIA permit the executive branch to do things in foreign affairs that would otherwise be impossible under the Constitution.

Congress' attitude is understandable. After all, the Constitution regards the legislative as perhaps the most important branch of the government, yet Congress does not even know what is going on in foreign affairs, half the time, and is powerless to do anything when it does learn the facts. The war in Laos, for example, has been run by the CIA without congressional approval or even debate.

Yet, how effective can an intelligence agency be if its activities are exposed to congressional scrutiny? How long would its secrets remain secret if they were pored over by congressional committees?

The questions raised by these proposals in Congress are fundamental in their implications. On the one hand, the United States must have effective ways to gather intelligence — and it also must on occasion be able to operate clandestinely.

✓ On the other, it cannot tolerate an agency that functions under too tight a secrecy curtain with almost unlimited funds and powers. That way lies other Bays of Pigs.

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LINCOLN, NEBR.
STAR

M - 26,553

JUL 17 1971

McGovern Would Ask Congress

He Can't See Using Troops Otherwise

... Candidate Campaigns Here

By DON WALTON
Star Staff Writer

Sen. George McGovern Friday said he cannot envision any circumstance under which he, as president, would "commit American forces to combat" without a congressional declaration of war.

And, he said, he would hope that whoever is president at the end of the war in Vietnam would "adopt a very lenient amnesty policy" for American boys who refused to participate in the war out of conscience.

That includes those who fled to Canada and those who were sent to prison for refusing to recognize the military draft, McGovern said.

Applause Enthusiastic

The South Dakota Democrat's declarations -- both given in response to questioners -- were enthusiastically applauded by a jammed reception crowd at a downtown hotel.

McGovern, the only announced Democratic presidential candidate, campaigned in Lincoln and Omaha as he kicked off a three-day foray into Nebraska.

Earlier, in Omaha, he praised President Nixon's decision to visit China and urged recognition of Peking in the United Nations as "the sole legitimate government of

McGovern took to the streets in both downtown Omaha and Lincoln, shaking hands with shoppers. He lunched with Douglas County Democratic leaders in the Gate City and dined with Lancaster County Democratic women in the Capital City.

Young Voters Numerous

At a reception in Lincoln, attended by large numbers of potential new young voters, McGovern fielded questions on a host of subjects.

The senator warned young people that "a lot of people will do what they can to make it hard for you" to register to vote in the 1972 presidential election.

They should be prepared to overcome any such obstacles and "Struggle to exercise your option," he declared.

Curb On CIA Favored

McGovern promised to support "a strong agricultural program" and told one questioner that Congress should strictly limit the CIA to intelligence activities.

"They should not be in the business of fomenting coups or dumping governments or assassination," he insisted.

His poor standing in the polls gave him no more than a recognition factor at this point," McGovern said.

"I expect to do much better in the primaries than with Dr. Gallup or Mr. Harris," he said.

And, the senator suggested, he believes the eventual Democratic nominee "will be decided" in the primaries.

Nebraska Key

Nebraska is a key contest for him, he told newsmen in Omaha.

"We're going to make a major effort in both Nebraska and South Dakota, and we expect to win both primaries," McGovern said.

An "all-out effort" will also be mounted in Wisconsin, he promised, and "we expect to do very well" there.

The departure of Sen. Harold Hughes of Iowa from the Democratic presidential sweepstakes represents "a significant gain for me," he said.

"We tended to appeal to the same constituency," he noted.

It is "too early" to accurately assess the effect of Friday's entry of Sen. Fred Harris of Oklahoma into the presidential free-for-all, McGovern said.

He'll Hit Economic Issues

Long identified chiefly as an antiwar candidate McGovern said he will "zero in on economic issues" during coming weeks. His targets will include unemployment, farm prices and "rampant inflation," he said.

He said he would support the Nationalist Chinese government, should be "essentially resolved" by negotiations.

the Chinese people, McGovern said.

"We should permit the Chinese to work out this problem among themselves."

President Nixon's trip to China "signals recognition of the fact that the real government is in Peking," McGovern said.

"We have maintained the charade (of acting otherwise) long enough."

He Sought Visit OK

In a taped interview which will be telecast on KUON-TV and the Nebraska Educational Television Network next Wednesday night at 9:30 p.m., McGovern revealed that he requested to visit China five years ago.

His request received no official response, the senator said, but now that China has opened its borders to some American visitors, he would like to go.

McGovern will travel to Laurel and Norfolk Saturday for meetings with farmers and party leaders in northeast Nebraska, then return to Omaha for a reception with labor leaders.

On Sunday, the senator will mine the vote-rich Democratic precincts of Omaha through a series of private meetings, a campaign dinner and an afternoon reception at Elmwood Park.

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STATINTL

GREENWICH, CONN.
TIME

E - 12,881

JUL 15 1971

Keeping Tabs

The problem of making Congress privy to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency without impairing its effectiveness is not a simple one. The CIA has traded on this circumstance in the past, using it to head off any serious move for congressional surveillance of CIA operations and spending.

Some reasonable compromise ought to be arrived at, however. In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the super-secret agency — so secret that Congress had only the roughest idea of its expenditures and virtually no information about what it did until after the fact — engages in clandestine activity about which the most serious questions can

be raised. There have been indications that the CIA may manipulate internal affairs of other countries and even engage in military operations — all without the knowledge, let alone the consent, of Congress.

As noted above, the difficulties posed by the nature and function of the CIA are not the sort that can be easily dealt with. The intelligence agency cannot be an open book; that would render it ineffective. It would be unrealistic to make public reports on what the CIA is currently involved in.

The bill introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky would not demand this, however. It would require that Congress, through its appropriate committees, be kept informed by being supplied with current CIA activity reports. Cooper's rationale in offering the legislation is sound: he argues that at present Congress must make important national security judgments without having access to anything like all the pertinent data.

Cooper's is not the only bill to address itself to this subject. In a concerted effort to bring the matter to head, Sens. Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and George McGovern of South Dakota also introduced measures. Three offered by Case are designed, he told his colleagues, "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars." McGovern's bill would let Congress in on how much is spent by the CIA, and would bar the present practice of concealing an undetermined amount of CIA funds in appropriations for other agencies.

Congress ought clearly to proceed with care in evaluating these measures. It must steer a course between the advantages of having more knowledge on which to base foreign policy decisions and the drawbacks of exposing sensitive intelligence operations to scrutiny. This will be difficult, but it is not impetus of legislative proposals. Somehow the dangerous practice of treating the CIA as it were wholly exempt from review must be halted.

HENDERSONVILLE, N.C.
TIMES-NEWS

E - 10,062
JUL 12 1977

Congress Would Close CIA

"Nobody knows how much the Central Intelligence Agency spends or what it actually does. Not even Congress."

The quotation is from an editorial in The Asheville Citizen and it is a statement with which we beg leave to disagree--vehemently.

Had The Citizen said no American, including members of Congress, knew what the CIA did or how much it spent, we would have been inclined to agree. But without such a qualification we cannot.

We dare say that the fellows down on the American desk at the Russian center on Red Square know within a few bucks how much money CIA has to spend and--of greater seriousness--pretty much what the CIA people are doing most of the time.

What The Citizen seems to be overlooking, however, is that the CIA is supposed to be a combination of intelligence agencies, an outgrowth (as we remember it) from the OSS which Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan organized back during or just prior to the entry of the U.S. in World War II.

The Citizen--devoted as its editors are to the right of the people to know--rather gloatingly points out that all this is to be changed and that Congress is to get access to CIA reports as well as its appropriations and expenditures.

If the CIA hasn't already been 'done in' by some of our loyal Americans who passed on the nuclear experiments, or by people like Kim Philby, a Britisher who sold out to Moscow when a student and rose to be chief of British counterintelligence, it has the coup de grace from such congressional legislation.

Of course, we know how much the Russians knew up to the point where a yodel in the House of Commons threatened to speak on the matter unless something was done about Kim, and after a certain point he was given nothing important--although he once held a higher security classification in the CIA halls than General Leslie Groves (who headed the atomic bomb project).

We don't have any friends at CIA. We don't know whether it has accomplished anything or not. We know it apparently has spent a lot of money. But it is a cardinal principle in intelligence (spy) work that nobody knows anyone except his immediate superior and his single (or perhaps rarely) multiple lower contacts.

Boy, old 607 James Road would really shudder if he knew that Teddy Boy Kennedy, Wild Willie Fulbright and some of the others knew both who he was and what he did for a living, because, if any one thing has been shown in the Times-Post-government business it is that Washington is about the loosest and talkingest town in the world.

Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey would limit covert use of funds and place some "outside control" on these "free wheeling" operations of the executive in foreign policy.

This would just be ducky, but we suggest that Senator Case take a few minutes off and examine the Constitution to see where it places the responsibility for foreign affairs.

Over in Moscow old Kim must be having a good laugh at that one.

Congress Turns to the CIA

STATINTL

✓ Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired effort to break the Executive's near monopoly of powers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the Central Intelligence Agency. This is understandable, and was to be expected, too. The agency's powers are great—or so one suspects; no one representing the public is really in a position to know. Yet because it operates under virtually absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the Defense and State Departments undergo.

The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA fall into two categories. Those in the first category start from the premise that the CIA is essentially an operations agency and an ominous one, which is beyond public control and which must somehow be restrained—for the good of American foreign policy and for the health of the American democratic system alike.

✓ So Senator Case has introduced legislation to prevent CIA from financing a second country's military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais in Laos) and to impose on the agency the same limitations on disposing of "surplus" military materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive from doing secretly what the Congress has forbidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would restrict Executive flexibility, since the government would have to justify before a body not beholden to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The advantage to the Executive would be that the Congress would then have to share responsibility for the actions undertaken. Since these actions involve making war and ensuring the security of Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we cannot see how a serious legislature can evade attempts to bring them under proper control.

✓ Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA expenditures and appropriations should appear in the budget as a single line item is another matter. He argues that taxpayers could then decide whether they wanted to spend more or less on intelligence than, say, education. We wonder, though, whether a serious judgment on national priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be based on knowing just its budget total. In that figure, critics might have a blunt instrument for polemics but citizens would not have the fine instrument required for analysis.

✓ In the House, Congressman Badillo recently offered an amendment to confine the CIA to

gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the traditional rallying cry of those who feel either that the United States has no business running secret operations or that operational duties warp intelligence production. The amendment, unenforceable anyway under existing conditions, lost 172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a principal reason why concerned legislators despair of the status quo: Earlier this year House Armed Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the 10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated complete responsibility to himself. Congressman Badillo is now seeking a way to reconstitute the subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately overseen by the Congress.

✓ Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's, however, lies a critical difference. Far from regarding CIA as an ominous operational agency whose work must be checked, he regards it as an essential and expert intelligence agency whose "conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to be distributed "fully and currently" to the germane committees of Congress as well as to the Executive Branch. He would amend the National Security Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.

To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts—perhaps a bit too readily—that a large part of national security policy is formulated on the basis of information classified as secret. If the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available the same information on which the Executive acts—and not as a matter of discretion or chance but of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again and again put off by an Executive saying, as was said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "If you only knew what we knew . . ." Otherwise Congress will forever be running to catch up with Executive trains that have already left the station.

The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp questions of Executive privilege and of Executive prerogative in foreign policymaking—to leave aside the issue of keeping classified information secure. But they are questions which a responsible Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper proposal will become a vehicle for debating them in depth—and in public, too.

SACRAMENTO, CAL.

BEE

E - 172,411

S - 200,546

JUL 10 1971

McCloskey Says He Will Challenge Nixon In Primary

By James Wrightson

McClatchy Newspapers Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES -- Pledging to end the war in Vietnam and to "restore truth in government," Republican Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. Friday announced he will run in the California primary election against Richard M. Nixon next June.

He said he will ask California Republicans to vote for a slate of nominees for delegates pledged to his candidacy at the Republican National Convention in 1972.

Gov. Ronald Reagan has said he will lead a delegation pledged to Nixon at the convention.

McCloskey, in press conferences here and in San Francisco, expressed grave concern for the future of the Republican party.

"Under the present policy of the President, vice president and attorney general the Republican Party is dying both nationally and here in California," he said.

He called for a party platform and candidates who could appeal to young voters.

He said his party cannot survive unless it can attract "the idealism, enthusiasm, and energies of the finest young people in the nation."

The lean, dark haired 48-year-old decorated Korean War veteran, a colonel in the Marine reserve, promised he would not run a "single issue campaign" based on ending the war.

He pledged:

--To "restore truth in government."

--To "return to historic Republican moral commitments on social issues rather than the present 'Southern Strategy'."

--A restoration of "judicial excellence and independence." (An apparent reference to Nixon's recent appointments to the Supreme Court.)

--To limit the CIA operations to gathering intelligence rather than becoming involved in internal affairs of

other nations, as it did in the government of South Vietnam.

--A "more responsible and effective economic policy."

--A "new set of priorities in areas of rural and urban revitalization of the environment."

McCloskey tied his proposals for ending the war to the return of American prisoners of war.

The young Marine who earlier this year angered the Republican leadership by saying one way to get rid of a President who will not end an "immortal war" is to "impeach him," said he thinks his platform will attract new voters to the Republican party and will persuade Democrats to re-register as Republicans.

McCloskey's decision to head a slate of delegates in the California primary came as no surprise to political observers.

On March 19, speaking to the liberal Republican Ripon society in Boston, he said he would enter primaries in the 17 states which have them if the President did not change his policy on the Vietnam war, and if no other Republican challenged the President.

McCloskey's announcement was taken here as more than an empty declaration.

He has promise of financial support from Republican industrialist Norton Simon, and Baltimore businessman Henry Niles who is chairman of Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace.

Political observers say an antiwar argument for a decorated Marine to a war-weary people is not to be discounted.

Several aides to leading Democrats were at the press conference as observers.

McCloskey's first claim to political fame was when he sunk the "Good Ship Lollypop" in a special election in

San Francisco's 14th Congressional District, San Mateo County, defeating Shirley Temple Black when she sought to continue the state's phenomenon of actors becoming politicians.

McCloskey supporters feel his principal strengths are an incisive mind and determination.

Friends say he is recruiting a stable of experts -- men from universities around his suburban San Francisco congressional district -- to give him a crash education on an array of issues which will appeal to young people.

His backers have opened a storefront office in Washington, DC, three blocks from the Capitol on Pennsylvania Avenue.

STATINTL

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL

JUL 8 1971
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

"We need information"

Cooper offers bill seeking CIA data

By WARD SINCLAIR

Courier Journal & Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In another move aimed at reasserting congressional authority, Sen. John Sherman Cooper introduced legislation yesterday that would require the executive branch to regularly share its intelligence reports with Congress.

Cooper's bill, amending the National Security Act of 1947, calls on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to "fully and currently" keep appropriate congressional committees apprised of security matters.

The Kentucky Republican said he had planned to introduce such a measure last year, but that it was sidetracked by other activities of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a member. He acknowledged, however, that new motivation came from the ongoing debate over newspaper publication of the so-called Pentagon papers, the extensive classified study of the roots of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Wants Congress to have all information

Cooper said his intention is to help provide Congress with sufficient and adequate background intelligence information—the same data available to the executive—for making decisions in the foreign policy field.

"We in Congress are called upon to support these activities with men and money; there is the possibility of engaging in commitments with other nations that could lead to combat—this has been the source of confrontation between the executive and the legislative," he said.

"I hope this amendment can lead to more harmonious relations between the two branches of government," he added.

The Kentucky senator said he felt that recent disclosure of the Pentagon papers showed "we didn't get the information" needed to assist Congress in determining its support of successive administrations in prosecuting the Vietnam involvement.

Cooper said he had not notified the White House in advance of his action yesterday. He speculated that the Nixon administration might resist his proposal, but he feels it will have considerable support in Congress.

Informing Congress not forbidden

"I think the prospects for passage are good," he said. "It would have an effect on the increased declassification of documents . . . it would be along the lines of establishing the standards the Supreme Court referred to" in its decision last week that allowed newspapers to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

Cooper said the 1947 security act did not prohibit the CIA from giving Congress the same intelligence data that it provides the executive branch. But, he added, it did not specifically call for such action, either.

"Oh, we have gone to the CIA and had briefings and the CIA has been helpful, but it is not a matter of how that they must provide the information to Congress," he said.

His amendment, he said, would require the CIA to keep the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees and their counterparts in the House regularly briefed on security matters.

Cooper said the intelligence apparatus of the government on occasion has appeared before these committees upon request, but he said there were other times when such had not been the case.

"I am aware of when we on the Foreign Relations Committee asked for information from both Presidents—Johnson and Nixon—and it didn't come or it came too late," he noted.

He also mentioned that the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., had tried without success some time ago to get the administration to turn over the Pentagon papers.

Cooper's action yesterday was another in a series he has spearheaded during the past several years in an attempt to reassert the constitutional role of Congress in sharing foreign policy decisions with the executive branch.

These efforts have included the Cooper-Church amendment on Cambodia, the national commitments resolution and a sense-of-the-Senate resolution limiting the presidential field of military action in Laos and Thailand.

TR FOR FOLO

CIA Report Bill Backed In Senate

By RICHARD DUDMAN

Chief Washington Correspondent
 of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 8 — Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress as well as to the Executive Branch.

Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, introduced his proposal yesterday as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the CIA.

Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York, announced their

support for the measure on the Senate floor. Fulbright spoke of holding hearings on the proposal.

Symington, chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he had had in obtaining full information about secret U.S. military preparations and operations abroad, including the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos.

Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic Energy Commission keep Congress "fully and currently" informed.

Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the CIA. An aid said that Cooper had found CIA information generally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had noted that it was rendered only in response to specific questions.

Under his amendment, the CIA would have to take the initiative in sending Congress its analyses of problems of foreign policy and national security.

The aid said that Cooper had been considering such a measure for several years. He said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports and probably had broadened support in Congress for a requirement to make them available.

In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the committees.

Any member of Congress or designated member of his staff would have access to the information. All such persons would be subject to security requirements such as those in the Executive Branch.

Cooper said that the best information should be available to the Executive and Legislative branches as a basis for national decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations."

Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA.

George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget.

Three bills were introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for

fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

Case said they were designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the Executive Branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Meanwhile, the House rejected a proposal that the Administration be required to tell it



John Sherman Cooper

what the military and CIA were doing in Laos.

By a vote of 261 to 118, members tabled — and thus killed — a resolution introduced by Representative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House with the policy guidelines given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The ambassador has responsibility for overseeing the clandestine military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the royal Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao.

William B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, clashed yesterday with McCloskey over whether the Department of State was directing U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.

Macomber denied the allegation and suggested that if McCloskey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State Department to testify.

The exchange occurred as Macomber testified before a House foreign affairs subcommittee on ways to improve declassification of Government records by the State Department.

Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be adequate to protect Government secrets while not being so long as to keep people from knowing about operations.

STATINTL

would perform the function of governing the local agencies, as the Farm Credit system now operates.

Another agency, the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration, would handle the subsidy end of this proposal. It would be handled separately to avoid problems of getting loan and grant money mixed into the same financial pot.

It has been alleged by those who claim that industry will not move to rural America that it costs more money to operate away from the population centers, and as a result, the chance for a major dispersal of industry is doomed to failure.

The sponsors of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act do not necessarily agree with this conclusion, but a number of states have proved that investment incentives do draw industries.

Rather than provide under-the-table or backdoor subsidies, this legislation would make open subsidies available, but only under stringent and controlled circumstances, and this would be done on a national basis rather than the state-by-state effort now going on.

It must be stressed that these would not be relief payments to fiscally healthy industries, but they would be incentives to American industry to disperse.

There would be two kinds of subsidies:

1. *Interest supplements:* If a firm cannot pay his interest out of local earnings without dipping into its capital, the company can be given an interest supplement by the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration. The payment could not bring the firm's interest level lower than one-percent.

2. *Rural Development Capital Augmentation Payments:* If a community wanted to build a sewer system, a calculation would be made of how much such a system would cost, and then it would be determined how much the people in the community could reasonably be expected to pay for it. The difference between these two figures would be the Rural Development Capital Augmentation payment. The same formula could be used for development of new industry, but again it must be stressed that this procedure would be under strict controls so that this money would not be used for fly-by-night or doomed-to-fail businesses.

THE REORGANIZATION

Under this bill farm and non-farm credit would come under a new Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. Under him, in two separate agencies, would be the Farm Development Administration, which now handles all farm credits (under the title Farmers Home Administration) and the Rural Enterprise and Community Development Administration, which would handle all non-farm rural credit.

The new assistant secretary would be assigned to no other duties than to oversee all rural credit. At present, the assistant secretary handling this task, must also supervise a wide range of other activities.

The 19 members of the Rural Development Credit Board would have five members appointed by the President of the United States; five nominated by the President Pro tempore of the Senate; and five nominated after consideration of the recommendations of the Speaker of the House.

The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint the same person who is his representative to the Farm Credit Board. The governor of the Farm Credit Administration would be another member of the board. The Executive Director of the Rural Development Credit Agency, and the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration would sit on the board as ex-officio members.

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep

the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the formulation of sound foreign policy and national security policy requires that the best and most accurate intelligence obtainable be provided to the legislative as well as the executive branch of our Government. The approval by the Congress of foreign policy and national security policy, which are bound together, whose support involves vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war, yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations, should only be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches.

There has been much debate during the past several years concerning the respective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, unfortunately, confrontation between the two branches of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, executive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relationship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would assure a common understanding of the purposes and merits of policies. It is of the greatest importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest importance to the maintenance of our system of government, with its separate branches, held so tenuously together by trust and reason.

It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security policy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and human, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people.

I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the legislative branch to better carry out its responsibilities.

I read the amendment at this point:

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

That section 192 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform fully and currently, by means of regular reports, the Congress of the intelligence information obtained by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security including full and current analysis by the Agency of such information.

"(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis thereof made available to any committee of the Congress pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any member of the Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such information and analysis shall also be made available by any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any officer or employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been

(1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the committee concerned to have the necessary security clearance for such access."

The bill would, as a matter of law, make available to the Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intelligence, conclusions, facts, and analyses that are now available to the executive branch. At the present time, the intelligence information and analyses developed by the CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Government are available only to the executive as a matter of law. This bill would not, in any way, affect the activities of the CIA, its sources or methods, nor would it diminish in any respect the authority of already existing committees and oversight groups, which supervise the intelligence collection activities of the Government. My bill is concerned only with the end result—the facts and analyses of facts. It would, of course, in no way inhibit the use by the Congress of analyses and information from sources outside the Government. It is obvious that with the addition of intelligence facts and their analyses, the Congress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible.

The National Security Act of 1947 marked a major reorganization of the executive branch. This reorganization made it possible for the executive branch to assume more effectively the responsibilities of the United States in world affairs and the maintenance of our own national security. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the unified services as we now know them.

Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, established the Central Intelligence Agency under a Director and Deputy Director, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the direction of the National Security Council, it was directed to advise the National Security Council on matters relating to national security and "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities."

The language does not specifically bar the dissemination of intelligence to the Congress. It is the policy of the Government that

3 JULY 1977

STATINTL

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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY

by John Franklin Campbell

Basic Books, 292 pp., \$6.95

Reviewed by Nicholas King

What's wrong with the State Department? This question has rung like an echoing gong down the decades. It has been asked by Presidents, by the public, and by almost everyone in the State Department itself. John Campbell's book provides a full and reasoned answer, forthrightly written and convincingly documented. Despite the title, the problem is handled in *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* with sympathy and insight.

The basic malady is the growth of a monstrous foreign affairs apparatus that has overwhelmed the State Department and its control of—and voice in—foreign policy decisions. The Defense Department and the Agency for International Development, for example, have more men in their overseas missions than State, according to the latest available figures. The Central Intelligence Agency's strength abroad is not known, but anyone acquainted



with our embassies is aware that CIA officials, under diplomatic cover, are numerous. They have their own (often overlapping) sources of information, their personal communications, and handsome budgets. Also, based upon outdated ideological or Cold War premises, they usually have their own foreign policy. So do the Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury departments, which send officials to embassies to represent their domestic interests; all of them are backed up by hordes of weighers, sifters, newspaper readers, and decision-makers back home in Washington. Added to this is the President's foreign policy staff in the White House, a separate bureaucracy instead of, as the author recommends, a small and flexible staff of advisers who could supply the President, the ultimate policy-maker, with what he needs to know.

Yet Presidents desire a strong State Department. A tough Secretary of State could be one of the truly commanding figures in the government, an influence in all projects and expendi-

—through his ambassadors—as to who does what out of which embassy.

For several reasons this is not so.

State began to decline in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's time through his use of personal and, to a large extent, military diplomacy. The McCarthy era subdued State's personnel into cautious conformists, relegating some of its ablest officers to oblivion. Morale and performance suffered further from arbitrary reforms from the outside, including efficiency-expert methods that could not possibly assess the quality of professional knowledge, negotiating skill, or political judgment.

Moreover, State's budget and expense account continued to be small compared with many other agencies in the field, as well as the diplomatic services of other big countries. (Not so long ago, the American ambassador in Bonn had at his disposal for personal expenses and entertainment one-third of what the West German ambassador spent in Washington.) State, for instance, must rely on another government agency for financing its communications abroad. And State, in common with other departments, is caught up in the habit of multiplying and complicating its structure with inter-this and inter-that committees, meetings, clearances, and the rest.

John Franklin Campbell would whittle down the size and structure of the department, and he would eliminate its duplicative agencies. The bureaucratic layers inside State and among all the foreign affairs pie-shavers in Washington have created an absurd procedural system, often with the experts at the bottom (as in the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam) while the ideologues and prestige hunters flourish at the top. Mr. Campbell knows that, although bureaucratic methods are necessary to the government's functioning, the fragmentation of authority tying up foreign policy formulation is a fundamental cause of today's confusion and inefficiency. Foreign officials never cease wondering what precise government in Washington such-and-such a duly mandated emissary is speaking for, or on whose exact behalf there he is spending money.

The author of this well-grounded, perceptive study realizes that what is wrong cannot be put right at one stroke, or even by one President. But, basing his thesis on past criticism as well as on his own experience in the Foreign Service, he calls for a number of specific, workable reforms that could gradually bring order, intelligence (in the ordinary sense) and flow to the making of modern American foreign policy.

Nicholas King was press attaché for the New York Herald Tribune or to that he was an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune.

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RONALD STEEL

STATINTL

takes a hard, un sentimental look at America's world predicament- and the "heroes" who got us into it

For a number of years, Ronald Steel—scholar, writer, and former diplomat—has been recognized as one of America's most clear-headed and provocative commentators on foreign affairs. In this book, he mercilessly demythologizes many of the people we have long considered heroes—and dissects some of the assumptions that liberals have taken for granted.

He examines the fading Kennedy legend—and shows how the policies of the Kennedys, and their heady triumph in the Cuban missile crisis, led directly to our present agony in Indo-China.

He questions the "invisible empire" concept of the C.I.A., so dear to its critics—and asks: "Rather than a sinister, self-seeking monster, is not the C.I.A. more realistically a tool of the President by which

he is able to do with his left hand that which his right hand would never dare try on its own?"


He also traces the dubious legacies of Eisenhower, Acheson, Kennan, Ball, McNamara, and other shapers of America's imperial policies since the end of World War II—and sums up the new ways in which our country must now relate to the world.

"A large view of America and the world gradually emerges . . . Steel's own growing disenchantment with the 'Empire' and its enthusiasts forms the central theme . . . But although there are barbs aplenty, there is seldom invective or irritability or heavy despair."—DAVID P. CALLEO,

Book World

"Clear, cogent, and provocative . . . an intellectual exploration that would profit the general reader as well as the scholar."

—*Library Journal*



IMPERIALISTS AND OTHER HEROES

A Chronicle of the American Empire

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A Look Into the Twilight World of George Fassnacht

By JOSEPH R. DAUGHEN
Of The Bulletin Staff

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It is a long way from the basement of 528 Rhawn st. to the one-room office of Norton Private Ltd. in downtown Singapore, but George E. Fassnacht has made the trip.

Fassnacht is the 38-year-old Philadelphia Police Department ballistics expert turned Central Intelligence Agency operative who was arrested Thursday after authorities uncovered the largest private munitions cache in the city's history in his Fox Chase home.

Janet Fassnacht, 33, and her four daughters from a previous marriage had lived atop the arsenal since May 29, 1968, when she married the close-mouthed weapons collector.

Headed for Orient

Fassnacht, however, did not. Two months after the wedding he left the four-bedroom brick twin home and headed for the Orient to ply his peculiar trade. He returned only once—for about a month in the winter of 1969.

While he was gone, Fassnacht flitted from Hong Kong to Saigon to Singapore, living the twilight life of a man whose occupation was intrigue and whose source of strength was secrecy. Much of that intrigue and secrecy was—and is—centered in the one-room office of Norton Private Ltd.

Bernard F. Woods, 39, operations manager of Norton Private, sat at his desk in Singapore and cautiously discussed Fassnacht with a special correspondent of The Bulletin.

'Program Director'

"I am not going to disclose what George is," Woods said. "I can't disclose it. It is classified. My firm has nothing to do with George except he worked for Norton Interna-

tional and I am employed by the same firm."

Fassnacht worked for about a year as "program director" of Norton International Corp., of Harper Woods, Mich., which is affiliated with Norton Private Ltd. Both firms appear to be as mysterious as Fassnacht.

Paul Norton Van Hee, 44, president of Norton International, told The Bulletin in an interview that his firm is engaged in "management, marketing and consulting." The company was chartered on Sept. 15, 1969, and last year had sales of \$175,000. Although it is presumably a normal business seeking customers, Norton International does not advertise in the Yellow

Pages, said Van Hee.

Norton Private, in which Van Hee said he has "an equity position," is registered in Singapore "to carry on the trade or business of manufacturers of explosives, gun powder of every description, nitroglycerine, dynamite, gun cotton or other substances or things."

'Can't Describe' Business

Norton Private was founded April 16, 1969, with a capitalization of about \$1.6 million. It has 70 employees, but only three are in Singapore. The rest are in South Vietnam. Asked what business Norton Private is engaged in, manager Woods said:

"I can't very well describe it. My boss brings people together to do tasks. I work for the local (Singapore) government, but what I do is classified."

Behind Woods' desk was a bronze plaque with an inscription that read in part, "The end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the name of the late deceased. . . Who tried to hustle the East—Rudyard Kipling."

Fassnacht's fight with the law is not yet ended, and there are no known tombstones in the case. But what is clear is that someone was trying to hustle something in the East.

Cellar Was His Domain

Mrs. Fassnacht, interviewed by police, said she could never remember when her basement was not crammed with munitions. Her husband, she said, was unyielding on the subject of the basement.

"He explained that all the guns and bullets and munitions were his own personal business and that the cellar was his domain and we could do anything we wanted in any part of the house, but the cellar was his," she said. Her daughter Cynthia, 14, was permitted to enter the basement occasionally.

"I used to go down the cellar with my father and clean the bullets for him so they would not get old."

Where did all the weapons and explosives, including some manufactured in Communist China, come from? Some had been in the Rhawn st. home, and in the home of friends, for years. Others had been shipped there from Japan and other places.

How did Fassnacht acquire them, and what was their final destination?

"Some people like girls, others like booze," said Woods. "George likes guns and collects them."

All Familiar With Guns

Fassnacht's associates knew all about guns, too. Van Hee and two other men—vice president John E. Corazzol, 35, and secretary-treasurer James M. Klodfelter, 41—are the officers of Norton International. Before they formed Norton, all three men worked for Cadillac Gage Co. of Warren,

Mich. Cadillac manufactures armored vehicles, machine guns and rifles.

Van Hee refused to say what Fassnacht's job was, and he would not discuss Norton's business. He also said it would be "a very rash assumption and a rash dramatization" to link his firm to the CIA.

Although Van Hee described his company as "not very large, a CIA agent seemed to be familiar with it. Told only that Paul Van Hee had refused to confirm or deny any possible relationship with the CIA, and without identifying Van Hee's firm, the agent replied, "We have no relationship with them at all."

Worked Out of Saigon

Mrs. Fassnacht told police that her husband was employed by the CIA when she married him and he remained a CIA employee for two more years, until about May 1970, working out of Saigon. He then went to work for Norton Private, she said, although Woods and Van Hee say he was on Norton International's payroll. Explaining how she got in touch with her husband, Mrs. Fassnacht said:

"You call the long-distance operator and tell her you want to talk to someone at Norton Ltd. Co. in Singapore."

"My husband has had very little contact with me and I have no mailing address except for the Norton Co. at 45 D Robinson road, Singapore."

Mrs. Fassnacht used this mailing address even though Fassnacht, until earlier this month, leased a four-room flat at 28 Watten drive, also known as Rise) in an upper-middle-class neighborhood of Singapore peopled mostly by Americans and Europeans.

Will Be Expecting

Mrs. Fassnacht, whose brother formerly was a detective in the Philadelphia Po-

STATINTL

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STATINTL

Pentagon papers portray stern U.S. face

Second in a series on the substance of the Pentagon documents on the origin and the escalation of the Vietnam war.

By Courtney B. Sheldon

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The disclosures of covert United States actions, directed both at friendly Saigon and hostile Hanoi, show a stern Washington face the public seldom sees distinctly.

Throughout the Vietnam war era, presidents have approved a string of secret military and diplomatic subversions. They were, those in command at the time insist, necessities of the times.

Not knowing of these clandestine operations until long after the event, the public and Congress are seldom in a position to challenge them on moral or political grounds.

The Pentagon papers, now being filtered out through the New York Times, Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) of California, give an unparalleled glimpse of life behind Washington curtains.

Without the current disclosures, misleading and incomplete as they may be in some instances, most of the stories would have had to await normal release times, usually some 20 years hence.

Scolded by Taylor

Here are some of the clandestine or sub-surface operations the Pentagon papers and their interpreters confirm or allege that the United States sponsored or engaged in in the Vietnam war period:

• While U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was counseling South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, U.S. authorities were plotting the Nov. 1, 1963, coup which ousted him (per Mr. McCloskey, who adds, "We were in it up to our eyeballs").

• Later, when more coups got in the way of successful prosecution of the war, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor called young South Vietnamese military men to the embassy and "read them the riot act."

"Do all of you understand English?" the Ambassador impatiently asked the Vietnamese officers (according to a cable included in the Pentagon papers). "I told you clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. . . . Now you have made a mess of it. We will carry you forever if you do things like this."

• As early as May 11, 1961, when the American public knew only that the U.S. had advisers in Vietnam, President Kennedy was dispatching underground agents to sabotage and harass the Communists in North Vietnam.

• President Johnson sanctioned similar attacks in the months which preceded the North Vietnamese attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Justification for attacks

It is not known whether the North Vietnamese thought at the time the destroyers were part of or supporting the pattern of attacks being made against them.

But it is a fact of history that the Johnson administration used the attacks on the destroyers to sell Congress the Tonkin Gulf resolution which was later to be cited as legal justification for the war.

In retrospect, it appears that the American public knew far less about the actions of their government than did the enemy in Hanoi.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Office issued a white book on the war in July, 1965. It discussed position papers of various U.S. officials which, in light of the Pentagon papers, sound eerily as if Hanoi had a pipeline into official Washington.

William L. Ryan, foreign affairs expert of the Associated Press, analyzed the white book and concluded, "There is evidence the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies in the South knew a good deal about U.S. plans, operations, prospects, and weaknesses."

U.S. involvement in the political affairs of the South Vietnam Government have been apparent all along even to the unsophisticated eye. Hanoi calls South Vietnamese leaders puppets. Washington publicly says it is giving advice and assistance, but not interfering in internal politics.

In one of the New York Times summaries of the Pentagon papers, it reports that "during another heated meeting on July [1964], General Khanh asked Ambassador Taylor whether to resign [from the premiership]. The Ambassador asked him not to do so. . . ."

In early 1965, one of the Pentagon papers reported McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs, as not agreeing with Ambassador Taylor that General Khanh "must somehow be removed from the scene."

Three weeks later, the Pentagon papers reported that some young Turks in the

South Vietnamese Army were determined to get rid of General Khanh.

The authors of the Pentagon report said General Khanh "made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters" and finally submitted his resignation, claiming that a "foreign hand" was behind the coup.

Thus it is not surprising the difficulties the U.S. has today in convincing the Hanoi government that it is keeping hands off in the October presidential elections in Saigon.

The Central Intelligence Agency seems to come off quite well in the papers that have thus far been published. Its forebodings have proved too accurate.

However, it is hard to forget that only on April 15 of this year the present director of central intelligence, Richard Helms, was saying in a public speech:

"We [the CIA] cannot and must not take sides. When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council . . . I do not and must not line up with either side."

'Must hit harder'

Yet here is an excerpt from a 1965 memorandum from John A. McCone, director of CIA, to other officials:

" . . . It is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIGs, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations, and their military compounds.

"This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint. If we are unwilling to take this kind of decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the missions of our ground forces. . . ."

Another official whose advice was not heeded was Undersecretary of State George Ball. Tucked away in one of his memos was a confirmation of how U.S. governments act without the public's knowledge.

Speaking of how best to get a U.S. peace proposal to the Hanoi government, Mr. Ball said:

"The contact on our side should be handled through a nongovernmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated)."

initiated to solve problems of intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties and the civil liabilities for oil pollution damage. International conventions on those subjects are now before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

However, previous efforts have concentrated on action after the pollution casualty has occurred. What is needed now is action to prevent casualties. And that is what Senator Magnuson's bill is designed to accomplish. It is a tough bill, that goes to the root of the problems—construction, maintenance, and operation of tankers and other vessels carrying certain liquid cargoes in bulk, and regulation of the movement of all vessels and placement of structures in navigable waters of the United States. These are essential actions that we must take, particularly in the face of the rapidly increasing amount of ocean transport of liquid cargoes in bulk.

At the same time, it is important that other countries join us in applying equally stringent regulations on construction, maintenance, and operation of vessels, and on their movement in international commerce. The problems are of international magnitude. And while strong domestic legislation such as the Magnuson bill will contribute enormously to their solution, the problems cannot be solved unilaterally by the United States. International agreement is essential, and I urge that immediate steps be taken by the United States to strengthen our efforts to reach agreement in IMCO on these important problems. And to strengthen our international negotiations, I urge passage of the Magnuson bill and swift establishment of its enforcement, particularly in those areas—such as vessel traffic control systems—where we are lagging behind other countries.

INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER CIA

Mr. CASE, Mr. President, much has been said lately about the efforts of Congress to reassert and redefine its authority in the field of foreign policy. For myself, I am scarcely at all interested in this as an exercise in congressional self-aggrandizement. I am very much interested in it as a means of forcing our Government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions.

In a moment I shall mention briefly several measures I shall soon be proposing to allow Congress to exercise increased control over certain Central Intelligence Agency—CIA—and Defense Department programs.

My purpose is to place some outside control on what has been the freewheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars.

To be perfectly honest, our system has gotten out of whack, and it is time to restore a better balance.

The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war, and I do not accept that there are any precedents in our history which would permit

Moreover, our recent history in Southeast Asia shows that wars approved by simply a handful of Presidential advisers may well be not only unconstitutional, but relatively unsuccessful, too.

Like most Americans, I was shocked by the cynical manipulation of our political processes revealed in the New York Times' account of the McNamara study on the origins of the Vietnam war. I believe that our country should not go to war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves secret attacks on the other side—some apparently with the aim of provoking retaliation against us and our allies. This approach has no place in our open society.

I do not want to get into an extended postmortem on Vietnam, however. Our primary task should not be to engage in recriminations or assign blame, but to bring the war to an end. That is why, last year and earlier this week, I voted for the Hatfield-McGovern proposal to set a definite date for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The Vietnam war, at least during the last several years, has been waged essentially in the open. The same cannot be said for the war in neighboring Laos. A top American diplomat was quoted recently by the Washington Star saying:

What we are doing here in Laos is totally inconsistent with our kind of society. We are fighting a war by covert means and an open society cannot tolerate that.

I agree with this diplomat's appraisal and consequently I have done everything I can to bring the facts on the war in Laos before the American public.

For example, I stated several weeks ago that there apparently was an agreement between the U.S. and Thai Governments for the financing and support through CIA of thousands of Thai troops in Laos. Only when the administration became aware of my speech did the Senate receive any kind of explanation of what was going on. And the explanation was incomplete and partially inaccurate despite its secret classification which prevented it from being made known to the public.

Even today, the Government tries to maintain a thick veil of secrecy over some of its programs in Laos. Every so often news trickles out in dribbles as an energetic newspaperman digs out a story or a government official leaks out a revelation.

But essentially, we are only told things after they have somehow gotten into the public realm, despite the \$350-odd million in taxpayers' funds which are being spent annually in Laos, to say nothing of the estimated \$2 billion annual cost of U.S. air activity over Laos.

Successive administrations have been able to carry on the secret war in Laos, as they did earlier in Vietnam, by use of that vast billion dollar treasure chest which Congress has appropriated, but never controlled, for discretionary intelligence and military programs. And the U.S. Government agency assigned to carrying out the administrations' policies—such as the running of the 30,000 man Secret Army—Armée Clandestine—and the funding of Thai troops has usually been the CIA.

I do not direct criticism against the

issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish CIA.

So I come to my three proposals to limit the Executive's authority to wage a secret war. These are not all-inclusive, but they are an attempt to get at the questions of the circumvention of congressional intent and the hiring of mercenaries. The specific proposals are:

First, a bill to extend the limitations which now apply to the use by the Defense Department of its funds overseas to all U.S. Government agencies, including CIA. This would prevent the circumvention of congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through CIA rather than through more open Government agencies. It would also eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using CIA personnel.

Second, a bill to prohibit the funding by any U.S. Government agency of military operations by any country outside its borders without specific congressional authorization. This would eliminate the confusing trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cambodia. It would not affect the present programs for U.S. payments to Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos in Vietnam, since Congress has specifically voted money for these troops. My bill would, however, require the administration to inform the Congress, on a confidential basis, if necessary, of the details of any agreements with foreign governments to finance their military operations abroad. I would hope this would prevent our Government from offering lavish inducements to foreign governments in return for the use of their troops. As you may remember, it was revealed last year that the U.S. Government in some cases had been secretly paying Koreans and Thais in Vietnam higher levels of combat pay than were being paid to American troops fighting in the same country.

Third, a bill to extend existing limitations on the use by the Defense Department of surplus military materiel to all Government agencies. I make this proposal because of reports I have received of the relatively unrestricted use of surplus materiel by CIA. I have no means of verifying these reports, but if they are untrue, my bill would not interfere with any existing Government programs.

The three proposals I have outlined would serve to plug some loopholes in the law. Of course they would by no means close them all. The Executive can find ways to skirt almost any prohibition if it is so inclined. The solution to the problem lies, in the long run, not in a tighter drafting of the law but in the acceptance by the Executive of Congress and the public as partners in the conduct of the peoples' vital business.

Our country was founded on the principles of democracy, and the essence of a democracy is the participation of the people and their representatives in the decisions which affect their very nation-

June 17, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BADILLO

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page 7, line 4, before the quotation marks insert the following new sentence: "Nothing in clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of this paragraph or in the immediately preceding sentence shall be construed to authorize the use of any of such funds by the Central Intelligence Agency (or by any agency or person operating on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand (including any operation of the kind commonly called 'guerrilla warfare' operation) which will be executed by forces composed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries, (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or (iii) personnel other than those listed in clause (i) or (ii) who are under arms and are indigenous to any foreign country or area."

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a very specific amendment limiting the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence, and specifically prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from conducting guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. The necessity for the amendment arises because the enabling act which created the Central Intelligence Agency provides that the CIA may perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence and affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

There has been clear evidence from news accounts over the years, which I am sure all of you have read, that the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia. This last week, as you know, the Senate had a secret session involving our activities in Laos and Senator SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD indicated as follows:

In the case of Laos one is unable to cite a figure for the total cost of this war to the United States. First, because what the United States is doing, and the cost of what we are doing, continues to be cloaked with official secrecy by the executive branch. Second, one cannot cite a figure for the total cost to us of the war in Laos because, it must be said in all frankness, neither you, nor I, nor any other Member of Congress is in position to know what those costs actually are.

Yesterday, my colleague the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE), questioned the chairman of the committee as to whether this bill specifically included funds for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the chairman answered that it does. The chairman also refused to say what the amounts were and said that only he and the ranking minority member of the committee knew.

The gentleman from California Mr. WALDIE also asked the chairman as follows:

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

The chairman answered as follows:

Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle

East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

If that is the understanding of the activities of the CIA by the chairman, then he should be in support of this amendment, because all I am saying is that that should be precisely the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather information, and not to engage in guerrilla activities. But because we do not know exactly what funds are available either in this body or in the Senate, and we do not know exactly to what purpose they are being put, this amendment is prepared so that we can be sure that the activities are limited.

I seek only to insure that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency be limited to those specified in the law, and that is to the gathering of intelligence. Certainly after the recent disclosures it becomes all the more important that we insure that the agencies of the executive department comply with the mandates of the Congress.

Even before the New York Times published parts of the Pentagon study of our involvement in the Vietnam war, it had become apparent that the CIA had literally been running the entire military operation in Laos, including the hiring, training, and leading of a mercenary army of Thais and Miao tribesmen and the tactical control of an air war which has made the Laotian people refugees in their own land.

As early as 1964, the CIA recruited Thai pilots to fly planes with markings of the Royal Laotian Government against Communist forces in Laos and there is evidence these Thai pilots are still flying missions in Laos, under CIA control and supervision. Reliable estimates given recently to the Senate indicate that the CIA currently is paying about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos.

Enactment of this amendment is necessary if Congress is to regain some measure of meaningful control and oversight in the field of foreign affairs. Regardless of how individual Members might feel about the recent articles in the New York Times, it is clear that the nature and extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hidden from and misrepresented to the American people and their elected Representatives. I strongly suspect that the pattern of subterfuge and outright misrepresentation continues. This amendment represents a step toward squaring with the American people. I urge its adoption.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment preclude the CIA from supporting such things as have been reported in national magazines, such as the pay for personnel in the Saigon Police Force, which police force is being used, of course, for campaign purposes to support the Thieu government in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because it would seek to limit the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence and to its functions as approved

by the Congress. Specifically it excludes the support of activities commonly called guerrilla warfare, support of mercenaries, support of regular or irregular personnel of any armed forces of any foreign nation or area within Southeast Asia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the precision with which the gentleman has formulated this amendment. I believe it is an exceedingly important one. I applaud his courage and support him.

Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman very much.

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The gentleman's amendment seeks to place a restriction upon the use of any funds authorized in this proposed act for military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia organized or supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act. It functions under the National Security Council under the President of the United States. It initiates no activities of its own without direction from the President and/or the National Security Council.

I do not propose to debate on the floor of the House the activities or functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. I will state categorically that the intelligence activities conducted by our Government are essential to the security of this Nation.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, as I read it, seeks to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any so-called military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Southeast Asia which would be executed by mercenaries, regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or any other personnel of a foreign nation. I will not go into the ramifications of such a restriction should it be enacted. I will merely tell the House that in my opinion, as well meaning as this amendment may be, it is very dangerous to the security of our country. Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival. Today, there seems to be a penchant for exposing Government secrets which wittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the enemy.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York would seriously restrict our intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and would certainly most seriously affect, and perhaps even prevent, the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

I am not going to expand upon my statement any further.

I urge the House to overwhelmingly defeat this amendment.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

11 JUN 1977

Inside Washington



Cheaper and Better Intelligence Sought



STATINTL

Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith

WASHINGTON — Without fanfare the prestigious Senate Appropriations Committee is taking a long, hard look at the agencies which conduct the Pentagon's far-flung and costly intelligence activities.

Last year, at the committee's urging Congress imposed a flat manpower ceiling — 138,000 employees — on those activities. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, recognizing the problems in his department's sprawling intelligence complex assigned Assistant Secretary Robert F. Froehke as coordinator.

Now the Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense is scheduling a couple of days of closed-door hearings to explore further economies. Congressional experts believe Froehke has at least been able to identify expenses assignable to gathering defense intelligence.

Major targets of the committee's interest are two little-known Defense Department agencies which together spend far

more than the often publicized Central Intelligence Agency. They are the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, and the National Security Agency, NSA.

NSA is the government's electronic spy-agency, specializing and cracking codes. Congressional critics wonder whether NSA has carried its activities to a point where much of the product is no longer worth the cost.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was originally established to coordinate intelligence activities of the separate military services. Critics claim that the coordinating agency has itself become a center of military bureaucracy.

BILLIONS AT STAKE — Overlapping responsibilities of CIA, Defense, and the State Department's intelligence bureau have periodically come under congressional criticism. That is one of the issues involved this time.

The Appropriations Committee is primarily interested, however, in the very large sums expended and the quality of the product not just in the possible duplications involved. The inquiry is being undertaken in connection with the committee's review of the annual defense appropriations bill.

The costs of many intelligence operations are classified, of course. For defense intelligence cost estimates, even when declassified, may be misleading because military personnel ostensibly assigned to other duties may actually be full or part-time intelligence operatives.

The costs of many intelligence operations have been more or less officially estimated at slightly under \$3 billion annually. That is substantially more than the \$500 million estimate which is usually used for the per year expenses of CIA.

The Senate committee is, therefore, hunting for economies in the agencies where most of the nation's intelligence dollars are spent.

With a concern in the White House over the cost and operations of the intelligence community, President Nixon is reported to be considering a reorganization of intelligence activities.

The President and, more frequently, national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger are said to be dissatisfied with the quality of the intelligence which reaches them. They would like to improve the product, clarify the lines of responsibility, and cut costs.

They are said to be increasingly concerned that the career director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, who doubles as boss of CIA, has no real power to coordinate all activities in his agency, Defense and State, though that was the concept when his job was created.

Helms himself, the first career man to head the Central Intelligence Agency, is highly regarded by the President. Even the critics of CIA in Congress applaud Helms for keeping his agency out of foreign policy decision making.

However, there has been increasing criticism of intelligence preparation for such operations as the empty-handed raid on the prison camp at Son Tay. More recently Kissinger was reported critical of the intelligence which let the South Vietnamese be quickly outnumbered and overmatched on their invasion of Laos.

As the United States seeks accommodation with the Soviet Union (and perhaps, China) on limiting strategic arms, and amid the continuing controversy over NATO and Warsaw Pact troop levels in Europe, the gathering of reliable intelligence can have a tremendous bearing on the making of wise national security judgments.

So, while they may lack the headline potential of a cloak-and-dagger spy story, there is real interest here in the efforts by Congress and the White House to produce better intelligence at lower cost.

Intelligence:

I Spy, You Spy, But What Do We See?

WASHINGTON—Eleven years ago it was the "missile gap," and before that there was the "bomber gap." Two years ago there was the "first-strike threat" of large Soviet SS-9 missiles. And now there is the "big hole" threat.

Through all those Soviet threats—each one of which at the time was more presumed than real—runs a common American strand. On the basis of disturbing yet inconclusive intelligence information, the Administration—and the Defense Department in particular—drew ominous conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions and urged a new round of weapons build-up by the United States.

The latest case in point involved the big missile silo holes that American reconnaissance satellites began detecting in the Soviet Union, starting last December. As yet, they are just holes, admittedly larger than those the Soviets have dug before, but that did not stop the Defense Department and its Congressional allies from drawing conclusions about the missiles the Soviet Union intended to put in the silos.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who first disclosed the detection of the large new holes on a national television program, warned that the "Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, on another television show, followed up by stating that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with the construction of a large missile system." Coupled with these statements were warnings that the strategic balance might be tipping in favor of Moscow.

Then last week, through Republican sources in the Senate, it came out that the Central Intelligence Agency believed that at least two-thirds of the 60 silo

holes detected so far were for the Soviet SS-11. This is a relatively small intercontinental missile comparable to the United States Air Force's Minuteman, and the Defense Department has acknowledged that it is too small to present a first-strike threat to the American retaliatory force. The size of the holes, the C.I.A. surmised, could be explained by the possibility that the Soviet Union was "hardening" its missile silos against attack, just as the United States has been doing for its Minutemen.

After that disclosure, the Defense Department began retreating. The new holes, it conceded, could be for "hardening" with concrete liners. But still, the Pentagon said, they were big enough to hold two new types of missiles, or perhaps improved models of the SS-11 and SS-9. At any rate, the Defense Department admitted, the intelligence information was too inconclusive to draw definitive judgments. That was a far cry from the impression created earlier by the Defense Department, that the Soviet Union was deploying an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps even a larger new missile aimed at a first-strike capability.

"We have just witnessed the shortest missile gap in history," proclaimed Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, the Pentagon's gadfly. "In a month, without the United States lifting a finger or spending a dime, this missile gap was closed. The 'scare-cen' technique boomeranged."

Perhaps, as suggested by Senator Proxmire, there was just an element of politics in the selective disclosure of intelligence information about the big holes. Every spring, just as regularly as the cherry blossoms bloom on the Tidal Basin, there crop up dire new warnings about Soviet weapons with a timing that just happens to coincide with Congressional consideration of the defense budget.

The problem, however, goes deeper than political use of intelligence information, which is probably inevitable when that information has to be translated into policy and appropriations by the politicians in the Executive Branch and Congress. In part, the difficulty, as the Nixon Administration is coming to realize, lies in the disjointed way that intelligence is gathered and analyzed.

In principle, the C.I.A. was set up to be the primary policy-making agency that could

provide unbiased intelligence analysis. Its director, presently Richard M. Helms, was to be the President's principal intelligence adviser. But in practice, intelligence was never completely centralized, and the C.I.A. directors have discovered that it is impossible to divorce analysis of intelligence from policy.

The Central Intelligence Director, for example, has virtually no authority over the 3,000-man Defense Intelligence Agency, which helps explain why the C.I.A. and the Defense Department could reach such differing interpretations over the big holes.

Even if intelligence operations should be further centralized—perhaps at the White House level, as is now being considered by the Nixon Administration—the problem would not be completely solved. The underlying difficulty is that intelligence is not a game of certainties but of conjectures. As in the case of the big holes, certain conjectures must be drawn on the basis of limited, circumstantial facts, and inevitably the conclusions tend to reflect the philosophical outlook and responsibilities of the policymaker.

With a responsibility for national security, the Defense Secretary has a natural tendency to choose the most pessimistic among the range of conjectures reached from agreed-upon but limited intelligence facts. That is what Mr. Laird did when he projected two years ago that the Soviet Union would deploy 500 SS-9's by 1975, and what he did when he saw the pictures of the big holes.

The difficulty is that this kind of approach can lead to a self-fulfilling form of "worst case" analysis, in which the worst that is assumed about Soviet intentions comes true because of the American reaction—or vice versa. Thus, the United States sees a "missile gap" and starts rapidly deploying them on land and on sea. The Soviet Union then starts deploying missiles at a great rate until it has more land-based missiles than the United States, which starts talk of another missile gap when those big holes are spotted.

Testifying last week before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., former Deputy Director for Research of the C.I.A., said that if it now turns out that the Soviet Union is putting SS-11's in the big holes "then we must ask ourselves how many times we

are going to know the 'weapons' to come before Congress, shouting 'missile gap' and 'technology gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap,' through selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence, in order to panic the country into expensive weapons programs."

That question is now beginning to be asked in Congress, which is far less gullible and more sophisticated than it was a decade ago, when it was willing to assume the unproved worst about Soviet intentions. Perhaps there is also a change in attitude down at the White House, where the President is willing to accept the possibility of an agreement limiting defensive ABM systems despite all the Pentagon talk about those Soviet offensive missiles. This change of attitude can probably be more important than any reorganization of intelligence agencies in preventing the Executive Branch and Congress from seeing missiles in holes where none yet exist.

STATINTL

27 MAY 1971

Special Report

Helms, the Man At CIA Helms, Is 'Top Secret'

By Newsweek Feature Service

WASHINGTON — In a recent edition of "Who's Who in America," the official biography for one Richard McGarrah Helms is less than an inch



HELMS

long. It identifies him simply as a "govt. ofcl.," lists prosaic things like his education credentials (B.A. Williams Coll. 1935), his clubs (Chevy Chase, City Tavern Assn.) and his office address: Central Intelligence Agy., Washington, 20505.

What the brief sketch doesn't mention, however, is that in the colorful career of the tall, handsome Helms, the U.S.'s chief intelligence officer, there is enough intrigue and derring-do to fill a dozen spy novels.

Take, for instance, the time in 1956 just after Nikita Khrushchev had delivered his secret "de-Stalinization" speech to the Communist party Congress in Moscow.

As deputy chief of the CIA's Clandestine Services, Helms directed the agents who dummed up a copy of the speech with 32 derogatory inserts about neutral nations and their leaders. They then circulated it abroad — and caused the Russians some severe embarrassment.

OR TAKE THE TIME HELMS supervised an operation that involved the digging of a tunnel under 500 yards of East and West German soil to allow CIA agents to tap Moscow's phone conversations with the East German government, its own secret police agents in Germany and its own army command.

In all probability, most of Helms's career will remain classified "top secret" until long after his death — which is exactly as he would have it. As he told a recent meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) in Washington, "... it is axiomatic that an intelligence service— whatever type of government it serves — must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate effectively..."

The speech, Helms's first public address since he was named Director of the CIA in 1966, was encouraged by the Nixon Administration which had become disturbed by critics charging that an intelligence network is incompatible with a democratic society.

AFTER CONSIDERING several criticisms with cool grace, Helms said, "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service..."

In all official circles, Helms is already regarded not only as honorable but also as dedicated, talented and — the supreme accolade in a capital that has its share of high-level dilettantes — immensely professional.

Where once it was thought that Richard Nixon would replace Helms with a Republican appointee,

the current consensus is that when and if the President reorganizes the sprawling intelligence community he will solidify, rather than diminish, Helms's authority.

Helms already has three separate roles: CIA Director; overall Director of Central Intelligence (which means that he is chief intelligence adviser to the White House and Congress); and chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board (which comprises all the other governmental intelligence outfits).

BUT HE HAS NO real authority over any group but the CIA. Under a reorganization, it is possible that Helms would either be given direct control of all intelligence operations or relegated in a special White House capacity.

Helms's quick mind, his remarkable grasp of complex issues, his insistence on staying out of the policy-making field and, above all, his forthrightness have earned him the respect of many of the Administration's severest congressional critics.

"Helms is great with Congress," says one Senate staffer. "He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies."

He is also one of the most sought-after dinner guests in Washington — charming, witty, debonair, completely removed from the popular image of the nation's super-speak.

THE 58-YEAR-OLD Helms learned his social graces in Europe, where he spent two years in fashionable schools. After graduating from Williams, he went back to Europe as a wire service reporter. Utilizing his fluency in German (he also speaks almost flawless French), he managed to wangle an exclusive interview with one of the Continent's rising radical politicians, Adolf Hitler.

Financial and personal problems forced him to abandon reporting and join the business side of a newspaper in Indiana. Then, during World War II, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services, and as soon as the CIA was created in 1947, he signed on.

Through the years, he served in most of the agency's branches, so that when the time came for President Johnson to pick a new director in 1966, Helms was the logical choice. Even though his career man had ever headed the agency before.

HELM'S LIVES IN Washington with his second wife, Cynthia, whom he married in 1939. Between them they have five grown children.

He keeps in shape by playing a creditable game of tennis and, if rumors are to be believed, one of his favorite pastimes is a kind of busman's holiday: reading spy novels.

But mostly Helms devotes himself to his work — work that he believes, as he told the ASNE, "is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world, and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one."

Newsweek Feature Service

STATINTL

Letters To The Editor

STATINTL

The Role Of CIA

Editor the Star::

✓ Mr. Welles, in the New York Times Service article carried in the Star May 11, is not specific as to the type of executive order Mr. Nixon might issue to define and strengthen the role of CIA, in the projected foreign intelligence reshuffle.

As a former denizen of Washington, with over 25 years association with foreign intelligence, I shall venture a few comments on Mr. Welles' article.

First of all, I hope that the idea of establishing a Department of Intelligence is junked. Effective handling of foreign intelligence does not require another monolithic structure in Washington. Bigness is no substitute for effectively delegated authority, clearly understood procedures and objectives, and professional competence. Mr. Welles notes that as an alternative to a new department, the authority and responsibilities of CIA might be realigned and strengthened. I believe that this would be the correct action to take.

In the years since 1947, when CIA came into existence, the foreign intelligence effort of the United States has grown tremendously in sophistication and effectiveness, and CIA has been at the center of all this development. There have, of course, been growing pains and problems. If there had not been Mr. Nixon would not now be looking for reorganization.

If it is fair to single out a whipping boy we must pick on the intelligence effort of the military services. The conceptually sound idea of establishing the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and charging it with the responsibility for making coherent sense out of the gallimaufry created by G-2, ONI, and A-2 foundered on a technical loophole and entrenched greed.

The technical loophole was that, in addition to each service contributing to the foreign intelligence effort of DIA, each was also permitted to develop, for itself, "Departmental Intelligence": information necessary for each to develop and use its own weaponry to maximum advantage. Unfortunately, as competition for money and individual recognition has grown, so has the predilection of the services, encouraged too often by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pay more attention to their own needs than to the central effort represented by DIA.

It appears that at this juncture DIA hasn't the muscle to battle the Joint Chiefs, and so long as there are so many military officers in DIA, with their fitness reports being written by their own services, no amount of paper work will make this different. The practical alternative is to turn over to CIA most of the functions assigned to DIA, accompanied by a very firm presidential charter as to the authority vested in its director and the level of cooperation expected from others in the foreign intelligence field.

I am sure that there is not space here to describe what some of these functions are, but they are quite simple and could be effectively carried out by an organization with the experience and professional competence of CIA. The alternative, a Department of Intelligence, would be subject to such a variety of conflicting ideas and growing pains that it would all too probably, unwittingly, recreate some of the mistakes we are now trying to get away from.

HAYDEN CHANNING
5150 N. Campbell Ave.

COLUMBUS, GA.
ENQUIRER

M - 32,231
MAY 24 1977

STATINTL

'Establishment' Details CIA's Peacemaking Role

THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISH-
MENT by Henry Howe Hanson.
Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 369 Pages. \$9.95.

ED SULLIVAN

THE Intelligence Establish-
ment clearly defines the
Central Intelligence Agency's
(CIA) current influence on U.
S. world policy. The CIA's
goofs are well known; unfor-
tunately, its important contri-
butions to peace are not so
well known. Thus, the public,
which funds CIA, has no way
of knowing the great role the
CIA has played in the past,
nor how great a role it will
play in the future in the area
of world peace.

War Involvement

Because the CIA has been
closely involved in the Indo-
china war from the start, the
theories and facts presented
in Cambodia cause one to
wonder, for the alleged goals
of that costly war are more
open to question with each
passing day.

Such books as these, and
there have been dozens with
a similar theme over the
past eight years, zero in
stronger than ever to piece
together facts and ideas con-
cerning the meaning of the
war. Here, too, one finds an
underlying theme that raises
question about who or what
is to blame.

Now, as the war appears to
be winding down, there
seems to be a political wind
blowing across the nation
which seeks out the source of
blame. For the war has been
costly in lives (over 44,000)
and materiel (currently
around \$30 million daily). To
an affluent nation such as
ours there arises the ques-
tion: what has been bought
at these expensive prices? No
one appears able to answer
that question satisfactorily.
When a question of such
magnitude goes unanswered
in a democracy there is a
tendency to seek out factors
of blame.

Personal Interpretation

The author offers sugges-
tions and implications from
which the reader may
choose. Each American must
answer the question for him-
self, however, since this re-

quires a personal interpreta-
tion based not only on the
facts, but on what the read-
er thinks this nation stands
for or against.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL..
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

MAY 24 1971
Royce Brier

CIA's Little Army From Thailand

FROM JERSEY, General Washington hired a schoolteacher named Nathan Hale to spy on the British in Manhattan. It was bad judgment. Hale had no experience in espionage, as he soon proved by being captured and hanged, to become an American immortal.

In the Civil War the government hired the Pinkerton outfit to set up an espionage system. It was never much good, but neither was the Confederate.

In World War II we set up a spy system in Switzerland, and after the war it was consolidated as Central Intelligence Agency. It has grown every year of the 26 since, encircling the globe with its tentacles, becoming a dense empire defying the President and the Congress to comprehend or control its global activities.

Excepting its frequent blunders, nobody knows or can discover what it is up to in a given time or place. Compared with it, Hoover's FBI is an open book.



FOR FBI AGENTS are subject ultimately to court examination of their activities, which involve constitutional rights. CIA agents don't deal with those having constitutional rights, and nobody says how or why it disburses moneys voted to it by a generous and spellbound Congress.

Most CIA action naturally focuses on trouble areas abroad, Europe in general, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Since we have been engaged for 20 years in Asian intrigue, half of that time in warfare with Asiatics, that is where the CIA sleuths and provocateurs congregate and conspire in this or that policy, which is removed from the hands of the President and the will of Congress.

This has become a savage and slippery maze of blind forces at work, which no extraneous power on earth can unravel.

IT IS A PREPOSTEROUS and dangerous situation for the Americans, and bears no relation to their traditional integrity of purpose and responsibility.

Senator Chase of New Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, said last week he has learned from government sources there are "4000-6000 Thai troops in Laos, and the United States is paying them through CIA."

He avers this is a violation of a congressional directive last year, prohibiting financing mercenaries in Laos except to help free POWs or facilitate American troop withdrawals. The committee is currently taking testimony from two aides recently in Indochina. The Senator said he wrote to Secretary of State Rogers about it a month ago, and has received no reply.

Then why not invite the Secretary to tell the committee what he knows about it, which might not be much, as there is no evidence Mr. Rogers talks to CIA, or vice versa.

But congressmen enjoy complaining, and don't enjoy doing. If they enjoyed doing they would adopt a joint resolution calling for an audit of CIA expenditures over the past few years. The howling would be pitiful that this would uncover supersecret investigation abroad, and work untold harm to vital American "interest." Who say? Who knows if CIA conniving is beneficial or detrimental to vital American interests anywhere, since nobody has ever yielded an inkling of what it is all about?

May 24, 1971

Reyes Brion

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STATINTL

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BUFFALO, N.Y.
NEWS

E - 281,982

MAY 19 1981

Helms of CIA: Secret Intriguer and Public Figure

Special to Buffalo Evening News

WASHINGTON, May 19 — In a recent edition of "Who's Who in America," the official biography for Richard McGarrah Helms is less than an inch long. It identifies him simply as "govt. ofcl.," lists prosaic things like his educational credentials (B. A. Williams Coll. 1935), his clubs (Chevy Chase, City Tavern Assn.) and his office address: Central Intelligence Agcy., Washington, 20565.

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WHERE ONCE it was thought that Richard Nixon would replace Mr. Helms with a Republican appointee, the current consensus is that when and if the President reorganizes the sprawling intelligence community he will solidify, rather than diminish, Mr. Helms' authority.

Mr. Helms already has three separate roles: CIA director; over-all director of central intelligence (which means that



RICHARD HELMS

U. S. Intelligence Head

he is chief intelligence adviser to the White House and Congress); and chairman of the U. S. intelligence board (which comprises all the other governmental intelligence outfits).

But he has no real authority over any group but the CIA. Under a reorganization, it is possible that Mr. Helms either would be given direct control of all intelligence operations or relocated in a special White House capacity.

Mr. Helms' quick mind, his remarkable grasp of complex issues, his insistence on staying out of the policy-making field and, above all, his forthrightness have earned him the respect of many of the administration's severest Congressional critics.

"Helms is great with Congress," says one Senate

staffer. "He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies."

HE IS also one of the most sought-after dinner guests in Washington — charming, witty, debonair, completely removed from the popular image of the nation's super-spy.

The 55-year-old Helms learned his social graces in Europe, where he spent two years in fashionable schools. After graduating from Williams, he went back to Europe as a wire-service reporter. Utilizing his fluency in German (he also speaks almost flawless French), he wangled an exclusive interview with one of the continent's rising radical politicians, Adolf Hitler.

Financial and personal problems forced him to abandon reporting and join the business side of a newspaper in Indiana. Then, during World War II, he worked for the Office of Strategic Services, and as soon as the CIA was created in 1947, he signed on.

Through the years, he served in most of the agency's branches, so that when the time came for President Johnson to pick a new director in 1966, Mr. Helms was the logical choice, even though no career man had ever headed the agency before.

Mr. Helms lives in Washington with his second wife, Cynthia, whom he married in 1969. Between them they have five grown children.

He keeps in shape by playing a creditable game of tennis and, if rumors are to be believed, one of his favorite pastimes is a kind of busman's holiday: reading spy novels.

reflects the erosion of discipline and morale in the forces in Vietnam.

NOTHING TO DO

The American forces in Vietnam no longer have a genuine combat mission, and an army without a combat mission is an army without a real purpose. Of the more than 260,000 American troops now in Vietnam, only about a fifth are combat troops, and their principal mission now is to avoid combat. If you ask at the Pentagon what in heaven's name the other 200,000 are doing, you hear generalities about an "orderly withdrawal," or you are told the answer is secret.

In fact, what most of the 200,000 are doing is virtually nothing, other than going mad with boredom. Under the President's withdrawal program, there will still be around 150,000 noncombat troops in Vietnam next November, still going mad with boredom. Soldiers will choose almost any escape from an army that has lost discipline, morale and purpose, and this has a lot to do with the heroin epidemic.

This country has a profound moral obligation to provide logistic support for the million-man South Vietnamese forces, which have been made pathetically dependent on American support for the defense of their country. But the United States has no obligation to continue to field a big non-fighting army in which tens of thousands of young men are becoming heroin addicts. The bulk of that non-fighting army must be withdrawn from Vietnam quickly and urgently, for the same reason that people in a burning house have to be gotten out quickly and urgently.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. GRAVEL) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

ONEIDA TRIBE OF INDIANS OF WISCONSIN, ET AL. V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A letter from the Chairman of the Indian Claims Commission transmitting, pursuant to law, its report on the final determination with respect to the case of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin for itself and on behalf of the First Christian and Orchard Parties of Oneida Indians, plaintiffs, versus the United States of America (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations.

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON MENTAL HEALTH

A letter from the Assistant to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia transmitting proposed legislation to authorize the District of Columbia to enter into the Interstate Compact on Mental Health (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL ACT

A letter from the Assistant to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia submitting proposed legislation entitled "The District of Columbia Educational Personnel

Act (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

CURTAINMENT OF MAILING CERTAIN ARTICLES

A letter from the Postmaster General transmitting proposed legislation to curtail the mailing of certain articles which present a hazard to postal employees or mail processing machines by imposing restrictions on certain advertising and promotional matter in the mails, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING

A letter from the Acting Administrator of the Department of Transportation submitting, pursuant to law, a proposed highway safety program standard on accident investigation and reporting (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Public Works.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. EAGLETON, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 5765. An act to extend for six months the time for filing the comprehensive report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 92-109).

By Mr. WILLIAMS, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

S.J. Res. 100. An original joint resolution to provide for an extension of section 10 of the Railway Labor Act with respect to the current railway labor-management dispute; and for other purposes. (Rept. No. 92-110).

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1887. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to specify certain activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency may not engage. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia:

S. 1888. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of land for, and to construct, administer, and maintain the Allegheny Parkway in the States of West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BAKER:

S. 1889. A bill to amend the Interstate Commerce Act so as to exclude from Federal regulation the driver qualifications of operators of certain classes of agricultural vehicles. Referred to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. TAFT:

S. 1890. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to relieve employers of 50 or less employees from the requirement of paying or depositing certain employment taxes more often than once each quarter. Referred to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself, Mr. Tower, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. GAMBRELL, Mr. BROCK, Mr. TALMADGE, and Mr. TUNNEY):

S. 1891. A bill to authorize emergency loan guarantees to major business enterprises. Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. TAFT:

S. 1892. A bill to provide Federally guaranteed loans to corporations vital to the national defense which are in involuntary bankruptcy or are being reorganized under

Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, and to maintain and expand employment in the United States. Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. BIBLE:

S. 1893. A bill to restore the golden eagle program to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, provide for an annual camping permit, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. WILLIAMS:

S. J. Res. 100. An original joint resolution to provide for an extension of section 10 of the Railway Labor Act with respect to the current railway labor-management dispute; and for other purposes. (Considered and passed today)

By Mr. GRIFFIN (for Mr. GURNEY):

S. J. Res. 101. A joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating July 20, 1971, as "National Moon Walk Day." Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1887. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to specify certain activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency may not engage. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I introduce a bill today to amend the National Security Act of 1947, which would bar the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any military or paramilitary operation abroad.

This bill is identical to one introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. BADILLO.

In introducing his measure on May 31, 1971, the Congressman explained that the bill would close a loophole in the National Security Act which now permits the CIA to undertake such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as may be directed by the National Security Council.

It is this provision which apparently is the justification for the presence of the CIA in Laos—not to gather intelligence, but to train, finance, and lead tribal guerrillas and even the Royal Laotian Army as a covert adjunct to U.S. combat operations.

It is reliably reported that the CIA has more than 300 men in Laos, supplying and training government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaissance teams. In addition, the CIA is mainly responsible for planning of the massive air bombardment of Laos, which has made a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land.

By its use of the CIA in this manner, our Government has developed a new and cynical formula for running a war, out of sight of the Congress and the American people. I fear that unless legislation such as the bill I offer today is enacted, we will find the CIA running military operations in Indochina long after other American combat forces have been brought home.

If enacted, this bill would restore the CIA to the role Congress originally in-

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

Notes and Comment

THE NEW YORKER herewith announces the first in a series of plans to save the taxpayers billions of dollars a year. But let's begin with a fact or two. A writer for the *Times* has revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency costs six hundred million dollars annually. We're sure it's much more, but we'll accept the figure. He further reports that fifteen per cent of its information comes from "agents"—that is, people seeking to overthrow other governments or prop them up, whichever the case may be. That part of it is fine—some governments need overthrowing; some need uppropping. Sometimes it's a little hard to decide which, but we'll leave that to Henry Kissinger. Thirty-five per cent of its information is gathered by electronic snoopers. We don't know how this works. Now, here's where we come in. Fifty per cent of the C.I.A.'s daily "input" is received from "overt sources, such as periodicals." We're a periodical, and we can help. Because of the way our business works, we have people reading all the time—reading everything: newspapers, magazines, books, unsolicited manuscripts (none of these even get to the C.I.A.), pamphlets. Our readers are intelligent, patriotic people, always thinking of their government. It's amazing how much duplication there is in this country. So the C.I.A. can close down this half of its operation, and we will take over at no cost. Probable net saving: three hundred million dollars. It should never have cost that much just to have people read. Anyway, any time any of us finds anything worthwhile, it'll be Xeroxed and mailed to Washington. If it seems really urgent, we'll phone it in.

14 MAY 1971

Disarm CIA: Badillo

Washington, May 13 (AP)—Rep. Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.) asked Congress today to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing or supervising secret military operations of any kind. Badillo said a loophole in the 1947 law that set up the CIA as an intelligence-gathering organization "is apparently being used to justify the fact that . . . tribal guerrillas and the Royal Laotian Army have been . . . led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war." He said more than 300 CIA men are involved in the Laotian secret army. ✓



Badillo

JOURNAL

MAY 14 1971

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

A Single Agency

A major reorganization of the nation's overseas intelligence services is under consideration at the White House, and the sooner the job is done, the better for the country. The precise outlines of the overhaul are not yet clear, but it is obvious that Mr. Nixon is determined to improve intelligence services while cutting high operational costs.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the most prominent of the federal agencies which collect and analyze foreign intelligence. But there are five other agencies involved in similar work. The total annual bill for all six agencies runs to about five billion dollars; about 200,000 persons are involved, mostly in the armed services.

A study made for the President includes a recommendation for the creation of a Cabinet-level intelligence department; it also includes provisions for tightening CIA's oversight of intelligence work done for the ~~armed services~~ in the Defense Department. It is plain that any reorganization will run squarely into operation of long-established vested interests.

There is a superficial attraction to the idea of creating a Secretary of Intelligence, but does the task of correlating overseas intelligence work rate a Cabinet post? It would seem that such a service is intended to provide information to all major agencies of government and, as such, might more properly be made a White House staff function.

Assigning the CIA primacy among the intelligence agencies is certain to run into opposition, particularly from military service agencies. But somehow, the goal of cooperation must be fixed and enforced in place of what must often be almost cutthroat competition among the six agencies for money, staff, and authority.

Congressional opposition or suspicion of a presidential effort to centralize the overseas intelligence services might be blunted if Mr. Nixon accompanied his executive order with a proposal for appointment of a joint congressional committee, such as the Atomic Energy Committee, to oversee the intelligence gathering services for the legislative branch.

Mr. Nixon will not have an easy time in the proposed reorganization, no matter what may be the precise nature of administrative reforms. But reforms are needed; in fact, they have long been overdue. A single agency, coordinating all intelligence work overseas effectively for the President and his Cabinet, is essential to the national security.

NEW YORK, N.Y.

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STATINTL

E - 702,637

S - 368,841

MAY 13 1971

Badillo Urges: Get CIA Out of

Guerrilla War

By ANTONY PRISENDORF
N.Y. Post Correspondent

WASHINGTON—A bill prohibiting the CIA from organizing or supervising guerrilla armies in foreign countries was introduced today by Rep. Badillo.

The legislation, Badillo said, would close a loophole in the National Security Act of 1947 that authorizes the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" if directed to do so specifically by the National Security Council.

This widely interpreted provision, Badillo said in remarks prepared for delivery on the House floor, "is apparently being used to justify the fact that for several years, at least, tribal guerrilla troops and the Royal Laotian Army have been trained, financed and led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war."

And, Badillo charged, the CIA is "mainly responsible" for the air bombardment of Laos, which he said has made "a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land."

Under the main provisions of his bill, Badillo said, the National Security Council

could not authorize the CIA "to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind" that involves either regular or guerrilla forces in a foreign country.

Badillo, a Democrat elected to Congress last year representing a triboro district encompassing parts of Manhattan, the Bronx and Queens, first disclosed that he was drafting the bill during his speech at the massive April 24 antiwar demonstration at the Capitol.

At that time, Badillo told the huge, peaceful crowd, "we must make sure that the Central Intelligence Agency can no longer run clandestine wars, as it has been doing for years in Laos."

In his brief speech today, Badillo said that based on information supplied by "well-informed sources," more than 300 CIA agents, many of them former special forces troops, are in Laos "supplying and training government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaissance teams."



CARL T. ROWAN

We Must Heal Our Wounds

A tempestuous week has ended for Washington, and it has afforded a lot of people abundant reasons to exercise old prejudices about the war, the Nixon Administration, the police, long-haired extremists, and the sort.

Some gloat that federal forces crushed the protesters' naive plans to bring the government to a halt.

Some lament the hooliganism that tended to discredit all war protesters.

Some saw reason to deplore the arrest of more than 7,000 demonstrators as "preventive detention" and "police state" tactics.

BUT WHEN YOU STRIP all the prejudices away, one overriding fact hangs there, ominous and challenging:

Last week it showed how deep are the anger and alienation, how widespread the irrationality and emotionalism, which the war has brought to this society.

The danger is that long after the war's end we shall still be struggling to heal the wounds, erase the scars, ease the distrust and contempt, and make this one nation again.

IRRATIONALITY AND EMOTIONALISM, once set loose upon a society, take many forms and are not easily recontrolled.

There was the woman clerk, weighing close to 300 pounds, orating to all corners about the "bums" who were trying to wreck her city.

"The first thing the cops ought to do is make all of them cut their hair," she said.

It never occurred to her that a government which can dictate how people may wear their hair would soon want to decree how fat a woman can be.

TELEVISION REPORTERS and others made a big to-do over the fact that relatively few blacks participated in the anti-war demonstrations. Why, when so many blacks have died in the war, and when the conflict deprives blacks of so much that they need, should this be?

The answers are many, and complex. Many blacks remain convinced that anti-war protests began as a cop-out by whites who fled the civil rights movement when the issue got around to housing and blacks possibly moving into their neighborhoods.

Then, with the recession hurting blacks almost twice as much as whites, black youths in Connecticut and Colorado don't find it so easy to reach into momma's purse and grab a few bills for a protest outing in Washington.

BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT and disturbing reason may be that the blacks who are most militant, most alienated, are distrustful of and hostile toward all whites. So no matter how anti-Establishment the Mayday Tribe professed to be,

it was still just "a bunch of whiteys" to the more extreme blacks.

Others are simply confused.

I sensed the trauma that lies behind this attitude a few days ago in a discussion with black students at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania.

ONE YOUNG MAN objected strenuously to my column exposing the paucity of black agents in the FBI and the lack of a single black in the supergrade (or supervisory) levels. He argued that I misled blacks by even suggesting that blacks could get justice by securing a fair share of top jobs in the FBI.

"The FBI is a repressive agency whose function is to guard the status quo, to keep blacks and the poor enslaved," he said. "There is no place in it for any black man. No black man could ever hold a top job in that agency unless he is a black devil, doing the bidding of the white Establishment."

I mentioned that Mississippi has an all-white highway patrol and wondered aloud if blacks were wrong to insist on a fair share of jobs in that organization.

That young man and a few of his colleagues held firm in their argument that blacks must not "join 'em," but must hang aloof until the day comes when they can "lick 'em."

THE NEXT THING I KNEW I was being asked to defend the FBI and the CIA against one young militant's contention that these two organizations are funnelling drugs into the black community!

It gets to be exasperating arguing with youths who think an accusation is the same as truth. It is angering to see young people mistake rage for a righteousness which allows them to slash other people's tires, damage other people's cars, infringe on other people's rights.

In our exasperation and anger (and in some instances fear) it is too easy to accept the easy expedient of government and police control of everything.

This week a lot of Americans are surely a lot more willing to accept the absurd proposition that Atty. Gen. John Mitchell has the right to bug or wiretap anyone he regards as a security threat—without the approval of any court.

"The bums threw paint on my ear; sure the Attorney General ought to keep an eye on them," is a pretty natural reaction.

And that is why it is more crucial than ever that this week Americans do less cursing about last week and more worrying about the weeks to come. Weeks in which we face the grim task of easing the deepening alienations of age, race, and political outlook. Weeks in which we shall have to struggle to prevent the erosions of liberty that are so commonplace in times of strife.

M - 508,404

MAY 3 1971

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

Accountability and Arrogance

Why does Attorney General Mitchell continue to insist that he has the right to cavedrop on U.S. citizens in national security cases without the court approval normally required in other cavedropping situations? Doesn't he see the risks inherent in such a policy to democratic traditions, whatever the practical considerations?

The answer to this disturbing question, so far as we can determine from Mr. Mitchell's aides, is not very reassuring. The Attorney General apparently believes that his doctrine of unaccountable power does not pose a threat to democracy simply because he believes himself to be an honorable man, a lawyer with the deepest respect for his country and its traditions. Why can't we accept his good will as insurance enough against the possible misuse of powers granted to him?

More disturbing still, this somewhat naive idea seems to be spreading, and to other powerful men who also should know better. For example, in a rare public speech recently, Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, declared truly enough that intelligence is vital to our defense, but he added that if the machinations of modern intelligence work seem to create the potential for undermining democratic traditions, the nation would just have to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to (the nation's) service."

Now it is not enough to call these statements naive, though that is obvious enough: Honor and good intentions are not the same as intelligence, understanding or even sanity. History is littered with the unfortunate acts of the stupid, the ignorant and the mad who abused their powers wretchedly in pursuit of goals which seemed honorable to them.

That men like the Attorney General and the director of the CIA should be tempted to such thoughts, however, should be seen in a deeper light. It is a great insight of the past few years that modern changes in the world, and especially advances in technology, have

given men powers which tax their humanity. Science in effect has outdated the rules by which we have traditionally conducted our affairs. Leaders who must use the new powers find themselves faced with staggering moral dilemmas no man should have to resolve.

A notable example of such change is nuclear weaponry, which makes it possible for one man to destroy all of human civilization. What is worth the use of such power? But more recently, as Mr. Anderson notes in an article on this page, it is becoming clear that advances in communications technology are giving men powers which, perhaps more subtly, tax their humanity too.


This has serious implications for a powerful state that is also a democracy, a form of government that gives high value to the humanity of all its citizens and the morality of its role in the world. For the logic of giving more and more men in a democracy powers too great for any human being to wield with the wisdom necessary to their use implies, inevitably, the decline of these values.

As the technologies grow more pervasive, then, men in power should take with utmost seriousness their own attitudes in using them. Ultimately the new powers require a kind of humility in their masters, an understanding that they may not be aware of all the implications of what they do, a willingness to seek the advice of others in exercising their power, a ready acceptance of review by the objective and the informed.

Now we have no doubt that for Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Helms to accept this notion fully and act on it would complicate their lives tremendously. But at the same time we think it imperative that the idea at least be better understood: The modern world makes the idea of accountability for power in a democracy more important than ever, however upstanding the people who use it. To ignore this idea is at best remarkably shortsighted; at worst it involves an arrogance no free society can afford for long.


DAILY WORLD
1 FEB 1971

STATINTL



CIA CHIEF, RICHARD HELMS, SAID "THE CIA IS NOT, AND CANNOT BE, ITS OWN MASTER."

"HIS MASTER'S VOICE"



Letters From The People

'Prove You're Honorable'

What the Central Intelligence Agency is shrouded in basically is the shrug of American shoulders convinced that all the secrecy and covert activity is necessary. To take more on "faith," as Richard Helms asks us to do, is to further turn our backs on an agency that seems to exist outside the reach of the U.S. Government and its controls.

What Americans must assume is that the same President who looks earnestly into the TV cameras and promises to extract us from a monumental blunder initiated by this constitutionally questionable organization is at that very moment instigating other such manipulations in the "national interest" that could lead us right back into another Vietnam or Bay of Pigs or Laos (and what are they doing in the Congo?).


Perhaps the CIA is a necessary part of the system, but Americans are no longer blindly taking on "faith" honorable men devoted to service. We say prove you're honorable.

Geraldine Ferris.


Ballwin

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

STATINTL



If FBI spied on Earth Day (right), Muskie wondered what was immune



Who Dug for Dirt on Earth Day?

Just how far may a government go in gathering secret intelligence information without undermining the freedom of the society it is bound to protect? That is one of the oldest dilemmas of democracy and also one of Washington's freshest political debates. Last week, the Administration's critics in Congress pressed new charges of overzealous snooping on the part of the FBI. And the director of the CIA, in a rare appearance on a public platform, defended his agency against those who accuse it of constituting a sinister "invisible government."

The FBI dispute was by far the more serious, for it is becoming plain that the Democrats sense they have a powerful public issue in the surveillance activities of the feds. Early this month, House Majority Leader Hale Boggs dramatically accused the FBI of tapping congressmen's phones—but he failed to supply any hard evidence. This time, the accuser was Sen. Edmund Muskie, front runner for the Democratic Presidential nomination next year, who sharply denounced FBI spying at an event so apparently innocuous as last year's Earth Day celebration. And he offered documentation.

Muskie made public copies of an eleven-page intelligence report,* written on FBI stationery, covering the Earth

Day rally in Washington a year ago. It was, he said, only one of 40 to 60 FBI reports on similar environmental observances around the nation the same day. In it, the FBI described the preparations for the rally, listed the organizers (one of whom, said the report, "has been publicly identified in the past as a Communist Party leader") and summarized the gist of the speeches, songs and placards—including the fact that Muskie himself had given "a short antipollution speech." In appendices to the report, the FBI described two leftist organizations, Students for a Democratic Society and the Progressive Labor Party. "The inference," Muskie declared, "is that Earth Day, Senator Muskie and many thousands of Americans who gathered together to protest pollution were somehow related to SDS and the Progressive Labor Party."

Watchful: The Earth Day snooping suggested that even if the FBI does not, as it claims, maintain surveillance over any members of Congress, it does frequently observe events in which they are closely involved. According to Sen. Gaylord Nelson, a Wisconsin Democrat and one of the originators of the Earth Day idea, at least 150 senators and representatives and 100 Administration officials took part in Earth Day rallies last year. What's more, 31 members of Congress have endorsed the antiwar demonstration (page 29), which will doubtless include more than a few watchful G-men.

Beyond that, Muskie wondered what

might be immune from inquisitive FBI eyes if something so unsubversive as an antipollution rally was not. "If there was widespread surveillance over Earth Day last year," he asked, "is there any political activity in the country which the FBI does not consider a legitimate subject for watching? ... How many Americans will hesitate, will not attend meetings and will not raise their voices because they feel what they do will become part of an FBI dossier?" The FBI performance on Earth Day, he charged, was at best "a monumental waste of the taxpayers' money" and at worst "a dangerous threat to fundamental constitutional rights."

The White House called the attacks "politically motivated," and Attorney General John Mitchell said the FBI was at Earth Day only to watch radical agitators. One such FBI target was the Chicago Seven's Rennie Davis, who spoke at the rally but was mentioned only briefly in the report. Muskie questioned why the bureau disseminated so long a report when no criminal behavior was manifest.

At the weekend, the President himself finally spoke out, during an interview with six newspaper editors—and he gave Hoover a brisk but finally ambiguous vote of confidence. While some criticism of the director could be justified, Mr. Nixon said, some was "unfair and malicious ... He is taking a bad rap on a lot of things ... The fact was that the number of FBI wiretaps has been sharply reduced during the Nixon years, the President said, and, to a rous-

*The document was unclassified and was not among those stolen from the Media, Pa., FBI office last month, and it was not a matter of surveillance and exposure of the campus movement and propaganda, which did much to inspire the current criticism, reportedly so infuriated director J. Edgar Hoover that a number of the FBI's 500-odd small "resident agents" will shortly be shut down.

WASHINGTON PANORAMA

CIA Chief Helms Defends Agency

By EDGAR POE

(T-P Staff Correspondent)

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created in 1917 during the Truman Administration, reports to the President, the secretaries of state and defense, and other high ranking U.S. officials on things taking place abroad.

The CIA does not advertise itself. Neither does it defend itself from frequent attacks. It is not a totally secret organization, nevertheless, many people regard it as a glamorous, cloak and dagger government agency.

Unlike the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which operates primarily in domestic and internal affairs, the CIA has no clandestine operations within the U.S. However, both agencies work closely together.

Because the CIA has found itself the center of more than one controversy in recent years, and because of the intelligence nature of its operation, it was news recently when Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, made the first major speech that any director has made since the agency was established.

After he made the address, some observers expressed conviction that Helms and the directors before him should have made public addresses. Many sincere Americans, of course, doubt the need for such an agency in a democratic society.

HELMES, addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, sought to dispel the idea that the CIA is an invisible government, a law unto itself and subject to no controls. In the eyes of some people, its activities are regarded as repugnant to a democratic society. Helms said that while he respects this view, he does not agree with it at all.

"There is a charge, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic," Helms told the editors. "We are not . . . in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and this arrant nonsense helps none at all."

As the President's principal intelligence officer, Helms is an adviser to the National Security Council. When there is debate over policy options, he said he does not line up with either side.

"Even in this day of the information explosion," he said, "we read everything that comes into Washington — De-

is exposed, it gives the opposition a starting point to work against the U.S. That is why, Helms said, "we seek to preserve a secrecy which, I should note, is honored without question in many thoroughly democratic countries."

"In Great Britain and other European nations," he said, "it would be unheard of for the head of the intelligence service to talk to a non-governmental group. In London, in fact, the location of the Intelligence Service headquarters and the identity of its chief have long been respected as state secrets by the British public, press and officialdom."

Here in the nation's capital nearly everybody knows that the CIA has its headquarters with its many employees at Langley, Va., just a few miles across the Potomac River from Washington. Langley is just a mile or so from McLean, Va., and only 7½ miles from the center of Washington.



POE

partment of State cables, Department of Defense traffic, our own reports, and the American and foreign information media," said Helms, a former newspaperman. "Then we bring to bear on that information every last bit of expert analysis at the service of the U.S. Government."

IT IS OBVIOUS, of course, that some of the most important intelligence targets are in Communist countries where intelligence collection is impeded greatly by the security defense of police states.

If any significant portion of the CIA's secret organization

STATINTL

Letters to the Editor

STATINTL

Confidence in the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

Richard Helms's defense of the C.I.A. [news story April 15] is thoughtful and intelligent but bypasses an essential point. He rightly recognizes the conflicts of values and procedures inherent in an open society's operating an organization that deals in secret information.

He suggests the conflict is satisfactorily accommodated by assuming that the C.I.A. is composed of honorable men and noting that it is subject to the review of critics and assessors, notably the National Security Council and the cognate committees of Congress.

These measures no doubt are the best we can devise. They would engender more reassurance, however, if they were not exactly the same ones on which the public has previously been asked to rely, only to learn later that we had been deceived.

The C.I.A. hardly has authority to insist that other Government agencies try to be more consistently candid. It may not even be able to insist that, when other agencies use the intelligence furnished by the C.I.A., they do so in a way that does not deceive or mislead the public.

However, its director could have contributed to general understanding, within Government and without, that confidence in such very important operations as the C.I.A. is shaken by any mismanagements of truth, wherever they occur.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD Jr.
Professor of Law, Yale University
New Haven, April 15, 1971

PITTSBURGH, PA.
POST-GAZETTE

M - 243,938

APR 24 1971

STATINTL



DR. HARRISON BROWN

Sees 'new greatness.'

Funding For Social Ills Is Asked

Scientist Says
Defense Funds
Should Be Cut

A major share of funds the United States is spending for defense should be channeled into treating the nation's social ills, an award-winning scientist said here yesterday.

The proposal was one of several which Dr. Harrison Brown, professor of earth chemistry, science and government at California Institute of Technology, said he would like to hear advanced by a future president of the United States.

Dr. Brown, who co-authored the original proposal leading to creation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, urged a stage-by-stage reduction in military spending, with half the savings being used for domestic problems and half for aid to developing countries.

He also proposed abolishing "all para-military elements of the Central Intelligence Agency," compulsory retirement for elderly U.S. senators, and ending the Congressional seniority system.

Dr. Brown, who in an address here seven years ago predicted major war as the "most-likely" future facing America, predicted yesterday that "a new day of greatness" will be achieved as more Americans become ready to accept political innovations.

Dr. Brown delivered the Robert Kennedy Dunean Memorial Lecture in Mellon Institute, where he was presented with Carnegie-Mellon University's \$1,000 Mellon Institute Award.

STATINTL

The Central Intelligence Agency

The director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helmes, has held his high and difficult office for the last five years. There is nothing about him personally or his career to suggest conformity with the popular conception of a secret agent or the director of an intricate and perilous system of espionage or varied other undercover operations. Insofar as the externals are concerned, Mr. Helmes is engaged in a prosaic job. But it is one that is concerned with the security of the nation.

Like most public services whose purposes and activities are not a matter of public knowledge, the office of Central Intelligence is vulnerable to public criticism. What are its functions? What does it do to justify the costs? Is it essential to the national interest?

This, after all, is the vital question and it is answered by Mr. Helmes affirma-

tively and emphatically. The survival of the Central Intelligence Agency is necessary to the survival of the national security and a democratic society.

It is unfortunate that by reason of public ignorance of the services of Mr. Helmes' bureau the value of its work cannot be realized. Through the activities of its agents the Defense and State Departments are enabled to know what is going on in all parts of the world and where the danger lies.

After all, most major governments have their agencies of information similar in purpose, if not in effectiveness, to Central Intelligence. If a nation hopes to remain alive in these perilous days it is necessary for its leaders to know what goes on around them. This is the function of the Central Intelligence Agency, a responsibility fulfilled quite competently by Mr. Helmes and the vast organization which he directs.

STATINTL

Inside the CIA

For the first time, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency has made a public speech about this most secret government operation. In telling of the work of his operatives, Richard Helms noted that other countries are even more secret about gathering intelligence—what the man on the street calls spying. In Great Britain, for example, it is not even public knowledge who is in charge of such activity.

When he had finished his talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Helms had uncovered only the top of the CIA iceberg. He gave an inkling of the enormous store of information in its books and files and photos (some from U-2s). But of sinister activities obviously no word.

In the James Bond world of international spying many things obviously are done that no nation dedicated to righteous and ethical practices could own up to. One charge Helms did deny—that the CIA is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. Helms' speech to the editors was intended to dispel

such suspicions and his appearance did much to explain why he has been enjoying a greater confidence in his integrity, honesty and judgment on Capitol Hill.

He insisted that the CIA has no policy axes to grind, that it merely digs up information for the policy-makers to act on. And, he said, "We do not target on American citizens." He might have added, but did not, "unlike the FBI and the Army." In the end, however, Helms conceded that the American public must take his word for it that his agents do not overstep the boundaries of morality.

"The nation must to a degree," he said, "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her (America's) service."

It's frustrating in a government of, by and for the people to be asked to take anything on faith. But Helms' assurances are better than none and he himself appears to be the kind of official Washington, particularly agencies like the FBI, could use more of.

21 APR 1971

U.S. Congressmen Hobbled

STATINTL in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Reps. Paul N. McCloskey and Jerome Waldie, who came here to learn more about the American role in Laos, found themselves unable to get documents they sought or to visit areas of the country they wished.

McCloskey, the California Republican who has threatened to oppose President Nixon in next year's GOP primaries on the Indochina issue, accused U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley of a "deliberate attempt to keep Congress from knowing the facts."

He and Waldie, a Democrat from California, sought copies of an embassy study which blamed last year's movement of refugees from the Plain of Jars on American bombing.

McCloskey, who was here for three days, said U.S. officials in Godley's presence at an embassy dinner denied the document existed.

When McCloskey was able to pinpoint the document, he said, officials undertook "a deliberate, conscious policy to divert us."

He said Monteagle Stearns, the deputy chief of mission at the embassy, failed on three occasions to respond to McCloskey's request for the study.

Substitution Charged

Then, according to McCloskey, Stearns substituted the front page of the document. The original page, the congressman said, showed the origin of the study was a memo from Stearns to Norman Barnes, chief of the United States Information Service here. Stearns and Barnes were two officials who said they had no knowledge of the study McCloskey was asking about.

McCloskey and Waldie also were refused permission to visit Long Chen, the village on the edge of the Plain of Jars which is the headquarters of the CIA-directed guerrilla army of Gen. Vang Pao's Meo tribesmen and which serves as a CIA Air Force base.

Andrew P. Guzowski, who is the embassy spokesman in Vientiane, said permission was refused because "the congressmen do not have security clearance."

In Laos, this puts a member of Congress somewhat below the level of a street vendor. When it was pointed out to Guzowski that any Asian, including North Vietnamese agents, can enter Long Chen, the spokesman said, "Well, it's their country."

The Major Reason

The major reason for refusing the congressmen permission to visit Long Chen is they might discover that U.S. officials were not honest in congressional testimony when they said bombing missions in Laos were approved by Laotians or Meos who were flying in forward air control missions.

In fact, both seats in the small air control mission planes often are filled by Americans.

When McCloskey went to interview refugees at Ban Nga Ga, 20 miles north of Vientiane, the embassy provided two priests to act as "unbiased" interpreters.

The priests, Father Rauff and Father Matt Menger, are, however, known locally for their staunch support of U.S. Embassy actions.

Father Rauff, in his role as an interpreter for McCloskey, at one point omitted to translate a villager's remarks about "bombers coming every day."

And Father Menger was overheard to say, while McCloskey was examining a child with a burned leg, "Thank God for the bombing. Without it this would not be a free country."

State Dept. Comments

Despite the obstacles, McCloskey did find that, almost without exception, refugees said they had left their villages because of U.S. bombing attacks, even though enemy troops were not in the villages.

McCloskey said, "The embassy decided to suppress this because it was not favorable to them."

(In Washington, Robert J. McCloskey, a deputy assistant secretary of state for press relations, said Monday that McCloskey had declined opportunities offered by the embassy in Vientiane to examine the refugee situation. The State Department spokesman denied a charge by the congressman that American bombers have destroyed Laotian villages deliberately.)

The difficulties McCloskey and Waldie had here in getting information from the embassy have become typical of the last few years.

False Information

The embassy, for example, refuses to provide any information about Americans killed in Laos. When Waldie asked about three specific recent deaths, Guzowski said the missions in which the Americans were killed originated in Thailand and the embassy here was not accountable for the deaths. "They are not my Americans," Guzowski said in answer to reporters' queries.

The embassy is willing to permit false information to be given the American public when it knows the information is false. The USIS here tapes Laos military briefings and provides them to U.S. Army briefers who relay whatever the Lao briefer says.

When, as a result of other information, questions are raised about Lao official statements passed on by the Americans, the U.S. briefers simply say, "Well, that's what the general said and I'm not going to contradict him."

There also are attempts to cover up the misuse of U.S. funds. The embassy, for example, is buying another 15,000 metric tons of rice from south Laos this year.

In the past, top-ranking south Laotians would sell their surplus rice to the North Vietnamese, then buy cheaper Thai rice and sell it at a higher price to the Americans, saying it was the south Laos rice.

According to Guzowski, Charles Mann, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, mission here is not interested in discussing

with the press whatever measures AID is taking to prevent the loss of more U.S. funds on similar rice deals.

Among other subjects the embassy is not anxious to discuss are opium dealing and the sales of U.S. supplies and weapons.

Other samples of omissions and evasions by the embassy here include:

When Long Chen was bombed mistakenly by U.S. aircraft, a spokesman here 36 hours later gave an account of damage by North Vietnamese artillery. He failed to mention the air strike.

When U.S.-led guerrillas were mauled by the North Vietnamese on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos in December, an embassy spokesman denied the story. When additional details were produced, the spokesman was forced to backtrack.

"Orientation" Missions

Guzowski has said Americans have been killed on "orientation missions" when, in fact, they have died on bombing missions; airdrops of rice have turned out to be missions transporting Thai troops; the description "light" casualties was used for an engagement in which 64 out of 110 men participating were killed; major actions have been described as a "few clashes took place."

The embassy consistently denies to the press use of American transport facilities to cover the war, particularly in those areas of northeast Laos where Americans are involved.

These air transport facilities — Air America and Continental Air Lines — are ostensibly privately owned and under contract to the U.S. government. They are the sole means of reaching battle areas in northeast Laos.

"I see no reason why we should fly the press around," says Guzowski.

Aircraft are available, however, when the embassy wants to show off its aid programs to places where the U.S. involvement is not evident can be arranged by reporters. The embassy's aircraft are

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.

NEWSDAY

APR 20 1973

E - 427,270

Your Agent

Government intelligence work can be an extremely dirty business requiring men to do much that is uncivilized in the name of civilization, usually their own. The U.S. has what may be the most formidable of these organizations, the renowned Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA's function is to protect the American way from outside influence and the public should not be deluded about the agency's dedication to this task. ✓

Recently, a former Green Beret, Robert Marasco, admitted killing a Vietnamese man on the orders of the CIA. The man, supposedly, was a triple espionage agent. Marasco says he put two shots in the man's head after being told by the CIA to eliminate him "with extreme prejudice." ✓

Only a few days later, Richard Helms, CIA director, in an unusual speech, asked the nation to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men" dedicated to democratic ideals. Undoubtedly, Helms was speaking sincerely. But there can be no honor in murder nor in the many other questionable activities attributed in the past to the CIA. Should Helms really think his people are representing this democracy honorably, the failure is more ours than his. If murder and assorted acts of intrigue are in fact, central to our survival, we should acknowledge what we have become and question our own commitment to the ideals Helms is sworn to protect. ✓

HUNTINGTON, W.VA.,
HERALD-Dispatch
APR 20 1971

H - 52,741

EDITORIALS

Director Urges Citizens To Take CIA 'On Faith'

ALONG WITH other members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, we listened raptly last week to the assurances of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the job his organization is engaged in doing is essential and is being done "better than it has ever been before."

Contrary to the notion that some Americans may have of the man who operates this cloak-and-dagger outfit, Mr. Helms exhibited no outward signs that his unusual calling had twisted his nature or his objectivity.

While conceding that citizens have to take the CIA more or less "on faith," he insisted that it does not "target on American citizens" and that by far the greater part of its work lies in coordinating information gathered by other agencies and departments of government.

"WE UNDERSTAND as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society," he admitted. But he asked that the nation believe, "We, too, are honorable men devoted to her (the nation's) service."

A dark and rather handsome man, Mr. Helms recognizes the ambiguous position which his agency occupies—since it is a secret organization whose personnel, activities, budget and objectives cannot be examined in public.

The prime objective, if what Mr. Helms said is to be taken literally, is

to collect information, but not to evaluate it. "We must be strictly objective," he insisted. "We must never take sides."

SOMETIMES THE facts point to dangerous situations or real threats to the nation's safety, but perhaps as often the knowledge contained in CIA files dispel certain possible dangers.

An example occurred during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the director explained. Information reached President Kennedy that the Russians were placing certain types of weapons in caves in Cuba so that they could not be spotted by aerial reconnaissance planes. The CIA was able to deny the stories because it had precise information on the size of the caves in question and knew that it would be impossible for them to accommodate the weapons.

Concerning certain high crimes in which the CIA has sometimes been accused of implication, Mr. Helms was silent. But he emphasized what any thoughtful citizen knows quite well: That the United States is a world power and hence that it may be involved without warning in situations that endanger its security. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that every shred of information bearing on the situation be obtained beforehand—even, as Mr. Helms explained, if it is such a relatively insignificant fact as "the depth of the harbor at Djibouti."

UNDOUBTEDLY, Director Helms was as candid with his audience (this was one of his very rare public appearances) as he could afford to be. In a world which at times seems to be preoccupied with various methods of eavesdropping, and which has made privacy almost incompatible with prominence, it would be childish to expect the CIA to see anything wrong with any act it found necessary to carry out a high policy decision.

That the act is necessary—even if it triggers such things as political assassinations in other lands—we will, presumably, have to accept on blind faith. We suppose there is no alternative to this kind of trust. On the assumption that everybody else is doing it, we hope Mr. Helms' organization is as efficient as he says it is.

PHILADFLPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 640,783

S - 684,833 1971

The case for spying

For all his reputation as the Nation's Chief espionage agent, Richard McGarrah Helms, of St. Davids, Pa., would cut a poor figure in a spy thriller.

No flair for the dramatic, just a quiet-spoken man in a dark gray business suit, to match the federal agency he has headed the last five years — the Central Intelligence Agency.

In his first public address as CIA director, Mr. Helms also showed himself recently to be a man with a passion for logic and precision, in articulating ideas and in making distinctions.

His topic was spying itself, its role in a "fearsome" world. Spying was not, said Mr. Helms, an optional activity, to be curtailed or abandoned, under pressure of critics who take advantage of the CIA's "traditional" silence to make "vicious and just plain silly charges..."

In the last violence-ridden quarter of the 20th Century, Mr. Helms asserted, it

was an absolute necessity — despite the fact that the CIA's mission, to help keep the President informed of international developments, may "appear in conflict with some of the traditions and ideals of our society..."

The problem posed by the CIA was not eliminating it but "to adapt intelligence work to American society." And in this, Mr. Helms said, the American public would have to accept, "on faith," that he and his CIA associates are "honorable men," devoted to the nation's service and subject to intense scrutiny by the elected leaders of the Federal Government.

It was a persuasive argument Mr. Helms outlined for the American Society of Newspaper Editors meeting in Washington, D.C. And, granted the intense scrutiny Mr. Helms cites, it is an argument the public is disposed to accept.

The Honorable Men Of The CIA

STATINTL

Last week Richard Helms in his first public speech since his 1966 appointment as director of the Central Intelligence Agency tried to counter what he characterized as a "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency." He attributed the criticism to an "inherent American distaste for peacetime gathering of intelligence," and told his audience that the nation must "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

If Mr. Helms's analysis of information gathered abroad is as incomplete and misleading as his interpretation of what prompts criticism of his agency here at home, then the country is clearly in trouble. It is not the intelligence gathering aspect of the CIA's operations that has fed the growing body of criticism. What the critics object to are covert paramilitary operations around the globe, and they question whether the secrecy that is admittedly required for some aspects of intelligence gathering should be extended to cover a host of questionable and frequently illegal activities under the pretext of serving an undefined "national interest."

In the years since it has become active in covert operations the CIA has financed the invasions of two countries, Cuba and Guatemala, and otherwise influenced the establishment and overthrow of governments in a number of lands, including Vietnam. It provided planes and mercenary pilots to the Congo (some of the same men it trained to invade Cuba) and for several years it has financed and directed a mercenary army in Laos in violation of our treaty commitments. At the same time it has engaged in activities that have more to do with propaganda than intelligence. It has subsidized magazines and publishing companies and the operation of radio

stations which free advertising in this country portrayed as supported by private donations.

In addition there have been instances in recent years when the agency has apparently been successful in establishing for itself a place above the law. Two examples are the dismissal of a slander suit against an agent on the ground that, even though his statements were not substantiated, he was acting under orders, and the case of the Green Berets accused by the Army of murdering a suspected Vietnamese double agent, but never brought to trial because the CIA refused to supply witnesses.

Even assuming that Mr. Helms is correct in his contention that the agency functions under the tight control of the President, an assumption which many knowledgeable critics dispute, the fact remains that the agency's activities have evaded the checks provided by the Constitution and in doing so it has deceived the American people. The issue, then, is not whether the men in charge of the CIA are devoted, or even honorable, and faith is not the answer to such fundamental criticism. It was faith in the efficacy of covert military and political manipulation, after all, that propelled us into our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia.

What is needed is a check on the presidential fascination with Mr. Helms's "Department of Dirty Tricks," a fascination that has pervaded the past four administrations. Congress is the appropriate body to provide that check, even though at present it is not doing so. The supervision now supplied by a handful of key members of Congress is, in the words of a recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "only sporadic and largely *ex post facto*." Fortunately there are efforts now underway to strengthen congressional oversight of the CIA. These efforts deserve the support of the American people.

LANCASTER, PA.

NEW ERA

E - 56,523

NEWS APR 19 1971

S - 110,874.

U.S. Is No Police State

A number of persons — including high-ranking members of Congress who should know better — are making allegations today that the U.S. is a police state, and that government agencies are collecting data on citizens for repressive purposes.

If this were really a police state, no person could make such claims. He would be clapped in prison immediately, and probably removed permanently from the scene.

But some Congressional leaders, especially those with aspirations for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972, have made noisy charges about surveillance, and about the agencies which are set up for the security of the country, both internally and externally.

President Richard M. Nixon, in the interview conducted with six top U.S. editors Friday night, effectively answered the loose charges.

America is no police state, he told the editors and the nation. He has been in a police state, he said, and it can be added that any American who has been in a police state can immediately testify to the differences.

Mr. Nixon also defended J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, who has been under heavy attack from some Senators. Mr. Nixon termed the criticism of the FBI head as "unfair and malicious."

The President outlined the number of wiretaps being made by the FBI for national security purposes, and said that there were fewer in the past two years

than under the Johnson administration. Others, he said, were made with court permission, with a large percentage for the fight on drugs.

Earlier in the week, the head of the CIA, Richard Helms, spoke to the editors' convention and effectively answered charges made against his organization. The CIA, he asserted, is not the "invisible government" that its foes say it is.

"In short," he said, "the Central Intelligence Agency is not and cannot be its own master. It is the servant of the United States government, undertaking what that government asks it to do, under the direction and controls the government has established. We make no foreign policy."

The FBI is the internal watchdog, and in these days when cranks can dream up new ways to plant bombs, and fomentors of violence want no restraints on their subversive activities, the FBI is sorely needed. The CIA is our external watchdog, and as Helms pointed out, we need its intelligence as much for waging peace as for conducting military operations.

It would be unthinkable to try to operate a government without the FBI or the CIA—as agencies of the government, responsible to government. That does not mean they can ever evade their responsibility to be responsive. But any move that weakens their standing, and hampers their work, can have critical effects on the future of the nation.

WORCESTER, MASS.
GAZETTE

E - 94,223

APR 19 1971

Secretive Servants

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently gave a public speech about his very private work.

His appearance before a national meeting of newspaper editors was an unusual break with the CIA's policy of silence, and required presidential approval.

Helms took advantage of the opportunity, launching into a vigorous defense of his agency.

The CIA is vital to our survival as a democratic society, Helms said. He cited the agency's role in uncovering Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. And he mentioned the necessity of accurate intelligence to bolster enforcement of any strategic arms limitation.

Helms emphasized that the CIA had no domestic security functions and had never sought any.

Thus did he attempt to answer critics who have accused the agency of blunders and unauthorized domestic surveillance.

"I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States government watch over extensively, intensively and continuously," Helms said.

The problem, of course, is that the checks and balances operate out of public view. And the blunders that do occur, such as the Bay of Pigs or the U-2 incident, gain publicity, while the secret successes do not. So it is understandable that honest persons can be-

come disquieted about the vast and shadowy power held by the CIA.

But the need for intelligence and even the more clandestine operations carried on by the CIA are sadly clear in what Helms called this "fearsome world." It is naive to believe our adversaries are not engaged in the same activities.

In the end we must trust that the executive and legislative branches of government have no intention of turning the CIA into a political police force, either at home or abroad. Compelling reasons to withhold such trust have yet to appear.



Helms

ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL
E - 257,863
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
S - 536,497
APR 18 1971

The Surveillance Tightrope

IT MAY HAVE been just coincidence.

But it was interesting and timely when CIA Director Richard Helms and Sen. Edmund Muskie discussed intelligence gathering practices on the same day.

Muskie, a leading presidential contender, chose the floor of the Senate chamber to criticize FBI surveillance of Earth Day activities last year. He even made public an FBI report noting his appearance for "a short antipollution speech."

The CIA chief chose a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington to defend the devotion of men in his agency and the need for maintaining an efficient intelligence operation for national security.

This is an area for legitimate debate.

"If antipollution rallies are a subject of intelligence concern," asked the senator, "is anything immune?"

It is an honest question.

There are no easy answers, as any constitutional lawyer who has grappled with the conflict of civil liberties and national security knows.

A free society must be able to protect itself from enemies abroad and within. That is agreed. It is also generally understood that reputable organizations, movements and crowds are susceptible to being manipulated for subversive purposes.

But the great danger of broad, umbrella-like surveillance is the power of government suspicion and harassment of citizens on unwar-

ranted grounds of likely guilt by association—even unknown "association."

If intelligence gathering is not carefully directed to avoid abuse, free society ceases to enjoy the very political and intellectual freedom the surveillance experts and enforcement agencies are working to protect.

It is a narrow, dangerous tightrope to walk.

Swaying too far on either side can easily upset democracy's delicate balance.

Presently, there is an increasing trend toward criticism of the FBI and intelligence gathering.

Taken to extreme, this pattern is as dangerous as the threat the critics set out to attack. Left unchecked, however, the surveillance and snooping is equally as dangerous.

That is why we believe Sen. Muskie acted wisely by including a constructive suggestion.

He has called for the creation of a domestic intelligence review board, composed of prominent members of government intelligence review agencies, Congress, the judiciary and the bar, to supervise intelligence activities of the FBI and other agencies.

The proposed board would also recommend executive orders and legislation required to curb the "unnecessary use of surveillance."

That is reasonable. And it shows the senator has not gone off the deep end as some political enemies would quickly surmise.

BEST COPY
Available

Editor's Report:

Still a Tree, Critical Press

By WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST JR.
Editor-in-Chief, The Hearst Newspapers

WASHINGTON — Of all the balls, picnics and banquets newspapermen go to or have to go to throughout each year, by far the most interesting is the spring gathering of the ASNE. This translates into the American Society of Newspaper Editors and results in their meeting and discussing the future of our business and listening to panel discussions and speeches by high government officials.

The get-together is held four out of every five years in Washington. On the fifth year, the editors journey to some other city as they did last year to San Francisco and a few years ago to Montreal.

I always find the ASNE get-together fun and productive—and this year's meeting was no exception. In fact it was one of the best because the president of the ASNE was Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star, which has for many years been owned by his family and been regarded as the family newspaper of the Washington area.

Since Newbold is a Washingtonian through and through, he knew exactly the kind of program to put together to enlighten and entertain the editors and their wives. For example, instead of following the traditional custom of getting the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense for a luncheon session, he pulled a real coup and got CIA Director Richard Helms to deliver his first public speech.

The next day he produced Sen. Henry (Scoop) Jackson of Washington, who, in my book, is one of the most responsible and dedicated public servants we have in government today.

In fact, I regard Scoop Jackson as the most qualified of all the possible Democratic contenders for next year's presidential nomination. He is a warm human being and has been a friend of mine for years. More to the point and the subject of his speech is a staunch advocacy of the kind of nuclear defense policy that would keep us ahead of the Soviets and prevent us ever having to bow to their blackmail.

Should next year's election develop into a contest between Scoop Jackson and Dick Nixon, I think the American people would not be surprised whichever way they turned.

This theory was confirmed not only by hearing Scoop at the luncheon but also by President Nixon's appearance at the final ASNE banquet, where he was interrogated by a panel of tough, perceptive editors.

It was a special treat to hear and meet Dick Helms. I had known most of his predecessors at the CIA—Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Allen W. Dulles and John McCone. But I had never had the chance to even talk with Helms. He is just not the kind of fellow who circulates on the banquet circuit or gets into the public eye.

Helms advanced the very sound view that he and his agency should be anonymous, because they deal in highly secret security matters that should come to the attention only of the President and the National Security Council.

Anyone with an ounce of patriotism and concern for this nation should realize that men like Helms and his CIA associates are performing a vital service to the United States. So he took the opportunity to talk to America's editors about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government, saying:

"In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled.

"On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1971 is better than it ever has been before.

"On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."

Helms dispelled the thought some editors might have had that the CIA was some sort of "big brother" police operation. It is wrong for liberal critics of our government to make such assertions—including the recent attempt to smear the aging J. Edgar Hoover as some sort of mean, senile Gestapo chieftain. I don't think the American people are about to turn their back on men like Hoover, who has served more than 40 years as chief of the FBI, or Helms, who has been with the CIA for more than 20 years. Both are Americans of whom we should be proud.

As the richest, most influential and most benevolent country in the world, we cannot afford to let our defenses down. We need every ounce of evidence we can lay our hands on about internal developments in various countries—both friends and foes—around this globe.

In a sense, the CIA does for the federal government what newspapers are supposed to do for the general public: Gather information and lay it out honestly and objectively for others to study.

The ASNE had on its agenda the question of whether reporting should be subjective or objective. In other words, the editors felt they had to debate, the issue of whether reporters should fill the news columns with propaganda born of their own advocacy or whether they should report only the news, honestly and fairly—and as it happened.

To me, this is not a question worth debating. I learned from my father years ago there is no place in the news columns for subjective reporting. The place for newsmen to express their own prejudices is

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By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

I CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when I'm ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of the Times.

Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups; and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 58-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jettisoning secretly around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He pretends the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of incoherence—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what he saw. He can rustle, ever more in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

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APR 18 1974

Washington In The Spring Is Wall-To-Wall Tourists

National Correspondence

By DAVID M. GILBERT

CHARLES A. HARRIS

WASHINGTON -- Few people attending the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors remembered a prettier spring or better weather for this event in the nation's capital.

But moving around the city this week after Hubert has been like trying to swim in molasses. The tourist season has begun with a record number of sightseers and the city is wall-to-wall people.

North Carolina editors and their wives still managed to get over to the New Senate Office Building on Friday to have lunch with Sen. B. Everett Jordan and members of his staff.

The senator has snapped back from his recent major operation and is in good spirits. He looks primed to offer for reelection in 1977. His administrative assistant, Bill Cochrane, said Sen. Jordan received more than 1,600 letters during his illness. The senator added that some 600 of the writers said specifically that they were remembering him in their prayers.

"It must have worked," he said, "for there is no doubt I am well."

Great View

Some of us had the opportunity Thursday night to visit the Will Arey's in their handsome Watergate apartment. Will is a native of Shelby and was in public relations with the Panama Canal Company for a number of years. The Arey family moved from Panama to Washington when Will went to work for the United States Travel Agency.

The Arey's have a spectacular view of the Potomac River and the Memorial Bridge from their 10th floor apartment. They live in that portion of the Watergate adjacent to the Rock Creek Parkway and only a short distance from the new John Fitzgerald Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.

Among the Arey's neighbors are

Congressman and Mrs. L. Richardson Preyer of Greensboro. We were hoping to see them, but the congressman had not returned from the Eastern recess in North Carolina, and Emily Preyer was helping mind the store at his office on Capitol Hill.

Will Arey described Congressman Preyer as "a man completely dedicated to his job in the House."

Ageless Hubert

Washington is an especially interesting city just for the people you casually bump into. As my wife, son David Jr. and I were returning to the Shoreham Hotel Thursday night, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey arrived at the same time — looking ruddy, ageless and, as one bystander expressed it, "like a kewpie doll."

He shook hands with the three of us, and I remarked that we had an opportunity to do that four years ago at a reception in the White House. "Yes," said the senator, "maybe it would be a good idea to do that again."

For the next few minutes the lobby was awash with Democratic presidential candidates en route to a dinner given by the National Press Club. Among them were Senators George McGovern, Birch Bayh and Harold Hughes. These three shared the speaking platform with Humphrey.

Sen. Edmund Muskie, regarded by most of the editors as the front-runner for the party's nomination, was addressing a fact group in Pennsylvania, but he sent a telegram.

"I hear," wired Muskie, "that you've put a four-minute time limit on my Senate colleagues. With that kind of restriction, I'm amazed that Hubert showed up. I know Hubert will adhere to it — but I'm sending along a box of throat lozenges."

Scoop Jackson

Another Democratic darkhorse for the nomination addressed the Thursday

(Scoop) Jackson of Washington came on strong with the editors. He struck many of them as a man of great common sense.

He is a key member of the Senate who is extremely wary of Soviet intentions and who advocates a strong U.S. offensive missile capability until such time as Moscow agrees to an enforceable arms limitation.

CIA Coup

ASNE program chairman Bill Hill of The Washington Star pulled quite a coup by getting a speech from Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This was his first public address since being appointed to the post by former President Johnson.

Helms revealed that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" helped the U.S. in identification of Soviet weapons in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

An extremely able speaker, the CIA director spent much of his time defending his agency against charges that it is an invisible government.

"We do not target on Americans," he said. "We make no foreign policy. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrat-

Ping-Pong

The current "in" jokes in Washington are about the breakthrough to Communist China via the ping-pong table. A TV network commentator was urging earlier in the week that we refer to it as table tennis, not the trademarked ping-pong, but I read of a Chinese-American in Washington who said they've always called it ping-pong in China.

It seems that what the world needs now is not love, sweet love, so much as it needs a good backhand. And Richard M. Nixon reportedly has one of the best.

Nixon's Panel

The President, incidentally, wound up the ASNE meeting Friday night by appearing at the banquet in his favorite format — questioning by a panel of editors rather than delivering a speech.

In a similar performance in the spring of 1963 in Washington, then candidate Nixon wowed the audience and his entire staff got a lift in the drive toward the Republican nomination.

That was a hard act to follow, but a lot has transpired since then. This year the President was questioned on his

CIA Director Analyzes Agency's Role

By Claude Sitton

America's chief spy is not given to speechmaking. Thus, the fact that Richard Helms addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Wash-



Sitton

In a democratic society.

No concern for the editors' opinions flushed Helms from the cover of the shadowy empire over which he presides. He came because of the Nixon administration's recognition of the public unrest over governmental power and the uses to which it has been put. No government can long survive if it ignores the wishes of the governed. And reaction to spying at home by the Army and the FBI indicates the governed think that government has overreached its mandate.

Helms' manner and dress seem calculated to reassure any who think the CIA is involved. A tall, trim man with receding dark hair shot through with gray, Helms looks like a grim Bob Hope. From the Ivy League cut of his navy suit, button-down collar and rep tie to the measured understatement of his speech, the director projects an air of calm, deliberate determination.

There is nothing evasive or indirect in Helms' treatment of CIA activities at home. He emphasizes that the agency

is specifically prohibited by law from having domestic police, subpoena or law enforcement authority. "We do not have any such powers and functions," he asserts. "We have never sought any. We do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens." So much for the little old lady in Frog Level who thinks a CIA spook has been peering over her shoulder.

However, Helms is less than candid or reassuring in describing the CIA's activist role abroad. A listener would never know that its intervention in the affairs of other countries has sometimes led to insurrectionary hijinks. And, on occasion, to America's public embarrassment.

The National Security Act of 1947, Helms conceded, enables the agency to conduct those foreign activities that the national government assigns to a "secret service." But any covert projects always come second to the production of intelligence, he insists.

Helms disclaims ultimate responsibility for any clandestine efforts to rearrange the world's political landscape. All undercover escapades are under the direct control of the executive branch — the President. This theme runs through the director's analysis of the agency's functions. "We answer to those we serve in government."

Logic is on Helms' side when he argues

that at no time in history has America needed more to keep abreast of foreign developments. What is the scope of the nuclear threat to U. S. security? What are current Soviet intentions? How soon will China have an intercontinental ballistic missile? But, if intelligence is a must for military planning, it also is necessary to prevent conflict. It would be unthinkable, for example, to conclude an arms agreement with Russia without means for checking compliance. And if intelligence can tell the nation what measures are needed to counter aggression, it can also cut the costs of those measures by narrowing the choices.

Helms conceded he has no easy answer to those who consider spying incompatible with democratic principles. "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we are honorable men devoted to her service," he says. Further, he contends that both executive and legislative branches have more than adequate supervision of CIA's activities.

Spying is and has been a dirty business. But realism in today's fearful and fearsome world makes it necessary, even for a democracy. Informed criticism of the CIA, however, deals not with its intelligence gathering but instead with the agency's paramilitary operations overseas. The record shows clearly that in regard to the latter the supervisors of whom Helms speaks either have been slack or have used the agency for questionable purposes.

CIA indiscretions abroad are not unlike those of the Army and the FBI at home — a case of government exceeding its mandate from the governed. Were this not true, Helms might not have found it necessary to make the first speech of his career as director last Wednesday.

Taking the CIA on Faith

Welcome indeed are CIA director Richard Helms' assurances that the quality of his agency's work "is better than it has ever been before," that "we do not target on American citizens," that "we not only have no stake in policy debates but we cannot and must not take sides," that "the elected officials of the U.S. Government watch over (CIA) extensively, intensively and continuously," and that "we understand as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society." Whether his assurances are based on fact or feather-fluffing is, of course, another matter, and one which he conceded the public cannot judge. "The nation must to a degree take it on faith," he told the American Society of Newspaper Editors, "that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

In all due respect to Mr. Helms, no one questions his honor or devotion, or that of his agency's staff. Moreover, on the basis of what little independent knowledge is available to us, we suspect that the high marks Mr. Helms gave the CIA are generally quite deserved. But that is not the point. The point is that the public has no firm or reliable basis on which to make any satisfactory judgment of the CIA at all. It is a secret agency. Mr. Helms is surely aware of the irony implicit in his plea that the nation accept on faith the CIA's devotion to democracy. For it is the essence of a democracy that matters of public policy be examined in public, not taken on faith.

Take, for instance, the one specific charge that Mr. Helms defended the agency against in his ASNE speech—that "the CIA is somehow involved

in the world drug traffic." He said: "We are not." But does the CIA have connections with others involved in drug traffic? If it does, would it not have double reason—the dirtiness of drugs and the protection of a particular intelligence operation—to deny the charge? For that matter, would a CIA confession have any more objective validity than a CIA denial?

The core of the matter lies, we believe, in Mr. Helms' observation that "the United States, as a world power, either is involved or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide range and variety of problems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy makers." As a general proposition, this is unsailable: nobody in his right mind would contend the United States does not need to collect foreign intelligence. In the specific application, however, questions arise: How much intelligence is enough? Does an able and ambitious intelligence agency's anticipation of contingencies in a given place or situation induce policy makers to posit an American interest there? Does the CIA's perception of the world as "fearsome," in Mr. Helms' word, affect its judgment of what contingencies it ought to prepare for and of what information it ought to pass on to the President?

To be sure, it is no more reasonable to expect the director of Central Intelligence to question publicly the premises of American global policy than to expect him to denounce the CIA as incompetent, imperial and anti-democratic. It is always going to be unsettling in our society, nonetheless, to be asked to take the CIA—or any other agency or operation of government—on nothing more than faith.

STATINTL

WASHINGTON STAR

18 APR 1977

France's Little Bit Of Africa—Djibouti

STATINTL

By NICHOLAS W. STROM
Special to The Star

DJIBOUTI, French Somalia—It is almost as if there had been no war in Indochina, no French defeat in Algeria, no breakdown in France's once far-flung colonial empire. It is as if the hands of the clock had stopped in the 1950s or even earlier.

In this sandy, sun-drenched corner of Africa, thousands of miles in time and space from the major world powerpoints, ramrod straight men of the French Foreign Legion still strut proudly. Shirts and khaki shorts always are immaculately pressed, haircuts are close and very military.

The Legion's colors once flew throughout the world—Guadaloupe to Saigon, Dakar to Madagascar. More than a quarter of the population of Africa alone lived under direct French rule. And always there was the Legion Etrangere—it was supreme, the symbol of the might of a great nation.

But time has marched on and Djibouti somehow has been left in the backwater, a curious museum piece, an historical anachronism, a diplomatic mystery. It is the only place in all Africa where the presence is legitimately and legally French.

"Yes," said the slightly greying French colonel, his voice in a near whisper. "Djibouti is a sort of throwback to the earlier, less complicated days. It is artificial in some ways, but for an old soldier it is not a bad spot to end a career."

The 45-year-old Legionnaire sat on the veranda of his pleasantly furnished home, reminiscing thoughtfully in French. A gentle sea breeze wafted through the trees. It was hot—very hot.

The officer pulled from a nearby shelf a dated issue of the respected daily *Le Monde*—June 1954. Dog-eared and faded, it carried a front page analysis of the French defeat at Dienbienphu. Moments later, he produced a recent issue with an analysis of the American and South Vietnamese incursion into Laos.

'Too Complicated'

"You see," he said, "it is true the world has become much too complicated for us—the defeat in Indochina, the Algerian war, the French presence for Africa before our colonies

HOW DEEP IS THE WATER?

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, speaking last week to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, outlined some urgent requirements for foreign intelligence. Among them: What is the scope of the strategic threat to U.S. security? What are current Soviet intentions?

Then, in a sudden turn to specifics, he furrowed more than one editorial brow with a reference to one of the lesser known problems in foreign intelligence.

"Or, for first matter," said he, "to give you an extreme example, how deep is the water alongside the docks in Djibouti? This question is not as far-fetched as it may sound. If France should one day grant independence to French Somaliland—now formally the Territory of the Afars and Issas—the area would almost certainly be a source of contention between Ethiopia, which looks to the United States for support, and Somalia, which is highly dependent on the Soviet Union. What ships could be used to land a UN peace-keeping force—or unload relief shipments? Thus information on Djibouti could suddenly become necessary to the United States government in an effort to prevent a new international crisis."

were really prepared—but out here in Djibouti, a man can still be a Frenchman because we know this place belongs to us."

The attitude of the colonel, who served in Indochina as a lieutenant—but was spared Dienbienphu by a leg wound—is characteristic of the older Europeans in this 8,000 square mile territory which on a map looks like a tiny notch hacked from the northernmost rim of the Horn of Africa. There are 150,000 people in French Somalia, about 95 percent of whom—if not more—are illiterate Islamic nomads who prowl the parched hill country with their undernourished herds as they have for centuries.

There are 10,000 Europeans, mostly French; half are military and their families. The balance are civil servants, who run the territory, and businessmen. The capital is Djibouti—proper, clean, well-designed, dignified and very colonial, a city of some 70,000 population surrounded on three sides by barbed wire.

The nomads can only enter the city if they have work permits and since the closure of the Suez Canal the city's economy has sputtered. Unemployment is said by officials to be mounting—presumably among the Africans who live in the city—but no figures were immediately available.

The French presence goes back to an 1893 treaty between France and an important Sultan on the

Somali coast. It was firming up in the 1930s with agreements for trade between France and Ethiopia. It is said that somewhere in the archives of Paris or Addis Ababa there is a treaty giving Ethiopia residual rights to the area when the French leave.

But the French profess ignorance of such a document and, in any case, they are not ready to leave.

"You must understand the situation," a senior civil servant explained. "This place started as a coaling station—a kind of halfway point—to Indochina. Following the Second War we were thriving, but with the Middle East and the closing of the canal we have our problems. Our port is the biggest in the area, with a major railway linking Addis, but ship traffic has dwindled since the six-day war and business here is only 10 percent of what it was before the conflict of 1967.

"We know if France stays here, she is a force for peace. The moment we leave, the Ethiopians and Somalis will each assert their historic and ethnic claim to this land and there will be war. It is for that reason that we stay. For us the place means nothing. It costs France billions of francs each year."

The business community has indeed suffered with the closing of Suez, but is optimistic. "Some day we shall bloom again," a long-time resident said. "A look at the map will explain all. We are resting at

Free and Secret?

Among the problems of the day-- the new and grim day of this final third of the Twentieth Century-- none is more agonizing than the one Richard M. Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, raised in his address to the newspaper editors in Washington. He cited with the sober respect it deserves one conviction of many serious students of government: "I cannot give you an easy answer," he said, "to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. . . ."

Yet the question must be answered, and short, to be sure, of infallibility, has been answered in other democratic countries much as we have answered it here. The French and British, for instance, have gone ahead with intelligence services while maintaining democratic norms. In Canada, just emerging from a security crisis rooted in domestic rather than foreign attempts against government, the question has been freshly re-examined. The Justice Minister in the Trudeau cabinet concludes that no doctrine of democracy denies it the right of self-preservation. Mr. Helms pleads that the nation must to a degree rely "on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service." Yes, on faith, and as Mr. Helms added, on unswerving vigilance in the federal agencies supervising CIA to the very threshold where secrecy must set in.



A Creed for Intelligence

In what may be the first public address in a decade by a director of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms stressed that the CIA played no domestic security role. Its mission is intelligence about foreign powers, and the CIA does "not target on American citizens."

Seeking to allay the apprehensions of those who discern contradictions in an agency of a free society pursuing foreign intelligence operations, Mr. Helms said:

"We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We propose

to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

That's a worthy creed which should be resolutely observed, not only by the CIA, whose mission focuses on external security, but by other agencies, whose mission may focus in part on internal security. Especially should domestic surveillance occur only under the most clearly defined, narrowly limited conditions if the democratic values and principles to which Mr. Helms alludes are not to be distorted. And in view of recent disclosures and allegations, those definitions and limits to domestic surveillance should not be taken on faith.

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Noyes urges ASME members to guard their perspective

By Luther Huston

Newspaper editors must achieve a more serious, more sophisticated perspective on their jobs. Revise their basic concept of news and quit being "suckers" for either side of the proponents of change, Newbold Noyes, president of The American Society of Newspaper Editors, told several hundred editors at the opening session of the society's annual convention in Washington April 14.

"The newspapers," said Noyes, who is editor of the *Washington (D.C.) Star*, "are not exactly writing a glorious chapter" in the history of the profession and have "a good deal to answer for at the bar of public opinion."

If the reader confidence in the newspaper press is at a low ebb it is because "we are lazy and superficial in much of our reporting" and fail to give readers the information and understanding that will "permit them to sort out the forces at work in society and to decide where their true interests lie."

After Noyes "keynote speech", the society adopted a report of its freedom of information committee which recommended enactment of a National Shield Law to protect newsmen from disclosing confidential information or the sources of such information; agreed to let Congress know that it opposed efforts of the Staggers subcommittee to subpoena Columbia Broadcasting Systems and transcripts of its documentary on "The Selling of the Pentagon"; voted against a proposal to establish national press councils but authorized formation of an ad hoc committee to select some specific ethical violation by a newspaper and conduct a "dry run" trial to see how the press council idea might work.

Noyes criticized the press for maintaining stereo-typed standards of news coverage. "Not only do we devote 80 per cent of our time and space to stereo-typed happenings, but we also insist these happenings are newsworthy only if they meet certain stereotyped standards". Noyes said, "there is no story in a speech or a press conference or whatever it is unless it involves conflict or surprise. Before a situation is worthy of

our attention, it must burst to the surface in some disruptive, exceptional (and hence newsworthy) event. Even when we know what is happening under the surface, we are forever waiting for a traditional news peg to hang the story on. What are we thinking of, sticking to such old-fashioned concepts in a time of revolutionary movement? If we have so little faith in the intelligence of our readers, how can we expect them to have faith in us? No wonder the readers constantly feel that events are overwhelming them, unawares." Newsmen, Noyes said, are not "merely spectators on the unfolding scene." We are the people who must, whether we like it or not, decide what is worthy of public attention and who must determine the way it is to be presented. The difficulty of this task has made it convenient for us to hide behind simplistic, even childish formulas as to what is news, the simplest and most childish being that this, after all, is what people naturally want to read."

New techniques must be developed that will permit newspapers to convey to readers the truest possible picture of what transpires, Noyes asserted. He acknowledged that he did not know what these techniques are but told the editors that "we must grow up, must change, because our readers are changing and growing up. They are demanding more of us now, and they are entitled to more from us than what they are getting."

"Change we must have," Noyes went on, "but the trick is to give our readers a basis, factual and intellectual, for assessing the paths of change into which they are being pushed, form rational choices while the choice is still theirs."

"I think the worst of our lazy and superficial performance today is that we of the press are allowing ourselves to be manipulated by various interests—some for change and some against it—some powerfully in support of the system, some destructively seeking to tear it down—all clever in the ways they do it. Our weaknesses, our laziness, our superficiality, our gullibility. No

doubt the Pent makes suckers of but no more easy New Left does. We to me, tragically, develop for our readers ingful perspectives of such specia

In the first publ has made as dire Central Intelliger Richard Helms told can Society of New tors that the work criticized CIA is "permit this countr in a fearsome work its way into a bet peaceful one."

"We are, after : this democracy, ar in it," Helms, a fo and advertising s "We would not our work distort and its principles. to adapt intelligence to Amer ican society, not vice versa."

Helms said that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before. He said that the "intelligence community—a name for all of the intelligence assets at the disposal of the United States, comprised the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence components of the various armed services, the National Security Agency, the intelligence elements of Department of State and—when appropriate, those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission." All of these agencies are represented on the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the director of Central Intelligence, not as head of the CIA, but as the principal intelligence adviser to the president and the National Security Council.

"By necessity" Helms said, "intelligence organizations do not publish the extent of their knowledge and they do not challenge criticism of their operations. We answer to those we serve in government."

The CIA, he said, is the only one of the organizations named

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many to manufacture a special kind of report for a very few."

Helms gave a detailed report of the CIA's part in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He cited the agencies success in disproving various reports, such as that light bombers were being stored in a particular cave and that what was reported as a rounded dome covering missiles was actually a relatively new movie theatre in Havana.

"Our intelligence files in Washington, however — thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missile, their transporters and other associated equipment and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for.

"Guided by this background, the interrogators were able to sort out from the flood of reports the ones which established the arrival of MRBM and IRBM equipment in Cuba. We were then able to locate the sites under construction and tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat."

The CIA's efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country, Helms said, "have generated one of the most virulent criticisms of the agency. They have led to charges that

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CIA and FBI

America has long had a sense of uneasiness over its Central Intelligence Agency. More recently that unease has extended to the long cherished Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is only natural that both agencies should defend themselves.

✓ Thus, Richard Helms, director of the CIA, stepped out of character to step into the public view and address a convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He asked that the American people "take it on faith that we too are honorable men." With that he chose to defend the intelligence gathering activities of his agency and to assert it engages in no domestic security role.

However, we fear Mr. Helms is reading the public mood incorrectly if he thinks its unease is directed at the intelligence gathering activities of his

agency. The unease stems, rather, from the evidence available that the agency plays not only an intelligence gathering role but, too often an activist role on foreign soil, a role that sometimes seems to exceed intelligence gathering needs.

The FBI has come under attack on the general ground that in an excess of zeal it needlessly invades the privacy of individual citizens and pokes with little restraint into the activities of government officials.

Perhaps the FBI, by its very nature, must be suspicious. Nevertheless we are struck by the paradox of the CIA asking the American people to take its honorable character on faith, while its domestic equivalent, the FBI, appears too often unwilling to take on faith—an equivalent, prudent faith—the honorable character of the American people themselves.

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Reg Murphy

The Spy Who Talked

WASHINGTON, D. C. — Richard Helms had not made a public speech in five years. By all things right he should have been nervous, edgy, itchy. For he had to defend his organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, before one of the toughest audiences in the country, the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Helms came to the podium assured, quiet, reserved and totally competent to discuss the philosophy behind the spy system he runs.

First, he looks like a spy — spare figure, dark blue suit, quiet striped tie, white shirt, graying hair combed straight back. Second, he speaks like a spy, restrained and understated.

His agency has been under sharp attack. It has not defended itself publicly. It has felt that it must not blow either its cover or its cool. Now, however, it is clear that the CIA is beginning to feel it must defend itself in an overheated situation.

Some of the criticism has been "vicious, and some just silly" he said. One silly illustration: The charge that CIA is deeply involved in the world drug traffic. "We are not," he declared.

A more difficult question is whether the CIA is spying on its own constituency or requiring Americans to act as spies for it. "We do not target on American citizens," Helms said. Rather, he insisted that the intelligence organization is involved in the massive collection of sometimes miscellaneous information—the depth of the ocean alongside the dock in Somalia, the sharp turns in caves in Cuba—which can be pieced together to mean something in the long run.

For example, the CIA had a report that Cuba was storing fighter planes in a large cave. Helms' agency was able to discount the report because spelunkers knew there is a very sharp turn several yards inside the cave which would make it impossible to store any vehicle there.

Basically, though, Helms came to maintain that his agency must be in an objective, credible position. It will not work if he or his agency take sides in strategy decisions. "If we did," he said, "the officials involved would suspect that we stacked the evidence," to bolster Helms' own position.

"We must have credibility... an intelligence organization without credibility is of no use," he added.

So in its zeal to protect its credibility with the elected officials, the CIA may have let down its defenses with the public at large. There is wide spread, and growing, public criticism of the agency.

In his understated way, Helms conceded that his agents sometimes "chafe" under this criticism. Yet he must continue to coordinate the data from the entire intelligence community — the CIA, National Security Agency, State Department, military intelligence units, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Atomic Energy Commission and others.

So now he had come to declare the agency's worth — not beg for indulgence. He had come to say that his associates are dedicated, professional — and human. He had decided to drop the cloak long enough to explain that even in England the identity of the security agency's director was a state secret.

Helms has his hands full trying to convince the public his agency is not a shadow government. But he convinced me. This is a firm resolve not to make fun of the CIA next time it tries to assemble data to save my neck.

STATINTL

E - 427,270

APR 1 6 1971

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue

Anti-Surveillance Outcry Gets to Nixon

By Martin Schram

Newsday Washington Bureau

From the official White House transcript of yesterday's morning news briefing by presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler:

Mr. Ziegler: . . . this administration does not conduct surveillance of private citizens at public events.

Reporter: . . . Are you saying that there will be no FBI surveillance at this upcoming peace rally and demonstration in Washington?

Mr. Ziegler: Let's be very clear on that . . . I am not going to make a statement here that would inhibit the FBI from carrying out a responsibility . . . of observing individuals who have either been convicted of a crime or who are prone to criminal violence. This is what their area of responsibility is.

Reporter: Did you not say a few minutes ago, "This administration does not conduct surveillance of private citizens at public events?"

Mr. Ziegler: Absolutely.

Reporter: That is different from what you said.

Mr. Ziegler: Wait a minute. You know what I am saying. Of private citizens or individuals who attend an event who have not been convicted of a criminal activity, who are not prone to criminal violence. That is what I am saying.

Washington—An anti-spy attitude is setting in across the land and it seems this week that the outcry is starting to bug Nixon administration officials—all the way up to the President.

Among the developments on the government surveillance scene this week:

- White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler reacted rather testily when drawn into a long discussion by reporters after fresh charges by Sen. Edmund Muskie, Democratic presidential hopeful from Maine, that the FBI had spied on 40 to 60 Earth Day environment rallies across the country a year ago. Ziegler labeled Muskie's charge "political" and linked it with earlier charges by House Democratic Leader Hale Boggs that the FBI had wiretapped his phone. But Ziegler then refused to deny Muskie's assertions, although the administration had been quick to brand Boggs' charge untrue.

- President Nixon personally authorized the Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms, to deliver a speech to an editors' convention here staunchly defending the need for a CIA. It was Helms' first speech since he assumed command of the agency in 1966—and in fact the first speech by any CIA director since Allen Dulles left the post 10 years ago.

With Helms coming out of cover to publicly defend the CIA, an FBI spokesman was asked whether J. Edgar Hoover soon might be making a

beleaguered domestic intelligence agency. The FBI spokesman said he doubted this would occur. "He used to give speeches quite frequently," the FBI official said, but he hasn't given so many lately." Hoover's last speech, the spokesman acknowledged, was in 1967; it was delivered before a closed convention of former FBI agents meeting in Washington. Hoover's most recent speech before that, the spokesman said, was in 1955; the spokesman did not remember the name of the group.

Sen. Muskie's most recent charges about the FBI spying at Earth Day rallies launched both the White House and the FBI into maneuvers of protective reaction. Ziegler said he would not comment on what the FBI did or did not do on Earth Day; Ziegler told reporters to ask those questions of the FBI. An FBI spokesman, in turn, said he would have no comment; the FBI spokesman said he would stand on what the White House had said.

Ziegler, meanwhile, continued to express White House confidence in Hoover and the FBI. Ziegler said, "The President's attitude is that snooping or surveillance of private citizens is quite repugnant to this administration." But Ziegler also made it clear that the FBI would continue its surveillance procedures where it feels they are necessary against persons who have been convicted of criminal activity or those "prone to criminal violence." Ziegler did not give an explanation of just how the FBI would determine who was "prone to criminal violence" and thus eligible for special FBI attention.

The Senate's No. 1 Democrat, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) told a group of reporters yesterday that he would oppose a congressional investigation of the FBI. He said he thought the charges raised by his Democratic colleagues against the FBI were "more noise than substance."

In private, some White House officials are quite bitter about the wave of anti-spy charges. "This administration is doing less surveillance than the previous administration," one Nixon aide said. "Certainly no more than any administration since Franklin Delano Roosevelt."

The Nixon official noted that President Nixon ordered a halt to military spying on civilians at the time the charges were first leveled. "and don't forget," he added, "this Army thing was not started by us in the first place. It was ordered under Ramsey Clark (Attorney General under President Johnson)."

Another White House official observed: "As this

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Taking It On Faith

In comparison with the FBI, which has been the subject lately of the most intense criticism by the public at large and Congress since its founding, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been burdened by relatively little public questioning or attack.

At issue in the case of the FBI is a growing belief in the declining competence of its powerful director and allegations that agents have overstepped constitutional bounds in the surveillance and harassment of private citizens. By the very nature of its responsibilities and how they are carried out, the CIA has not been nearly as open to such charges.

Still, CIA Director Richard Helms felt it necessary to ease the nation's worries about official secrecy. And in so doing in a speech delivered to a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Helms noted that the public appearance of a nation's intelligence chief is unthinkable in most countries.

The CIA, said Helms, is a dedicated, unbiased, money-saving organization which does not interfere in domestic politics and has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement functions. Regrettably, he said, the nation will have to take his word for it. "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service."

Helms further said that he has no easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work to be incompatible with democratic principles. There is no easy answer. For as foreign as undercover work is to democracy in theory, it is unquestionably needed in these times to preserve our democratic institution. People tend to reject things they don't understand or know about. But to reject the idea of secrecy in areas so relevant to our national security would be folly.

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWS

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

APR 16 1971

The CIA's Place

Richard Helms emerged from his cloister this week to deliver his first public address since he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency five years ago. What emerged with him was a reasoned defense of the CIA's objectives, none of it particularly new but all of it responsible.

What did not emerge, of course, was any insight into how well the CIA is meeting its objectives, beyond Mr. Helms' assurance that "the quality of foreign intelligence available to the U.S. government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before." Necessarily operating in a clandestine world, the CIA's boss could hardly have gone further, thus leaving it to the public "to a degree (to) take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to (the nation's) service."

That's the way it has been since the CIA was established in 1947. It's been hard to go along at times, since the agency has on occasion embarrassed the nation with erroneous information, seemingly attempted to manipulate international events, and exploited other groups as fronts for its work.

Perhaps, though, past difficulties have made the CIA more sensitive to its public image. Fewer embarrassments have come to light, at any rate, under Mr. Helms, though we may never know whether this is the result of greater skill in covering up or of keener sensitivity to the CIA's place in a democracy. However it may be, the director's address is testimony to his awareness of that place: "We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa." That specifically includes, he notes, keeping out of spying on American citizens, a restraint which ought to be obvious for an agency that holds no domestic security power.

The answer to fears about the CIA's possibly operating as a law unto itself lies in careful surveillance, not destruction. The surveillance is the responsibility of the National Security Council, some select members of Congress, and other units of government. While this means to Mr. Helms that the CIA is not its own master, it also calls for faith again—faith in the watchdogs.

Democracy undeniably needs to keep its eyes open around the world, for its existence can depend on alertness to threatening danger. Thus the CIA's work, to quote Mr. Helms, "is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one."

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
16 APR 1971

CIA--WE'VE GOT TO HAVE IT

At a luncheon meeting in Washington Wednesday of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms delivered a speech of the first importance to the American people.



Richard Helms

The CIA, Mr. Helms observed, is often called an invisible government, spreading slimy tentacles around the country and plotting the eventual enslavement of the American people.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Actually, the CIA is a giant spy agency devoted to gathering information on the activities of all other nations' governments—with special and relentless attention to the enemy regimes in Moscow, Peking and Havana.

It has fascinating pipelines into all of these governments. One of the CIA's star performers, for example, was Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, outwardly a high Soviet military intelligence officer who funneled information to our side until the Kremlin found him out and killed him in 1963.

We simply have got to have the CIA, just as the British Empire in its heyday had to have the world-famous British intelligence service. And to keep our so-called Department of Dirty Tricks efficient and effective, we must let it do most of its good works in secret.

As Mr. Helms said in closing, Uncle Sam is a big boy now, and he lives in "a fearsome world," and the CIA is vital to his survival and continued safety.

Speaking of enemy nations, President Richard M. Nixon on Wednesday loosened restrictions on—

U.S. TRADE WITH RED CHINA

—saying U.S. firms henceforth will be permitted to export non-strategic items to the slave state presided over by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

We hope the President knows what he is doing, and we expect to discuss this matter in detail in Sunday's editorials. But it is even more to be hoped that extreme care will be taken in determining what are non-strategic items.

Specifically, let us hope every precaution will be taken against exporting to Red China goods which can be transhipped to Red North Vietnam to beef up Hanoi's war against South Vietnam and our fighting men there.

It is often said that in modern warfare almost anything can become strategic. In trading with this sworn enemy of ours, let's not forget that danger for a moment.

OAKLAND, CAL.
TRIBUNE

STATINTL

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APR 16 1971

The CIA Speaks Up

It's the unhappy lot of the nation's Central Intelligence Agency that it can never do anything right—publicly, that is.

For in its assigned task of operating a world-wide intelligence system, the CIA takes no credit for its triumphs and makes no apologies for its failures.

Before the CIA was created to coordinate the Federal Government's intelligence output in 1947, the several military services and the State Department pretty much went their own way in studying and analyzing activities of foreign governments for activities that might be hostile to the United States.

Many students of history are convinced that if there had been a CIA at work in December, 1971, the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would have been predicted or at least warnings sufficiently distributed to insure less surprise and better American defense.

The fact that there have been no Pearl Harbors since does not lessen the viciousness of the attacks continually mounted against the CIA whenever a miscue in its extensive clandestine operations comes to light.

Now comes disturbing evidence that President Nixon is personally concerned that these unprincipled assaults on our intelligence operation can actually endanger the nation's security.

He directly approved an appearance Wednesday of CIA director Richard Helms before a Washington convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In his first public appearance since becoming CIA head in 1966, Helms vigorously defended his agency's operations as being necessary to the survival of our democratic society.

He asked the nation to "take it on faith that we are honorable men devoted to her service." On the record alone, there is no valid reason why this plea cannot be honored.

The CIA does not, of course, operate in total autonomy. There are congressional watchdog committees, and every president since Harry Truman has kept close tabs on agency activities.

Mistakes no doubt have been occasionally made, for spying is a dirty business that knows no rules, but most of the attacks on the CIA are specious and unwarranted. It's high time Helms spoke up.

CHEYENNE, WYO.

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STATINTL

Nothing to Fear From the CIA

The director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency spokes yesterday to the American Society of Newspaper Editors meeting in Washington. Regardless of what Richard Helms had to say, that of itself was sufficient to make news; for as Mr. Helms pointed out, in many countries the existence of such an intelligence organization is a state secret whose director and personnel are anonymous.

Applauding Mr. Helms's willingness to appear not only for a public speech but also to representatives of the public media, we also accept at face-value his statement that the CIA is a dedicated, efficient, unbiased, money-saving organization. Helms said people would just have to take his word for it, which we do. No one of course is in a position to judge just how efficient the CIA may be since there is no ordinary, public standard of measurement available.

As for the economical aspects, this similiarly belongs in a world of its own; the CIA, for example, cannot be compared with the postal operation or some other service agency. The role of the Central Intelligence Agency, like that of the Army, Navy, Air Force and other elements of the military establishment, ultimately is the preservation of the United States of America from its enemies.

This is an activity that does not lend itself to ordinary economical considerations although the cry goes up constantly that economy be practiced in the Department of Defense.

Mr. Helms probably appeared before the editors' organization from a sense of feeling it necessary to defend the

CIA from its numerous public critics in this country, most of whom either do not know what they are talking about because of the CIA's very necessary obscurity and mystery, or else who are motivated by less obvious reasons than they reveal.

There are those in America who constantly attack all elements of our government which lend protection to that government and the society it serves. Many of these are impelled for reasons of an emotional nature, having an antipathy for any kind of apparatus which is of a nationalistic nature. Others are merely hostile to this nation itself, which is not a matter of mere guesswork since numerous revolutionaries have publicly spoken out in such a vein within the past few years.

Most countries in both totalitarian and democratic societies maintain such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency, either fragmented among the military services, para-military in nature, or separate entities such as the CIA in the U.S. and the KGB in the Soviet Union.

But only in America would the head of such an organization get up in public and make a speech to a bunch of newspaper editors with an air more befitting the president of a chamber of commerce than a super-spy agency.

Americans have nothing to fear from the CIA; the only concern we should feel is that it may not always do its job, in behalf of the best interests of this country, especially such interests that may oppose those of some other nations, in the best fashion possible.

CIA Chief Reveals Soviet Spy Help in Cuba Missile Crisis

BY CHALMERS M. ROBERTS
Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON—In his first public speech as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms said Wednesday that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" helped the United States identify Soviet weapons in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

He mentioned no names, but the reference appeared clearly to be to Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet intelligence officer who brought much information out during visits to London in the 16 months before the missile crisis. Penkovsky was arrested that October and was subsequently executed for treason.

"The Penkovsky Papers," published as a book in 1965, were widely believed to be based on CIA interrogations, and the claim was made in the introduction that Penkovsky's information was invaluable during the crisis in evaluating the threat from Russian missiles.

However, not until Helms' speech Wednesday at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors had an American official in a position to know come so close to crediting Penkovsky openly.

Helms detailed the kind of work the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies did at the time, trying to separate fact from fiction about what Russian Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was doing in Cuba.

Helms then included this paragraph: "Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union."

This enabled specialists, with the help of pictures taken over Cuba, Helms said, to "tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat" in determining whether the Soviet missiles were capable of striking at the United States if Mr. Kennedy gave the Russians an ultimatum for their removal.

With that secret data, Helms said, "we were able to inform the President precisely how long it would take (the Russians) to make the missile sites in Cuba operational."

Helms said knowledge of Russian weaponry developed by the CIA, plus its understanding "of Soviet knowledge of our progress," helps the government decide how much money to invest in new weapons.

"If good intelligence can narrow down the choices," he said, "it can save the

U.S. taxpayers many times its cost."

Much of Helms' speech was a defense of the CIA against charges that it is an "invisible government." He denied reports that the CIA is "somehow involved in the world drug traffic." Without mentioning recent charges against the FBI, Helms said, "We do not target on American citizens."

The closest Helms came to discussing the CIA's role in current policy issues was his reference to the present strategic arms limitation talks. He said it would be "unthinkable" to conclude a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union "without the means for monitoring compliance."

He did not discuss the CIA's role in the observation satellite program or in electronic eavesdropping used for that purpose only. He did say that the United States can safely undertake such an agreement "only if it has adequate intelligence assets to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

Helms also said that the CIA wants to talk to private citizens who may have acquired useful information abroad, but that if such a person "does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly."

Referring to student protests against the CIA, Helms said, "If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest federal office building."

Helms said it was "for Congress to decide" how the CIA is to be supervised but that "elements" of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees "are told more about our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmentalized agency."

STATINTL

CIA Director Bares Hole in Iron Curtain

By STAN CARTER

Washington, April 14 (News Bureau)—CIA Director Richard Helms disclosed today that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" had in previous years passed military secrets to the United States.

The American spy chief said later that the Russian informants included Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, the Soviet military intelligence officer who was shot to death for treason in 1963, "and others."

Helms made the disclosure in his first public speech in five years as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, he described the agency's role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

"Our intelligence files in Washington—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems," Helms said.

"Knew What to Look For"

"We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters, and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for."

Helms said this information in the CIA's files was used to sort out misleading and erroneous information from Cuba. Then, he said, American reconnaissance planes were able to locate Soviet missile sites under construction on the island.

Questioned after the speech, Helms said it was the first time, to his knowledge, that the CIA had confirmed receiving military information from "a number" of Russians. He said published accounts of the 1962 crisis had not revealed this. He said he was making the disclosure to indicate that the CIA had known exactly what to look for in Cuba and was not dependent solely on technological means of obtaining information.

Acknowledged for 1st Time

Though it was generally known that Penkovsky had worked for both British intelligence and the CIA, Helms acknowledged this for the first time. Asked whether it could be assumed that his reference to well-placed and courageous Russians meant Penkovsky and other persons, he said: "Yes, and others."

Sentenced, Shot in 5 Day

Presumably, some of the Russian spies are still "in place."

Penkovskiy was arrested on Oct. 22, 1962, at the height of the Cuba missile crisis, on charges of espionage for the United States and Britain. He was sentenced on May 11, 1963, to be shot for treason. Greville Wynne, a British businessman accused of being a spy-go-between, was sentenced at the same time to a long prison term.

Penkovskiy was executed on May 16, 1963. Wynne was later traded for Gordon Lonsdale, a Soviet spy in England.

With the approval of President Nixon, Helms accepted the editors' invitation in order to answer charges that the CIA "is an invisible government—a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society, and subject to no controls."

Helms said that simply wasn't so, that his agency did not give policy advice, did not spy on Americans, and was strictly accountable to the President and appropriate congressional committees.

Saying that the CIA would lose its effectiveness if it did not maintain secrecy about its work, Helms told the editors:

"We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one."

STATINTL

15 APR 1971

Helms Defends the C.I.A. As Vital to a Free Society



Associated Press
Richard Helms addresses
editors in Washington.

Rare Speech Discloses Some Russians Aided U.S. in Cuban Crisis

Excerpts from Helms address
will be found on Page 30.

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14 — The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, vigorously defended his agency today as necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asked the nation to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Mr. Helms asserted, in his first public address since becoming head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1966, that "we propose to adapt intelligence work to American society, not vice versa."

He spoke with the specific approval of President Nixon before a luncheon meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In a footnote to history, Mr. Helms revealed that American intelligence in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was aided by "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians."

He told reporters later that he was alluding not only to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was identified previously, but also to others who provided information on Soviet missile systems. When asked for their names, Mr. Helms laughed.

Colonel Penkovsky was a Soviet intelligence officer secretly working for the Americans in 1961 and 1962. He was detected in October, 1962, and executed in May, 1963. The publication of his alleged memoirs in the West in 1965 aroused considerable controversy over their authenticity.

Mr. Helms asserted today that United States intelligence would have "a major and vital role in any international agree-

Noting that the Soviet Union had rejected proposals for im-

Mr. Helms said the United States could undertake an agreement to limit such arms "only if it has adequate intelligence to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

China Held Police State

At a time when the visit of an American table tennis team to mainland China has generated official hopes for better relations with Peking, Mr. Helms told his audience that "some of our most important intelligence targets lie in totalitarian countries where collection is impeded by the security defenses of a police state—for example, Communist China."

Mr. Helms's rare public appearance today was initiated by Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star and president of the society of editors. When Mr. Helms said he could speak only with the approval of the White House, Mr. Noyes wrote to Herbert G. Klein, the President's director of communications.

Mr. Klein said today that President Nixon had readily approved Mr. Helms's appearance. He said the Administration thought it a good time for the American public to have Mr. Helms explain the role of the C.I.A., since the agency was not under the kind of fire that had been directed toward it in the past.

Mr. Helms noted in his address that in Britain and other European democracies, "it would be unheard of for the head of intelligence services to talk to a nongovernmental group as I am talking to you today."

Dulles Talks Recalled

A spokesman for the C.I.A., in response to an inquiry, said later that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961, spoke publicly about twice a year. But he could not recall an instance in which Mr. Dulles's successors, John A. McCone and Adm. William R. Raborn, delivered public addresses. Thus, Mr. Helms's speech was probably the first from an intelligence director in 10 years.

Mr. Helms, who has a reputation as a skilled administrator, said, "There is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."

"It is difficult for me to agree with this view," he said, "but I respect it. It is quite another matter when some of our critics, taking advantage of our engagement in intelligence, say things that are either vicious or just plain silly."

No Domestic Functions

Mr. Helms emphasized that the agency had no domestic security functions and had never sought any.

"In short," he said, "we do not target on American citizens."

The agency was discovered in 1967 to have financed several international activities of the National Student Association and to have given subsidies to unions, foundations and publications.

More recently, the agency was implicated in the Government's surveillance of political dissidents in the United States by the testimony of former military intelligence agents given before a Senate subcommittee.

Mr. Helms asserted that the agency had no stake in policy debates.

'Must Not Take Sides'

"We can not and must not take sides," he said. "When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council, to which he is an adviser, 'I do not and must not line up with either side.'"

If he recommended one solution to a problem, those recommending another would suspect "that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of C.I.A. goes out the window," he said.

Mr. Helms, after asking that the nation believe that the agency's operations were compatible with democratic principles, said "I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively, and continuously."

He said the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of Management and Budget and four committees of Congress regularly reviewed the agency's operations, plans and organization.

CIA 1.01-McCone, John
-Raborn, William

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of Newspaper Editors

15 APR 1971

Excerpts From Speech by Helms to Society

STATINTL

of Newspaper Editors

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—

Following are excerpts from an address by Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government.

In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled:

On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before.

On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our Government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

I am referring to the assertions that the Central Intelligence Agency is an "invisible government," a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls.

This is an outgrowth, I suppose, of an inherent American distaste for the peacetime gathering of intelligence. Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and ideals of our free society.

May I emphasize at this point that the statute [National Security Act of 1947] specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.

In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the President and his National Security Council

of all of the intelligence components of the United States Government. The production and dissemination of this national intelligence is the responsibility and the primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimate function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy.

Ironically, our efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country have generated some of the more virulent criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role, but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him.

If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United States Government, we may well try to hire him.

The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert and seduce, or something worse.

We use no compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly. If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest Federal office building.

Similarly, we welcome the opportunity to place research contracts with the universities, but again, these are strictly voluntary.

And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our democratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy, because it is axiomatic that a security service—whatever type of government it serves—must wrap itself in as much se-

crecy as possible in order to operate effectively.

If we disclose how much we know, the opposition is handed on a platter highly damaging indications of how and where we obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who may have helped us. He can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up the agents, and shut off the flow of information.

I cannot give you an easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.

I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively and continuously.

Starting with the executive branch, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken without the prior approval of an N.S.C. subcommittee which includes representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, we report periodically and in detail on the whole range of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of men who have distinguished themselves in Government, industry, education and the professions.

Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.

There are elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and the House which—like the President's board—are told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency. But now, in the end, we are

The same objectivity which makes us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we understand as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society.

We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.

We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.

POST-DISPATCH

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STATINTL



IN DEFENSE OF THE CIA: Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressing the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington. Newbold Noyes of the Washington Star, the society's president, is at left. (AP Wirephoto)

Helms Says CIA Is Necessary To Survival Of Democratic Society

From Post-Dispatch Wire Services

WASHINGTON, April 15—The director of the Central Intelligence Agency says his agency is necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asks the nation "to take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service."

Richard Helms, in his first public address since he became head of the agency in 1966, said yesterday, "We propose to adapt intelligence work to American society, not vice versa."

He spoke with the approval of President Richard M. Nixon before a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Helms said that the success of American intelligence in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was due in part to "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us."

He told reporters later that he was referring to persons who provided information on Soviet missile systems.

American intelligence would have "a major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms," Helms said in his speech.

He said that the Soviet Union has "a right to be treated as equals for inspections within its territory and that the United States could undertake an

"only if it has adequate intelligence to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

Helms said: "There is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."

"It is difficult for me to agree with this view, but I respect it. It is quite another matter when some of our critics—taking advantage of the traditional silence of those engaged in intelligence—say things that are either vicious or just plain silly."

Helms said that the CIA had no domestic security functions and had never sought any. "In short," he said, "we do not target on American citizens."

He denied as vicious a charge that the CIA was involved in the world drug traffic.

Senator George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, demanded yesterday that the CIA and the Department of State investigate allegations by Ramparts magazine that the CIA facilitated the movement of opium out of Southeast Asia.

In a speech today, Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem.), Washington, told the newspaper editors that a relentless Soviet arms build-up threatened the survival of the American nuclear deterrent force.

Jackson said popular opinion, which holds that the military balance leans heavily in the favor of the United States, was wrong.

Jackson said the arms race must be brought under control at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. He repeated his proposal that the United States should buy more time and should consider a partial, interim agreement—for an initial period of one year—with the Soviet Union.

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STATINTL

'Dedicated, efficient, unbiased'

Helms defends his CIA

UPI — Richard Helms, in his first public speech since he became CIA director in 1966, told the American Society of Newspaper Editors yesterday the CIA had been subject to criticism that was "either vicious, or just plain silly." He described the agency as a dedicated, efficient, unbiased, money-saving organization which does not interfere in domestic politics.

Mr. Helms specifically denied one allegation that the CIA is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. He described the charge as "ar-rant nonsense."


The CIA director noted that the public appearance of a nation's intelligence chief would

be unthinkable in most countries. He pointed out that in Britain, even the name of his counterpart is treated as a state secret.

Mr. Helms, who spoke with the approval of President Nixon, said "we propose to adapt intelligence work to American society, not vice versa."

He said his agency was essential to the survival of a democratic society and asked Americans to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to the nation's service."

He noted that the U.S. intelligence will have "a major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms."



—United Press International

CIA Director Richard Helms (left) talks with Newbold Noyes Jr., president of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors and editor of The Star, during the editors' conference yesterday.

CIA Has Agents in Kremlin

Spies Are 'Well-Placed,' Helms Tells Newsmen

By THOMAS B. ROSS
 Chicago Sun-Times Service

British, CIA Agent

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency says the CIA has penetrated the Soviet government with a "number of well-placed" Russian spies.

Richard M. Helms, in his first public speech in five years as director of the CIA, yesterday cited the spies' key role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and implied that some of them still are operating in the Soviet Union.

By making the claim at this time, Helms apparently sought to serve notice to the Kremlin that the United States has secret ways of checking on its good faith in current negotiations on strategic weapons, the Middle East and other critical issues.

Helms said the CIA was able to detect Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962 "thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of brave and courageous Russians" who provided crucial details on Soviet missile systems.

Helms was asked later if he was referring to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, the Soviet military intelligence official who served as an agent for both the CIA and British intelligence. Helms replied that his remarks covered Penkovsky and "others."

Penkovsky was arrested Oct. 22, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile crisis, and executed May 16, 1963. But the Soviet government has made no public mention of additional spies in the case.

Helms' speech thus left the implication that "other" CIA agents remain in place inside the Soviet Union.

Helms obtained clearance from President Nixon before accepting the invitation to speak before the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Helms' speech created a current clamor over charges of Army and FBI "spying" on civilians. He went to great lengths

to insist that the CIA has no domestic security role.

Helms acknowledged that the CIA collects "foreign intelligence in this country" by tapping university experts and interviewing persons who travel to Communist countries.

Semantic Troubles

"The trouble," he lamented, "is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words 'interview' and 'hire' translate into suborn, subvert and seduce or something worse."

He denied as "vicious" a charge that the CIA is involved in world drug traffic. Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., demanded yesterday that the CIA and the State Department investigate allegations by Ramparts magazine that the CIA facilitates the movement of opium out of Southeast Asia.

Helms conceded, on the other hand: "Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and

ideals of a free society... Assertions are made that the Central Intelligence Agency is an 'invisible government' — a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls...

It is difficult for me to agree with this view, but I respect it."

STATINTL

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THE DECLINING SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE SUPER-POWERS

Peter Wiles

YOU may remember that when Flora Poste, in *Cold Comfort Farm*, was summoning up strength to deal with her Aunt Ada Doon, she read again and again in the *Higher Common Sense* of the Abbé Fausse-Maigre 'the chapter on "Preparing the Mind for the Twin Invasion by Prudence and Daring in Dealing with Substances not Included in the Outline"'.¹ I only wish that, in dealing with our subject, I too could have read the *Higher Common Sense* of the Abbé Fausse-Maigre. For I feel very much like a Mannerist painter, the traditional frame of whose canvas cannot contain his whole picture. True, all the old elements of reality are still there, and as vigorous as ever. His art is still fundamentally figurative in the old way, but here a form is absurdly elongated, there a familiar face has an unnatural pallor and, above all, the extremities of limbs spill out of the canvas altogether. Many small things, in other words, are quite new, and their importance cannot be estimated.

Some of these 'substances not included in the outline' make it much more doubtful whether an imperial Power can any longer mobilise its own people and resources for imperial purposes. Nationalism, certainly, remains very strong indeed, stronger for instance than Communism. We cannot doubt that nations will still fight for their independence and territorial integrity, even for the liberation of 'irredentas' on their borders. But what about putting our troops in Berlin, Saigon, Prague or Singapore, where nationalism is only indirectly involved? For how long in this permissive and cynical age will any people have the moral self-confidence to do such things?

Self-confidence is the key. An imperialist government has to feel a great historic righteousness about what it does, and the citizens of its core nationality must share much of this feeling. There must of course be adequate numbers of people, and an adequately productive economy; but the will to mobilise, and the willingness to be mobilised, are far more important, and since men are moral beings that will rests upon self-righteousness.

Now it is obvious that this self-righteousness and this will have fallen in Britain to levels so low that we have become almost quite unusable for imperial purposes. What I ask you to consider is how far the U.S. and Soviet peoples have gone along the same road. For the old-fashioned cold war between the two old-fashioned super-Powers is still the most important international tension; indeed most of the other tensions concern us British not directly but only in so far as they concern these two.

Having married a U.S. citizen, and being a professor, I am often in the United States, and all my work contacts—though perhaps only half of my social contacts—are with students and professors. From this unrepresentative viewpoint, which is also far too much the viewpoint of the journalists we read, the situation is very frightening indeed. A large and growing number of young and educated people have found an answer to William James' desperate question, can there be a moral substitute for war?² Their answer is civil war. The aggressive energies of this country are turning inwards. The slogans, the demonstrations, even the haircuts, are not only perceived by the old as acts of aggression; they are intended to be just that.

So, naturally, external war has been rejected. One-half at least of those of military age, go to great lengths to dodge conscription. And

STATINTL

The Stolen FBI Documents and the Story About Them

I commend your revelation of the FBI documents. There can never be too much exposure of either the FBI or CIA. Both have adopted the methods and attitudes to be expected only in a totalitarian society. Both are truly unAmerican . . . It is long past time for FBI's sacred cow to depart. Thank you Washington Post.

THOMAS A. CHITTENDEN.

Boys, Md.

The proposed legislation would permit the court to make discretionary allowances not to exceed \$150 for a receiver and \$250 for a trustee in those cases where the distribution is too small to provide an adequate basis for computing a reasonable allowance for the necessary services rendered.

Under this proposed legislation, the maximum allowances which are at present permitted for a trustee will be applicable to receivers. This will represent an increase in the percentage rates for receivers and also have the effect of increasing, for receivers, the range of the application of the higher rates to the medium and larger distributions.

The maximum allowances for trustees have been increased, with this proposal, by increasing the range in which the rates for a trustee are applicable.

The proposed increase in the custodial rate would make it unnecessary for the referee to enlarge the duties of the receiver in order to fairly compensate him for his services.

The proposed increases would apply only in bankruptcy cases initiated subsequent to the enactment of the proposed legislation.

The above bill was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States at its October 1970 session.

By Mr. BURDICK:

S. 1396. A bill to amend section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 63) and sections 631 and 634 of title 28, United States Code, to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference, S. 1396, to amend the Bankruptcy Act to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate.

The Federal Magistrates Act, approved October 17, 1968, 32 Stat. 1107, provides that with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States "a part-time referee in bankruptcy—may be appointed to serve as a part-time magistrate," and authorizes the Conference to "fix the aggregate amount of compensation to be received for performing the duties of part-time magistrate and part-time referee in bankruptcy" 28 U.S.C. 634. The act, however, does not authorize a full-time referee in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a part-time U.S. magistrate. In addition, section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act, pertaining to qualifications for referees in bankruptcy, provides in part that an individual shall not be eligible for appointment as a referee unless he is "not holding any office of profit or emolument under the laws of the United States or of any State or subdivision thereof other than conciliation commissioner or special master under this title." Exceptions to this provision are made only in the case of a part-time referee in bankruptcy.

In the design and organization of the new system of U.S. magistrates two difficulties have arisen which would be ameliorated in part if a full-time referee in bankruptcy were authorized to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate.

First, there is the problem of a "back-up" for a magistrate who is ill, or temporarily away from his station on business or vacation. Some courts have requested authority to appoint a second part-time magistrate at some locations at a nominal salary to arraign defendants and set bail in the absence of the regular magistrate—a function which a full-time referee in bankruptcy might well perform. Second, certain language in the Magistrates Act and in the Bankruptcy Act seems to prohibit a court from combining a position of part-time referee in bankruptcy with a position of part-time magistrate, in order that it may have one full-time officer rather than two part-time officers. It is the view of the Judicial Conference of the United States and its Committee on Bankruptcy Administration and the Implementation of the Federal Magistrates Act that it would be in the interest of good judicial administration to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform magistrate duties and to authorize a full-time combination position of referee in bankruptcy.

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1397. A bill to amend the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 to impose restrictions on information activities outside the United States of Government agencies. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

PROHIBITING THE UNITED STATES FROM ENGAGING IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, last year the Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of hearings on the operation of U.S. advisory and assistance programs in Vietnam. The hearings revealed a great deal concerning the nature and extent of our involvement in the internal affairs of that country. Today, I wish to discuss briefly one of the most insidious of those programs and to introduce legislation to correct the underlying policy. I refer to the propaganda services which our Government renders on behalf of Vietnam.

Traditionally, American citizens have viewed with great suspicion anything that suggests the creation of an official Government information agency. And rightfully so. They realize that Government information programs cannot be divorced from political propaganda designed to serve partisan or personal purposes. Germany's experience under Goebbels lingers in the American memory.

Yet in Vietnam the U.S. Information Agency, which was created to promote better understanding of our country abroad, is now engaged in a massive campaign, using every tool of the communication arts, to sell the Thieu Government to the people of Vietnam. Through television and radio, and newspapers, magazines, and leaflets by the tens of millions, the USIA is teamed up with military psychological warfare specialists to inculcate on the people of Vietnam the kind of official propaganda system that we refuse to allow in our own country. It is the ultimate corrup-

tion in a war which has for years now eroded the moral sensibilities of our Nation.

Our Vietnam policymakers under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon have assured the American people that all we seek for South Vietnam is the right of "self-determination." But is "self-determination" really possible as long as the United States spends millions of dollars in promoting the interests of the government in power in Vietnam, doing everything possible to convince the Vietnamese people that the Thieu government is their friend and protector? When the Vietcong and North Vietnamese view the magnitude of the U.S. propaganda and aid effort in Vietnam, there is little wonder that they are skeptical about repeated promises of free elections. I think my colleagues are generally aware of the importance of the mass media in election campaigns. Does anyone believe that opposition candidates, assuming that genuine opposition candidates are allowed, will be given equal time and treatment on Vietnamese radio and television or in the other U.S.-financed information programs, when the basic purpose of all these programs has been to win the Vietnamese people over to the Thieu government's side.

It is all very well to call for free and open elections; it is an appealing slogan. But when it comes to specifics as to who controls the campaign machinery, the mass media, and the election process, "free and open" is likely to look very much like "government controlled." Lack of credibility as to U.S. intentions has always been a major problem in communicating with the other side. The contrast between what is said by our Government concerning free elections and what we, in fact, do in promoting the interests of President Thieu demonstrates that the problem is far from being resolved. The United States should make it clear to all concerned that it will take a strictly neutral position in the coming election in Vietnam. To do so it must gear its activities to aiding the people, not the government. One of the most obvious ways to demonstrate neutrality is to cease assisting the Thieu government on propaganda programs.

Mr. President, since I was first elected to the Senate, I have told the people of Idaho that I would not support legislation which would authorize the Federal Treasury to pay the campaign expenses of nationally elected officials. I do not feel that the taxpayers of this Nation should support my campaigns or the campaigns of others for public office. I feel even more strongly that our Nation's taxpayers should not provide support to foreign political leaders in their attempts to gain favor with their own people.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record following my remarks the transcript of the Foreign Relations Committee hearing of March 19, 1970, concerning USIA operations in Vietnam. Nowhere in that act is there authority, direct or indirect, for any government agency to engage in a propaganda campaign to increase understanding between a foreign government and the people it governs. The simple fact is

8 MAR 1971

STATINTL

I will try to identify those things that need change'

Professor Rusk teaches 'and the like'

By JOHN W. ENGLISH

Athens, Ga.

Dean Rusk, a law professor at the sedate University of Georgia, has been in local news headlines since his arrival on campus in early October.

Yet the former Secretary of State has succeeded in establishing a low-profile life. Daily he is in his cozy, carpeted office on the second floor of the law school building, accessible to students and faculty colleagues. The professor and his wife live in a modest Georgian townhouse in a quiet residential district in the heart of this Southern community.

Mr. Rusk, a native Georgian, seems to be the happy and secure occupant of the Samuel H. Sibley chair of international and comparative law, a post which pays \$45,000 a year. Although he is a full professor, Mr. Rusk does not have tenure and won't be eligible for another two years under the university system regulations.

In the fall quarter, Mr. Rusk had no classes, but instead did three television programs for the Georgia educational TV outlet. The topics he discussed with a law student panel were Southeast Asia, the United Nations and the Middle East.

After the first TV show, he defined his role to newsmen present: "I'm a private citizen whose job it is to teach, give tests and the like. It's something I wanted to be before World War II." And, at 61, the former Rhodes scholar set his new challenge: "I will try to identify those things that need change."

Mr. English is an instructor at the School of Journalism at the University of Georgia.

With his concern on the future rather than the past, Mr. Rusk has just finished teaching his first full quarter since he was at Mills College in 1940.

His special interest is preventive law in such areas as outer space and the limits of the ocean's continental shelf. He also explains current legal developments dealing with political asylum and hijackings in the air and on the high seas.

His style is calm, level-headed and his restrained language is still laced with diplomatic jargon and circumlocutions which reflect his years as a cautious pub-

as internationalism and commitment are central to his thinking.

And he is aware of changes:

"We're losing a whole generation of people who have been conducting our foreign relations—Averell Harriman, Ellsworth Bunker, Dean Acheson, myself and others. We now need a whole new generation to take over."

Mr. Rusk's sense of historical perspective and articulate detail is impressive and exhaustive. He often intermingles personal references in his talks on foreign affairs; he recently began one anecdote: "Secretary McNamara and I went down to talk to the senators. . . ." At another discussion, he said that public officials were "prisoners of information they get. Decisions in foreign policy are in the fog of the future and never easy."

Reminiscent of his days in Washington, Mr. Rusk told a February convention of the Georgia Association of Broadcasters:

"The No. 1 problem is to keep the nuclear beast in its cage. To avoid nuclear war is the elementary interest that binds the superpowers. I do not believe that Southeast Asia, under the present circumstances, is likely to engage the 'great powers.' We may have passed the point where that was a great risk. I don't see the struggle in Southeast Asia expanding to a much larger action by the 'great powers.' Therefore, I would put Indochina behind Berlin and the Middle East as actual trouble spots."

On Vietnam, the professor told the broadcasters:

"I think that it depends a good deal on the pace of Vietnamization and whether they will be given the time to build up the forces that they need. . . . I think it is possible, but it may take a little more time than many people in this country would hope. And, therefore, I think President Nixon faces a very difficult problem in trying to determine whether the American people will give him the time that is required to put the South Vietnamese in a position to defend themselves."

At another point Mr. Rusk said:

"President Johnson knew that he was not going to be able to wind up the war in Vietnam before he left office. And so he left President Nixon all of the options open to him. He had a number of options in South Vietnam that could not be over-run by North Vietnam. We had the Paris

peace talks established as a point of contact between the two sides for any political discussion. And we had already gone pretty far in building up and equipping the South Vietnamese forces."

"President Nixon could make his choice since he was assuming the responsibility at the behest of the American people for making these decisions. Now he's elected to make certain decisions, and I think all of us want to wish him well in the outcome."

"Gratuitous Advice"

The former secretary added:

"I've tried to avoid the role of a grandstand quarterback trying to give gratuitous advice to my successors. After all, the American people decided they wanted some other people there and they don't want to hear from me."

The change in jobs seems to have brightened his outlook. "I don't anticipate a world government in the next decade or two. But co-operation between nations can start with the concept of the family of man in such areas as the environment, weather prediction and the prevention and control of disease," he has told students.

And in an informal talk in the lobby of a girls' dorm, Mr. Rusk explained that he saw "no need for the ABM system because it only aids the arms race." Student heads nodded. (But in the next breath he added that the United States should "concentrate on offensive weapons." A few scowls appeared.)


One coed asked him if the President should attempt to silence the outspoken Vice President. The former secretary tactfully responded: A "public servant should have free speech but should exercise that freedom with the dignity that befits his office."

Enigmatic Image

Always formal but affable, the professor maintains his enigmatic image—impeccably dressed in dark suits and unflappable as ever. Georgia students generally appear neither irritated nor excited by his presence on campus.

In contrast to some earlier university visits as secretary of state, Mr. Rusk has here. "There have been absolutely no problems," said Edward Krasinger, campus public relations director. "Mr. Rusk has

12 April 1971



Answer Line is a reader service cutting through red tape to get your answer. If you have a question, call The Herald-Examiner, RI 8-1212, and ask for Answer Line. We receive questions Monday through Friday from 10 a.m. until 2 p.m. and from 6 p.m. until 9 p.m. Or you may write Answer Line, The Herald-Examiner. Please do not ask us where to buy or sell items. Questions of most significant interest will be answered in Answer Line and are not answered by mail. Please, no personal items.

What is the difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Secret Service and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)? Are they three separate agencies? What types of crimes do each investigate?

Mrs. C.J.C., Orange

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is a part of the U.S. Department of Justice. When he was attorney general, Charles J. Bonaparte deemed it necessary for the Justice Department to have a permanent investigative force. And on July 26, 1905 an executive order was issued resulting in a Bureau of Investigation under the jurisdiction of the attorney general.

The name of this organization later became the Division of Investigation and in July 1935, the name by which it is known today, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was officially adopted.

The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over all violations of federal laws and matters in which the U.S. is or may be an interested party, except those matters specifically assigned by congressional enactment or otherwise to other federal agencies.

J. Edgar Hoover is the agency's director.

A branch of the Treasury Department, the Secret Service is one of the oldest federal law enforcement agencies. It was established July 5, 1865, with William P. Wood as its first chief.

The primary duties of this agency are: (1) protection of the President and vice president, and their immediate families; (2) the suppression of counterfeiting (coinage, currency, transportation requests and other forms of obligations and securities of the U.S.); (3) investigations pertaining to (a) thefts of government property under control of the Treasury Department; (b) loss of valuables in shipment by agencies of the U.S.

These are but a few of the duties of the Secret Service.

James J. Rowley is the director.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a separate entity, answerable only to the President and the National Security Council. The CIA was instituted by the passage of the National Security Act of 1949. This agency investigates espionage, sabotage, and other un-American and subversive activities.

Richard M. Helms is the director.

LONG BEACH, CAL.
PRESS-TELEGRAM

E - 110,623
S - 149,381

MAR 8 1971

EDITORIALS

Secrets of a D--n L--y

When is a secret file not a secret file?

Answer: When Miss Frances Knight, director of the U.S. Passport Office, knows who's in it.

At least, we guess that is Miss Knight's answer. It is the only thing we can conclude from a long "clarification" she issued to defend her record-keeping activities.

Stung apparently by New York Times columnist Tom Wicker's reference to her as "the Dragon Lady of the State Department," Miss Knight retorted that the New York Times evidenced "persistent and extraordinary concern . . . with protection of wanted criminals, espionage agents, individuals known to have engaged in passport fraud, child custody cases and so forth."

MISS KNIGHT WENT further and rapped all of journalism, which she said was "once upon a time regarded as a distinguished and respectable profession." That was before Mr. Wicker and the New York Times got into the business, presumably.

Besides the Wicker column, what aroused the D--n L--y of the State Department was a New York Times article alleging that the State Department acknowledged maintaining a secret surveillance file of passport applicants.

"I am not aware of any such file," Miss Knight says firmly.

What she does keep, she says, is a "lookout file." It contains names of persons who may be denied passports or who may be granted passports but may be targets of law enforcement agencies' inquiries as to their trips abroad. In the latter category are not only persons with records of criminal activities but also persons whose actions, in Miss Knight's judgment, "do not reflect to the credit of the U.S. abroad."

THERE ARE 243,166 names in the file and Miss Knight won't tell anyone who they are. She insists that doesn't make the file secret, since its existence was revealed to the Warren Commission in 1964.

That is like saying that the Central Intelligence Agency is not a secret operation because everyone knows it exists.

Judging from the New York Times article, there are those in the State Department who are more candid on the subject than Miss Knight is.

We don't question the Passport Office's right to maintain a file listing names of noncitizens, Army deserters, airplane hijackers and others who shouldn't get passports or who ought to be watched closely when they leave the country. But the list ought to be subject to congressional scrutiny and it ought to be kept by someone of calm temperament and the good judgment to discuss the project candidly.

8 March 1971

Leaf Executive Has Global Job

By TYLER WHITLEY

News Leader Business Editor
Stuart G. Christian Jr. can't begin to estimate how far he has traveled since he joined the tobacco business some 30 years ago.

But one indication is that he refers to trips to Mexico and Canada as "local" jaunts.

The 51-year-old Richmonder is one of a coterie of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc. officers who journey over the globe selling and buying tobacco.

Four officers are abroad now, one is just back from the Far East, another is preparing to go to the Middle East. Christian, who has begun limiting his travel activity, plans to make one of his frequent trips to Africa in a few weeks.

CIA OFFICIAL

Christian, a vice president of Universal Leaf, says, in fact, that Universal Leaf's officers travel abroad so frequently that often a Central Intelligence Agency official drops by their Richmond office when they have returned to hear their observations on what is going on.

One of Christian's observations about Africa is that the place is crawling with Red Chinese, stirring up guerrilla warfare.

Not that Universal Leaf mixes in international politics—"the last thing you do is talk politics; you must be awfully careful," said the dark-haired, informal executive.

UP THE ROAD

Anyway, Christian is too involved these days with tobacco industry "politics" one hundred miles up the road in Washington.

He is president of the Leaf Tobacco Exporters Association, a trade group that seeks to promote exports of U. S. tobacco, and is chairman of the executive committee and immediate past president of the Tobacco Association of the United States.

The former group consists of about 50 tobacco buying and processing companies, such as Universal Leaf, that export. The latter association consists of the major domestic manufacturers, plus processors, bro-

It concerns itself primarily with domestic matters, such as regulating the auction markets and taxes, according to Christian.

INDUSTRY SPOKESMAN

Of medium height and build, the personable executive wears sport clothes that appear to reflect his casual, easy manner. During a conversation in his spacious office at Universal Leaf's headquarters, he displayed a friendly personality that would appear to serve him well in his role as an industry spokesman.

Christian had kind words for the current Administration. The administration, he says, has done a fine job in negotiating for farm exports—"a much better job than the previous administration."

As president of the Leaf Exporters Association, Christian is deeply involved in a problem of grave concern to the U.S. tobacco industry. Exports dropped last year from 570 to 510 million tons. Because of the high cost of producing tobacco, the U.S. is fast becoming non-competitive in the world market, Christian said.

"The only thing that keeps us alive is that nobody yet has completely duplicated the taste and aroma of U.S. tobacco," he said. Rhodesia came closest, but economic sanctions have kept that African country out of the world markets, he said.

In self-defense Universal Leaf has been acquiring affiliates throughout the world and now operates in 17 foreign countries, he said.

High labor costs are making U.S. tobacco non-competitive, Christian feels. He thinks the only way to solve this is to have larger, more mechanized farms. The domestic industry now is characterized by small farms, he noted.

The exporters association is trying to change the law so farmers with tobacco allotments can sell their allotments and transfer the ownership across county and state lines, he said.

FAVORABLE BALANCE

Christian, who obviously has used the statistics frequently, pointed out that exports of U. S.

million in 1970 and they resulted in a net favorable trade balance of \$334 million. One of three acres of tobacco grown in the U. S. is exported, he said.

Like most tobacco men, Christian is critical of the economic sanctions on Rhodesia.

European countries, such as West Germany, that once purchased tobacco from Rhodesia are now buying it from Red China, he said.

"The sanctions created a nice little hard currency market for the Chinese," he said.

LAWYER'S SON

The son of a well-known Richmond lawyer, Christian attended McGuire's University School, A. P. Hill School, Episcopal High School and the University of Virginia.

He says he dropped out of college before graduating.

"The only diploma I have is from the Basic Advanced Management School at the University of Virginia," he said. "They assured me they wouldn't send any grades back to the company and guaranteed me a certificate."

WORLD WAR II

He started to work for Universal Leaf during the summer while going to college. He was working there when World War II broke out.

As an infantryman, he landed at Normandy on D-Day plus two, saw "too much" action during the Allied advance and was wounded after 45 days.

Christian returned home with a Purple Heart and went back to work with Universal Leaf in September, 1945.

"I tell people I'm a retired Army man," he said with a grin.

COMPETING FIRM

After 13 years with Universal Leaf, Christian left to join Dibrrell Brothers, Inc. a Danville firm that is Universal's largest competitor. He stayed with that firm for 14 years, then two years ago returned to Universal Leaf as vice president.

At one point, Christian said seven or eight months a year abroad.

ing up," he said.

Christian said he has studied French and Spanish but has not had the opportunity to use the languages in his work. There are some language difficulties in Eastern Europe, he said, but "the rest of the people speak English and prefer to speak it."

MORE TRADE

Though he describes himself as "one of the most ultraconservative people you have ever seen", Christian is in favor of more trade between free world countries and Iron Curtain countries. Trade, he said, promotes a better understanding of people.

He visited Leipzig in East Germany on a sales mission a couple of years ago and found it "one of the most depressing places in the world", he noted.

"Anybody who has any designs on being a Communist ought to go to a Communist country," he observed.

Christian makes his home at 17 Greenway Lane. He is married and has three daughters, aged 13, 17 and 11 and a 15-year-old son.

He "plays at" golf and tennis and belongs to the Country Club of Virginia and the Commonwealth Club.

Much of his time is devoted to trade association work.

"Some people have to get involved," Christian explained. "It is an important part of business," he continued. "Sometimes your time is completely wasted; other times it is damn beneficial."

Don't Blame CIA

STATINTL

The Central Intelligence Agency should receive none of the blame for creating crises in foreign lands, W. Averell Harriman, one of America's senior diplomats, yesterday told about 200 at a Woman's National Democratic Club luncheon.

In answer to an anonymous inquiry from the audience asking "how the CIA could be curbed from stirring up trouble abroad," Harriman replied testily:

"That's the silliest question I ever heard. Whenever the CIA has received such blame, one should look to whatever

man occupied the presidency at that time and find the proper person for that responsibility It makes me tired to think that one magazine, Ramparts, could destroy the important activities and abilities of the CIA."

Harriman, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, former governor of New York and secretary of commerce, and now the chief American delegate to the Paris peace talks, actually was on hand in the interests of his new book, "America and Russia in a Changing World."

"I never am going to write

my complete memoirs," he said reflectively, "because I would wind up trying to prove that I always was right."

He said his present aims are "to see this unhappy war in Vietnam ended, and to insure that President Nixon is a one-term President; I think we have a very good chance of seeing that happen."

Of women's emerging role, Harriman commented that "perhaps, in the future, there will be a woman chairman of the Democratic National Committee If that happens, we men would know how to behave."

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SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

FEB 17 1971

Royce Drier

CIA Mounts a Light Brigade

GENERALS GRANT and Lee both despised spies, and employed them sparingly, when at all. Both deplored warfare, but since their consciences required it, they tried to keep it straight, devoid of frills and delusions.

The present brass in the Pentagon manifestly dotes on frills and delusions. But it doesn't make for successful generals.

The failure in Vietnam has to be laid at the door of the generals, since the three Presidents who commanded them make no pretense of military lore.

First the generals were deluded that with modern machine warfare they could zap the guerrilla warfare on its own jungle terrain. This raveled out in three delusory years, and the generals were whipped out of their boots at Tet. Then they convinced themselves and a President that massive firepower, about equal to that used against the Germans, would hack it. It didn't.

Meanwhile, the generals had for years been flirting with spies darting about like moths in the Indochina twilight.

* * *

THEY HAD READY to hand a spy outfit, the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was founded in Switzerland in the big war, and it worked out fairly well, as our spies dealt with peoples like our own. So the CIA became a vested empire which survived and grew great in the Cold War.

But when its operations shifted from Europe to Asia, it pulled a series of goofs you wouldn't believe. The source of the goofs is plain: CIA was dealing with Asiatics, who don't think as we do, and who had ample reason to distrust the Man from the West, who had been swindling them, and their fathers and grandfathers for centuries.

* * *

WITHOUT KNOWING the supersecret table of organization of CIA, you can see how it functions in Asia.

The regional managers of the young espionage wizards build a native Asiatic group to move on the "enemy," Communist or tribal, to counter enemy plans and action. They enlist the help of the local military when they can. But CIA is only a body of Washington detectives, untrained in strategy and tactics, but this doesn't stay their meddling. The result is nil, or furiously harmful fomentation, as any sensible army colonel with a gritty war to fight with GIs, will concede.

A UPI dispatch from Saigon yesterday: "Military sources today reported the arrival of 3000 Loe-tian hill tribesmen, led by American Central Intelligence agents, to harass North Vietnam troops in the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex."

Now, there is a soul-stirring harassment body if you ever heard of one. Half of them will go over to (or back to) the "enemy" at the drop of a cigarette package. How would a CIA battalion leader know what to do to close down a supply trail? These are the guys fighting our war, extricating us from our mess? Let's not be silly.

But it's impressive in the vast CIA hive in Washington, and it must be impressive in the Pentagon. Is it impressive to you, or to your boys mucking around out there? Not if you give it a moment of thought.

February 17, 1971

NEWPORT, R.I.
NEWS FEB 12 1971

E - 14,530

Former Director Of CIA Gives Talk At Newport Discussion Club

The Central Intelligence Agency has "an impossible job" Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, professor of political science at Brown University told the Newport Discussion Club last night at the Hotel Viking. The former executive director of comptroller of the CIA said the task of the intelligence agency

was to direct "the total United States intelligence effort" and to coordinate the activities of 9 other intelligence agencies; as directed under the National Security Act of 1947.

Its duty is not only to gather information, the former newspaperman said, but it is to predict "what the Soviet Union or China is going to be doing five years from now" and so inform the President, the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. It is this prophetic aspect of its duties that make it an "impossible job", he emphasized. He made it evident, however, that he thought it one of the "finest agencies in our federal government."

Kirkpatrick acknowledged that the CIA is not a popular organization. Americans "abhor secrecy", he replied. They have the feeling there is something "slightly dirty" about espionage. They also fear its unchecked power. They wonder if responsible control over its activities is adequate.

The former CIA executive assured his audience there are many powerful checks on the activities of the intelligence organization. Some of them were inaugurated by President Eisenhower 20 years ago. President Kennedy established the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of prominent military men who are free to probe its activities. The Bureau of the Budget may investigate its "managerial control" as well as its finances. And finally there is Congress. Three sub-committees in Congress are constantly informed about important moves of the CIA.

The public sometimes worries about whether there is adequate control over individual agents at work abroad. Kirkpatrick

U, assumed command of CIA in October, 1959, he "straightened things out in a hurry." Smith was a strict disciplinarian who demanded absolute control of operations. The speaker approved of this attitude, saying that espionage is "too dangerous not to be disciplined." "There is no action taken by an agent abroad which is not cleared at home," he declared.

Another apprehension of the public is that we are being watched at home, that dossiers are being run up on people. This is another unfounded fear, according to Kirkpatrick. CIA activities are focused exclusively outside the U.S, he said.

He acknowledged "an aggressive recruiting program" on college campuses. A constant flow of bright new young people into the CIA is an absolute necessity.

In comparing Russia's espionage efforts with this country's, he said their personnel outnumbered ours 10 to 1 or perhaps even 100 to 1. Russia has the greatest espionage effort ever supported by any country, he declared. Even its cultural exports such as the Bolshoi Ballet engage in espionage. In answer to a question about Russian trawlers, the speaker said about 18 might be operating off our coasts. Two or three, perhaps, are listening to naval reports right now off Newport.

Stalin had the most complete intelligence information before World War II began that any leader ever had, but he refused to use it. Kirkpatrick said a man was ordered shot by the Soviet leader because he reported troops were moving across the border into Russia when the Germans began their offense in World War II, although Stalin

FEBRUARY 10, 1971

STATINTL

JOHN
CROWN

Thank God for CIA

LAMENTABLY, it has become the accepted procedure and the "in" thing to attack the activities — real and imagined — of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Politicians who tire of that other popular sport — denigrating the Federal Bureau of Investigation — can always fall back on attributing all sorts of dark doings to the CIA.

One of our local worthies, in fact, has attributed his brilliant victory in a legal case to the fact that he implicated the CIA and, according to him, the case was dropped to avoid CIA embarrassment. That should be a landmark case for all aspiring lawyers. Get the CIA implicated and success is assured.

WITH THIS approach to the Central Intelligence Agency, the average citizen might well be forgiven if he gets the idea that the deadliest enemy facing the United States is something called the CIA. It is an organization that is often vilified and rarely praised.

Yet it we did not have it — or something identical — our security and our world position would be in a sorry state, if indeed, we existed at all.

The Central Intelligence Agency came into being in 1947 during the Democratic administration of President Harry Truman. It came into being in recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union were the dominant powers in a world that was a jungle and would become progressively more so. No longer was the United States one of an assortment of seven or more "first rate" powers. As the leader of the Western world our global

responsibilities were awesome, as they still remain.

Therefore we could no longer blithely move about in such a world with such responsibilities in the naive hope that all would turn out well. No

No longer can we go on the courtly premise that one gentleman doesn't read another gentleman's mail.

longer could we go on the courtly premise that one gentleman doesn't read another gentleman's mail.

BEING AN open and free society, our operating a covert intelligence organization is not a welcome one to many of us. But it is a choice between being dainty and being realistic. Fortunately the choice was for realism and the Central Intelligence Agency was organized as an arm of government.

As noted earlier, there are those who find great rewards in attacking the CIA. They vary. There are those dreamy-eyed idealists who believe if we were to destroy all our weapons, the magnificent gesture of such an act would lead the remainder of the world to follow suit. At the other extreme there are those who find it to the interests they serve to keep both the CIA and the FBI under constant attack.

And in between those two extremes we have different individuals and different groups who are opposed in varying measures of intensity and for varying reasons to the existence of the CIA.

RECENTLY Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey saw fit to raise his arms in holy horror (or feignedly so) because the CIA was funding Radio Free Europe.

I fail to see the cause for alarm.

Consider the purpose of Radio Free Europe. Consider what it accomplishes. I can see a connection between it and the CIA — and justifiably so. And I can see where Radio Free Europe serves a larger purpose. Sen. Case must have been hard pushed to get a headline, and experience shows that any senator can get a headline by blasting the CIA.

Consider the plight of poor Teddy Kennedy. After exuding confidence and optimism that he would be re-elected Senate majority whip, the senior senator from Massachusetts went down in abject defeat. So how do you get a headline and divert attention from such ignominy?

You attack the CIA, that's how, and that is what Teddy did recently. With righteous anger (or feignedly so) he accused the CIA of diverting relief money for refugees in Laos to forces fighting the Communist invaders. Bravo!

BECAUSE the CIA of necessity engages in covert operations, it is relatively simple for politicians and lawyers to accuse the CIA of virtually anything they wish. For the CIA to either confirm or deny such accusations could place the organization in a dangerous position. Its operations are of such a delicate nature that it cannot afford to take public stands.

And for my part, I'm overjoyed we have the CIA. Thank God for it.

KALAMAZOO, MICH.

GAZETTE

JAN 29 1971

E - 58,086

S - 60,100

Ask The Opposition

The mark of a good researcher is imaginative use of unusual sources of information.

Ron Kley, a research associate at the Maine State Museum, turned to one of the most unusual recently when he needed a satellite photo of the northeastern United States for a museum exhibit.

He wrote to the space agency, the Air Force and the National Weather Service, but came up empty-handed. Only the Weather Service had ever been very interested in satellite photographs of Maine -- and their concern was restricted to cloudy days.

But Mr. Kley is a stubborn man, and it occurred to him to turn to the only people who were surely interested in nice, clear satellite pictures of the United States.

Kley wrote Moscow asking for help, and he was pleasantly surprised. The Russians replied that they had the best known satellite picture of the northeastern United States in existence, and they would be glad to send him a copy for \$100.

Kley got the money together and bought the photo -- a composite of several presumably taken by the Soviet Union's earth-circling spy satellites.

His success recalls that of a

Washington Post reporter who, several years ago, was trying to find out the number of persons working for the American Central Intelligence Agency. He inquired at the CIA, but was told the figure was classified information.

Like the Maine museum researcher, it occurred to him that such information would certainly be of concern to the people in Moscow.

So the reporter walked the couple of blocks to the Russian embassy in Washington, and politely asked if someone could tell him how many people worked for the CIA.

The Russians laughed, but promised to call Moscow.

A few hours later they called the Post and gave the reporter the information. When his story appeared, it attributed the figures on the size of the American intelligence agency to informed sources in the Soviet embassy, and noted that the CIA refused to confirm or deny their accuracy.

We can imagine the Soviet intelligence experts chuckling with glee over their vodka about both these incidents. Somehow it's nice to know that the inscrutable Ivans always spying on us have a sense of humor.

JAN 26 1971

MY LAI CHARGES DROPPED

Lawyer Says CIA Fearful

By KEN BOSWELL

The Central Intelligence Agency's fear of publicity has been credited with the dropping of charges against members of the U.S. Army by one of the men's attorneys.

But federal sources — with the exception of the CIA itself — have denied any involvement in the case.

Atlanta attorney Charles L. Weltner said Monday that dismissal of murder charges against his client, Sgt. Escueto Torres, and three other enlisted men came after the attorney obtained subpoenas for three CIA agents to appear in Torres' court-martial.

Charges against Torres, Pvt. Max D. Hutson, Pvt. Gerald A. Smith and Pvt. Robert W. T'Souvas — all in connection with the alleged My Lai massacre — were dismissed Friday by Lt. Gen. Albert O. Connor, commander of the Third Army at Ft. McPherson.



CHARLES WELTNER
Lashes Out at CIA

"I would find it difficult to assume that he (Gen. Connor) decided (to dismiss the charges) without the help of someone in the stratosphere up in Washington," Weltner said Monday.

SEVERAL calls to the nation's capital produced no confirmation of Weltner's charges.

"We never make public statements," said Joseph Goodwin from his Washington CIA office. "We never comment to published reports."

"As the silent service of government, we can't very well talk publicly," Goodwin explained as he referred a reporter to the Department of Justice.

But the Department of Justice denied any inside knowledge of the My Lai incident.

"That's an Army case," a department spokesman told a reporter. "... I think you oughta check with DOD (Department of Defense)."

"This is the first I had heard of that," said Lt. Col.

Harry Heath, a Department of the Army spokesman.

"THE BASIS for dismissal as stated by Gen. Connor did not include any reference of any kind to prospective witnesses such as the CIA," Heath said.

Heath, asked if someone higher in authority than Gen. Connor may have been involved in the decision to dismiss the charges, replied:

"I can categorically deny this. Gen. Connor was charged with the disposition of these cases, and as the convening authority and as commanding general of the Third U.S. Army, the decisions he reached were independent decisions made on the best information and advice available to him at his headquarters."

Heath suggested that a reporter contact officials at Ft. McPherson for further confirmation that Connor acted alone in dismissing the charges.

"That (CIA subpoenas) had nothing to do with it," said a spokesman at Ft. McPherson, who also denied the possibility that higher-ranking officers may have been involved.

"THE DECISION (to drop charges) was made before the Department of the Army ever found out about it," he said.

The My Lai case dismissals were not the first time attorneys have claimed a victory through the CIA's determination to stay out of public view.

In 1969, eight members of the Army's Special forces—including Capt. Budge Williams of Athens, Ga. — were charged in connection with the death of a Vietnamese national.

Attorneys got nowhere when they contended that the dead man was a dangerous double

agent whose death order came from the CIA.

But, when one adamant attorney won permission to bring CIA records into the case, the charges against all of the Green Berets were quickly dropped.

WELTNER said he received authorization to subpoena a three CIA men shortly before the charges against Torres were dismissed.

The three agents were James B. May, senior province adviser in Quang Ngai; Robert Ramsdell, a contractual employee and operating head of the committee controlling Operation Phoenix in the My Lai area; and Capt. Clarence J. Dawkins, who was the liaison officer between Operation Phoenix and the Americal Division.

Weltner said he told Army officials that he hoped to show that the CIA had created a "systematic program" for the elimination of "an indeterminate number... in the thousands — of Vietnamese civilians" who were suspected of working with the Viet Cong.

The territory around My Lai was "a place that contained a vast number of Viet Cong infiltrators," many of whom were named on a CIA "black list," Weltner contended.

DETROIT, MICH.

NEWS

JAN 25 1977

E - 592,616

S - 827,086


STATINTL

A military view

Intelligence change may peril security

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER,
USAF (Ret.)

A recent Pentagon release advised that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would report directly to the defense secretary and not to or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as in the past. Apparently, the JCS now will have no intelligence advisers reporting directly to them.



Lt. Gen. Eaker

This organizational change could represent a hazard to national security. Deprived of prompt and thorough intelligence, immediately available, the joint chiefs scarcely can discharge their function, assigned by the national defense act, of serving as the principal military advisers to the defense secretary and the President.

Prior to World War II, foreign intelligence came to the defense decision makers from two uncoordinated sources. Our ambassadors abroad reported to the secretary of state. Our military attaches rendered reports from their military contacts and observations to the secretaries of War and Navy.

OUR EXPERIENCE in World War II indicated the need for a third, more active, intelligence organization and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created. This agency rendered such valuable service that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) later was established to perform many of the functions of the wartime OSS.

The President and his Cabinet, the civilian side, then had this source of intelligence reporting directly to them.

The JCS and the military side had the DIA, formed after the war by combining the intelligence functions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

These two intelligence channels, one on the civilian side and the other on the military side, have provided needed checks and balances. There are many cases where disaster was averted by this dual-

The most embarrassing intelligence

failures, such as Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis and the Pueblo incident, can be traced to the failure of the defense decision makers fully to use the evidence provided by one or another of these two intelligence channels.

UNDER THE NEW system it will be possible that an imperious defense secretary might say: "This is my decision; now give me an intelligence estimate to support it." This occurred prior to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's tenure.

There must be real concern when the JCS has to get intelligence secondhand. It also makes less certain that the commander in chief always will get sound intelligence estimates.

McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's principal national security adviser, it will be remembered, is reported to have said that there obviously were no Red missiles in Cuba, since it would be irrational for the Kremlin to put them there. But from the military intelligence side came the unmistakable evidence to the contrary, the U-2 photographs.

The civilian intelligence agencies and those under military jurisdiction historically have operated somewhat differently. The civilian side estimates what will happen, with reasons, while the military always has emphasized enemy capabilities, what he could do, with less emphasis on what he might do.

A CRITICAL and current example will illustrate this difference.

The civilian intelligence estimate might advise the President: "There is no evidence that the Reds now are servicing their nuclear submarines in Cuba." The military estimate, based on the same evidence, might say instead: "The Red base in Cuba is completed and ready to service Russian subs at any time."

The defense decision makers could be reassured by the former estimate but alerted by the latter.

The dual intelligence channels are like the human being with two ears and two eyes. This is no time for the United States to commit national mayhem, thus sight in one eye.

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year; it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The department spends more than 80

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted the submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the arm of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a clear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed ships "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist dealing with reporters, but in views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines, airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's task is to put and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, about 10 per cent—\$500-million to

STATINTL

Fred Cicetti

Here and There



On page 1749 of the Manhattan telephone directory, there is this listing:

"CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NY FIELD OFC 755-0027"

There is no address given for the New York branch of the Washington espionage company. I discovered this strange, but not surprising, listing almost three years ago. I had a powerful urge to call the number, but I was afraid. Sounds ridiculous, I know, but, nevertheless, I was afraid to call.

But my curiosity would give me no rest. Every time I used the phone book, I was reminded that the CIA was listed on page 1749. Last week, I did it. I picked up my phone and dialed the number. A woman answered.

"755-0027," she said, without identifying the telephone as the CIA's.

"Hello, is this the Central Intelligence Agency?" I asked, thinking the woman might be an operator for an answering service.

"Who is this calling, please?" she interrogated.

"My name is Fred Cicetti. I am a reporter for The Evening News in Newark and I'm interested in writing a piece about the CIA office in New York. Can you help me?"

She responded skeptically and told me to hold on. About a half-minute later, a man came on the line. He didn't identify himself; I didn't ask for his name. I repeated my pitch to him. He performed a near-perfect, bureaucratic back-pass. He was beautiful.

"I'm sorry, I can't help you," he said, cheerfully. "That is a policy matter beyond my purview. You'll have to write to Washington about that."

He gave me this address: "Assistant to the Director for Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C." I asked him if he was permitted to give out the name of the assistant to the director, but he sidestepped me. He was good.

"I don't know who will handle your letter," he said. "I prefer not to use a name."

Security Check Likely?

I asked him—with a nervous laugh—if a security check would be done on me.

"I won't have to look over my shoulder for someone tailing me, will I?" is what I said.

"Oh, no, no," he assured me. "We have some people who, by necessity, are exposed in Washington and they'll handle it."

A few days later, I mailed my letter to the nameless assistant director.

"Dear Sir:

I write a human-interest column for The Evening News of Newark, N.J. I am interested in writing a piece about the CIA operation in the New York metropolitan area.

This is not a put-on. I fully realize that the nature of my work is inimical to your work. But I suspect that there is some information about the CIA's activities out of the New York office that can be published without harm to national security. There may, in fact, be some information that, if printed, would be helpful to you. I do not know what facts are available to me, and this is why I am writing to you. Please advise me on this matter."

After I mailed the letter, I convinced myself that my missive would be filed, microfilmed, and cross-indexed. If the CIA hears my name again, I thought, they will retrieve this letter and know for sure that I am dangerous and must be watched.

Yesterday, there was a large brown envelope in my mailbox. Enclosed were two reprints of articles done about the CIA. Both were extremely revealing and, no doubt, this quality earned them the CIA imprimatur. There also was a brochure entitled, "Intelligence Professions," that is probably used by the CIA's college recruiters. And there was a blue pamphlet, which contained the CIA's statutory authorization and some generous compliments from our President.

Letter From Director's Aide

With the enclosures was a letter from Joseph C. Goodwin, the previously anonymous assistant to the director.

"Dear Mr. Cicetti:

I am enclosing some material which, hopefully, will give you a clearer picture of the background, history, functions and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency. As to your specific request for information, I can only refer you to the paragraph on "Policy on Public Disclosures" on page 5 of the blue pamphlet."

This is the paragraph:

"Because of the nature of its duties, required by law and by considerations of national security, the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm or deny published reports, whether true or false, favorable or unfavorable to the agency or its personnel. CIA does not publicly discuss its organization, its budget, or its personnel. Nor does it discuss its methods of operation or its sources of information."


this newspaper will not self-destruct.

HAGERSTOWN, MD.

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JAN 15 1972



Sen. George McGovern
... presidential timber?

Presidential Ambitions No Secret

McGovern Maps 1972

Campaign

By DENNIS BARBAGELLO

SHIPPENSBURG, Pa. — Senator George McGovern (D-S. Dak.) all but formally announced his candidacy for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination as he addressed approximately 2,000 students and faculty members at Shippensburg State College Thursday night.

McGovern earlier told a news conference that he plans to enter all major presidential primaries next year "because that's where the Democratic presidential nomination will be decided." He said he will enter the race early because he wants a better chance at the nomination than he had in 1968.

McGovern said he had little concern for polls which show Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine the leader for the Democratic standard. He said: "Polls two years before the election are irrelevant. The current polls only indicate that one man has been running."

The senator told guests at a dinner given in his honor that he "expects to make an important announcement early next week."

In his speech on "A Second Declaration of Independence," McGovern urged all Americans to reaffirm their belief and faith in the ideals expressed in the original document. He said: "The surest hope for America lies neither with a new set of national ideals, nor an entirely new system."

The senator said he felt the real hope lies in America's historic ideals and a more intelligent effort to modify and influence the system.

He said he examined "all the blue prints for change." He noted these included the conservative ideas of the Young Americans for Freedom and the ultra-liberal philosophy of the Students for

a Democratic Society. Neither, he said, offered the answer. He said, "We must make a genuine effort to make the founding ideals part of our national policy."

McGovern said those seeking change should realize that the most radical ideas for change are expressed in the writings of Paine, Jefferson, Madison and Lincoln.

He said, however, that our society must never refuse to examine new ideas and challenge old ones and added, "The phrase 'America, love it or leave it,' should become 'Democracy live it or lose it.'"

The Senator said the Constitution, as he reads it, places the war-making powers in the hands of Congress. But, he said, in recent years that power has drifted into the hands of the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and "impetuous chief executives who send American troops across international frontiers."

He concluded his address by saying, "It is time for Americans to come home from

killing Asians and heal our social wounds."

In responding to questions from the floor, McGovern said that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover might "have a better place in history if he retired now." He also said it was time for the CIA to be brought under tight control of the executive branch.

Asked to comment on the legalization of marijuana he said: "One of the greatest steps this Congress has made is the legislation designed to scale down the stiff prison terms of marijuana use." He continued: "Adults with three martinis under their belts shouldn't have the right to throw a teenager in jail for five years."

When asked if he felt the

the Middle East, the senator said he supported the efforts of the President to bring about a negotiated settlement.

McGovern said, however, he felt the Soviet Union was taking advantage "in that more strategic part of the world because of our current heavy commitment in Vietnam."

But he criticized the President for not bringing more pressure on Bethlehem Steel Corp. for its recent price hike. McGovern said the President was wrong in not promising wage and price guidelines and cited the action of the late President John F. Kennedy, who forced steel makers to roll back price hikes and hold prices in line for three years.

COLUMBIANA, OHIO
NEWS

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JAN 5 1971

Solves Nothing

It's okay if Defense Secretary Melvin Laird wants to take sort of personal command of his department's various and often far-flung intelligence operations, although he already has quite real command over them if he chooses to exercise it. But if he wants to stop the military from spying on U.S. civilians, he needn't redraw the organization chart.

For that, Mr. Laird only has to issue a clearly stated, unhedged and convincing order that the armed forces are no longer permitted to conduct intelligence operations in the United States, except as may be directly necessary in specific counter-intelligence situations.

He needs only to make it absolutely clear that any officer of any rank who permits such unconscionable activities will be hastily booted out of the military.

That would give fretful citizens, and the concerned representatives some are lucky to have in Congress, a clear shot at any military group that is discovered snooping and compiling dossiers on citizens because of their political or ideological beliefs and activities.

The whole intelligence community maintained by the U.S. government is overdue for a substantial reorganization.

Some of the intelligence activities of the services branches have ducked the supervision that the Defense Intelligence Agency was supposed to assert over them. And the DIA and the better known CIA sometimes engage in needlessly overlapping efforts. The FBI conducts foreign intelligence, although it is supposed to stay home—while the CIA reportedly sometimes poaches in the domestic precincts that are supposed to be the FBI's alone.

By stacking the pyramid a bit higher—bringing his DIA up to the secretary's office rather than topping it off a step lower the Joint Chiefs of Staff — Mr. Laird has solved none of those problems. The move is essentially a public relations gesture, though a welcome one. The problems remain. They have merely been rearranged.

STATINTL



Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Army's Non-Soldier Soldiers



WHEN ALLEN DULLES and other veterans of the wartime OSS persuaded President Truman to establish the Central Intelligence Agency, the American people were convinced that they were making a great saving in money and manpower as well as a businesslike stride toward efficiency. How badly they were deceived has now been revealed once again.

But the hue and cry which followed Sen. Sam Ervin's revelation that Army intelligence was spying on candidates for office and elected officials is the wrong hue and cry. Of course it is so palpably asinine that it is hard to imagine it as heralding a police state. The real danger which Sen. Ervin's revelation points to is something the courtly and venerable North Carolinian did not even mention.

The real danger is that the U.S. Army is so encumbered by unnecessary jobs that it has become the world's most monstrous example of a large investment for a small return.

Never in the history of nations has there been an army which provided so few fighting soldiers for such vast numbers of uniformed men. Never before has there been an army which recruited its soldiers with virtual promises that they will be given noncombat jobs.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE is only one example of how the Pentagon bureaucracy has thwarted the nation's defense. An intelligence job is a nonfighting job. If you have recruited soldiers on the basis of a promise that they will not have to fight, intelligence is one place to put them. Inevitably, the time will come when intelligence is so vastly overmanned that somebody will suggest spying on political candidates in order to give noncombatant soldiers something to do.

But intelligence is an instructive example because the promise of a central intelligence authority to watch over the nation's defense is of such recent memory. President Truman thought he had done the

job, and so did Allen Dulles. The three services were to conduct battle intelligence. The DIA was to conduct strategic intelligence and to act as the clearinghouse for information gathered by the military.

But within 10 years former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had created the Defense Intelligence Agency and was trying to beat the CIA with reports to President Kennedy. The new agency grew until it was larger than CIA and produced even more paper. But it did not halt the growth of its subsidiaries. Service intelligence agencies grew, too.

FOR ALL THIS investment—about \$3 billion per year—the nation has received, over the period of the war in Vietnam, an intelligence performance so dismal as to make historical comparison impossible. Information about enemy capability, enemy whereabouts and enemy troop strength has been consistently wrong.

Because it has been consistently wrong, three successive Presidents have

been made to look foolish, and the American people have been misled by so many victory-around-the-corner statements as to make farce approach tragedy.

The farce is defined in Melvin Laird's marvelously funny order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff last week. Defense Intelligence, said the Secretary of Defense, should cease spying upon American civilians, and the unit which had been doing so should be abolished. Then, with the wisdom granted only to those who have seen the defense bureaucracy at firsthand, Laird forbade the Joint Chiefs to set up another such unit in its place.

Tragedy is still waiting to be defined. But surely the possibility of tragedy exists in a defense establishment which requires that for every uniformed man who serves in a division nearly five uniformed men must back him up and that—as the revelations about the Defense Intelligence unit proved—many of these men have literally nothing to do.

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NO INTELLIGENCE

A Worried Look At The C.I.A.

Frank A. Capell is a professional intelligence specialist of almost thirty years' standing. He is Editor and Publisher of the fortnightly newsletter, *The Herald Of Freedom*, has contributed to such important national magazines as *The Review Of The News*, and is author of *Robert F. Kennedy - A Political Biography*, *The Untouchables*, and other books of interest to Conservatives. Mr. Capell appears frequently on radio and television, lectures widely, and never fears controversy. He lives in New Jersey, is an active Catholic layman, and father of seven sons.

THE Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 after its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), was exposed as thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. Let us examine some of that O.S.S. personnel.

In 1948, former Communist spy Elizabeth Bentley appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. On Page 529 of the formal report of those Hearings is the record of Miss Bentley's testimony about intelligence she received from Comrades inside O.S.S. while she was operating as a Soviet courier:

All types of information were given, highly secret information on what the OSS was doing, such as, for example, that they were trying to make secret negotiations with governments in the Balkan bloc in case the war ended, that they were parachuting people into Hungary, that they were sending OSS people into Turkey to operate in the Balkans, and so on. The fact that General Donovan [head of O.S.S.] was interested in having an exchange between the NKVD [the Soviet secret police] and the OSS.

That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D. were working very close indeed.

When asked what kind of information Communist O.S.S. operative Maurice Halperin gave her to be forwarded to the Soviet Union, Miss Bentley testified:

"Well, in addition to all the information which OSS was getting on Latin America, he had access to the cables which the OSS was getting in from its agents abroad, worldwide information of various sorts, and also the OSS had an agreement with the State Department whereby he also could see State Department cables on vital issues." Halperin was Chief of the O.S.S. Latin American Division at the time when, as Miss Bentley has sworn, he was one of her contacts in a Soviet espionage ring.

Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of the Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzani has been several times identified under oath as a member of the Communist Party. Using the most highly classified information, he supervised the making of charts on technical reports for higher echelons of the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the O.S.S. Comrade Marzani made policy decisions and was liaison officer between the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the Office of the Undersecretary of War.

When questioned before a Congressional Committee, Irving Fajans of O.S.S. took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit to his Communist Party membership and long history of activities on behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Fajans was a key O.S.S. operative despite the fact that he was known to have been member of the Communist Party and have served in the Communists' Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the years 1937-1938.

Robert Talbott Miller III was another contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Bentley. An O.S.S. employee assigned to the State Department, he was Assistant Chief in the Division of Research. On a trip to Moscow, Comrade Miller married a member of the staff of the *Moscow News*.

Leonard E. Mins, a writer who had worked for the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and written for *New Masses*, was also on the staff of the top secret O.S.S. Comrade Mins took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit to his Communist Party membership in the Communist Party. He refused to deny that he was a Soviet agent ever

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THE MACHINE
THAT FAILS

by Richard Holbrooke*

The postwar period in international relations has ended.

—President Nixon,

U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's

In the realm of policy some changes have been made, others promised. But the massive foreign affairs machine built up during the postwar era rumbles on, as ornate and unwieldy as ever. If meaning is attached to the President's promise of a new foreign policy for the seventies, then the shape of our massive bureaucracies must be changed, and those changes must be substantial.

"If we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come," Mr. Nixon went on to declare, "we had to begin with a basic restructuring of the process by which policy is made." But the restructuring has not yet met the problem—the accumulation of more than two decades of institutions, procedures and personnel, existing unchanged in a changing situation. Can we create an apparatus which will, in fact, "respond to the requirements of leadership in the 1970's"?

As a member of the bureaucracy myself, I feel its shortcomings with a special keenness. It is hard to decide whether to play the drama as tragedy, comedy, or simply theater of the absurd.

"After several years' absence in private life, an elder statesman is recalled by the President to temporary duty in the State Department. He notices that there are twice as many Assistant Secretaries and "deputies" as he had remembered from his last stint of public service a decade before. "I have three people on my staff," he says,

*The views expressed here are the author's alone, and not a statement of government policy.

"who spend all their time attending meetings so they can come back and 'brief' me about what was said at the meetings. The funny thing is," he adds, "I don't give a damn about what's said at any of those meetings."

Size—sheer, unmanageable size—is the root problem in Washington and overseas today. Most studies and recommendations discuss in detail the need for reorganizations, personnel policy, more managerial

skills, the need for youth and new ideas, and so on. All these are important factors, but they are primarily unrecognized spin-offs of the central and dominant problem—size. There are two distinct but related ways that the apparatus is too big—in numbers of people (or, as we bureaucrats say, "warm bodies") and the multiplicity of chains of command. Of the two, the latter is by far the more serious:

An officer arrives at a consulate in an area where a minor guerrilla war has been going on for years. The United States is officially uninvolved, but the officer discovers that another agency of the U.S. government is giving limited covert assistance to the guerrilla movement. Rather than send a coded message (the code clerks work for CIA), he dispatches a letter via the diplomatic pouch to his Ambassador and the Washington desk officer to ask how this was authorized and why. Neither man, it turns out, knew what was going on. After some interagency wrangling, the policy is changed—to the best of the officer's knowledge.

In order to appreciate how fragile and jerry-built the foreign affairs machine really is, with its five major engines and countless minor ones, it is only necessary to remember how it was built. The present structure was the result of compromises made in time of emergency, as America reacted after World War II to the newly perceived threat of the cold war. Senior officials often disagreed over the need for new agencies even while agreeing that the function needed to be performed. Dean Acheson, for example, opposed the formation of a separate Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1946. But for reasons which Presidents Truman and Eisenhower felt were valid, as each new front in the cold war was perceived in Washington, a new agency or organization was formed to fight it: for "the battle for men's minds," the United States Information Agency (USIA); for technical assistance and economic development, a series of foreign aid agencies leading up to the present Agency for International Development (AID); for covert operations, as well as independent analysis, the CIA; for the building up of armed forces of friends and allies, a massive military assistance and advisory effort in more than 80 countries, under the control of the Pentagon; and, of course, a large U.S. military presence deployed around the globe.

To pull everything together back in Washington, a National Security Council (NSC) was created in 1947. It has gradually acquired a staff of more than 100 officials and acquired its present position of pre-eminence within the foreign affairs establishment. Other new

STATINTL

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Continued

STATINTL

TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE C.I.A.

STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Every few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.

How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pressures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature of our aid to Laos."¹ There was no mention of the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 3, 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly] military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the . . . irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."²

There have been revelations about C.I.A. foreign operations before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in Laos is that they have been forced out of the Administration while the activities are still in progress. The revelations come also at a time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.

These events have led to the introduction in the present Congress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without congressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor of even one House, where both were decisively defeated by better than two-thirds majorities.³ The remarkable thing is that the activity was all confined to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Representatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.

Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.⁴ The Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been considerable pressure for such legislation only by announcing that all existing covert financial assistance to the nation's educational and private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the year.⁵ More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administration to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to provide open gov-